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third of its life insurance policies written, and about thirty percent
of assets held by its trust and investment companies (a type of
institutional investment vehicle). Given ongoing efforts by the
People’s Bank of China to implement holding company regulations
that may apply to some FCCs, this Article also contrasts the
structure and regulation of Chinese FCCs with state-owned and
private companies in the EU, Japan, and the United States. In doing
so, it examines the extent to which state-owned FCCs in the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”) are unparalleled in structure, as well as
how laws in other jurisdictions either prevent companies organized
like the PRC’s FCCs from forming or require more restrictive
oversight of similarly-structured entities. This Article also finds that
unlike financial groups in the EU, Japan, and the United States,
many large Chinese FCCs formed using cross-shareholding and
pyramid structures. It concludes by summarizing challenges that
complex FCC structures in Mainland China may pose to regulators
moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION

Mainland China’s 1 financial system, arguably the world’s
second largest, 2 is uniquely characterized by the prevalence of
massive “mixed conglomerates” that control multiple large financial
and non-financial businesses.3 This Article classifies these business
organizations as a type of financial-commercial conglomerate
(“FCC”)—a multi-layered corporate group, usually led by a nonfinancial 4 entity, that: (1) operates sizable non-financial business
lines; and (2) controls two or more types of financial institutions that

1
For the purposes of this Article, the term “Mainland China” refers to areas
of the PRC where the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission have
direct jurisdiction to regulate and supervise financial institutions.
2
At the end of 2016, the PRC’s banking system became the world’s largest,
surpassing the Eurozone’s in size by assets. Gabriel Wildau, China Overtakes
Eurozone as World’s Biggest Bank System, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/14f929de-ffc5-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30
[https://perma.cc/V8VZ-KA6D]. At year-end of 2017, Mainland China’s banking
assets ($38.8 trillion) doubled those of the United States ($16.2 trillion). See Alfred
Liu & Benjamin Robertson, China’s $35 Trillion Problem: Managing Financial Assets Is
Hard,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
25,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-26/china-warns-offinancial-asset-mismanagement-after-initial-tally [https://perma.cc/X9MJ-MYJM]
(citing regulator data). Mainland China accounts for the third highest share ($9.6
trillion) of 2017 assets belonging to “financial institutions that are not central banks,
banks, insurance corporations, pension funds, public financial institutions, or
financial auxiliaries,” behind the Eurozone ($32.2 trillion) and the U.S. ($27.1
trillion). FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2017, at
2, 15-17 (2018), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050318-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YHX-QE9H] (defining “other financial intermediaries” and
providing data). Mainland China is also the world’s third largest insurance market
($575 billion of life and nonlife premiums in 2018), behind the United States’ and
Europe’s advanced economies. See DANIEL STAIB, MAHESH H. PUTTAIAH, & OLGA
TSCHEKASSIN, WORLD INSURANCE: THE GREAT PIVOT EAST CONTINUES 9 (2019),
https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:b8010432-3697-4a97-ad8b-6cb6c0aece33/sig
ma3_2019_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZGP-38GM]. Japan’s is the fourth largest.
See id.
3
Global banking regulators define “mixed conglomerates” as “groups which
are predominantly industrially or commercially oriented but contain at least one
regulated financial entity.” TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, SEC. & INS. REGULS., THE
SUPERVISION
OF
FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES
8
(1995),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7AE-N9PW].
4
For purposes of this Article, “non-financial” describes activities, businesses,
and entities that are commercial or industrial in nature, and thus do not primarily
relate to business activities involving financial intermediation, such as banking,
insurance, investing, or trading financial products.
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conduct a substantial level of financial intermediation. 5 These
groups can be state-owned (“SFCCs”) or privately-owned
(“PFCCs”), although some PFCCs may have state-owned
noncontrolling shareholders. Mainland China’s FCCs operate major
non-financial businesses in a range of sectors including
construction, e-commerce, energy, healthcare, mining, and
transportation.6 They also control multi-billion-dollar banks, large
funds, and major payment systems.7
The existence of large corporate groups made up of sizable
commercial, financial, and industrial businesses is not necessarily
5
For purposes of this Article, “substantial level of financial intermediation”
generally means that an FCC’s total 2017 financial assets exceeded over $10 billion
U.S. dollars (“USD”) or that the FCC began facilitating over $1 trillion USD annual
payments in volume. This Article’s definition of FCC is based on the People’s Bank
of China’s ( 中 国 人 民 银 行 , “PBOC”) definition of “de-facto financial holding
companies” (“de-facto FHCs”), which it classifies as “non-financial companies
[that] have acquired majority shareholding in two or more types of financial
institutions.” PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, CHINA FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2018, at
168
(2018),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130736/3729741/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM]. To align with the PBOC’s analysis, this Article
considers the following types of financial institutions when identifying FCCs:
banks, funds, securities companies, insurers, futures companies, trust and
investment companies (“TICs”), and internal financial companies. See infra note
272 and accompanying text (listing types of financial institutions owned by “defacto financial holding companies”); infra notes 66-6967 and accompanying text
(explaining internal financial companies); infra note 215 and accompanying text
(explaining modern-day TICs). Consistent with the PBOC’s approach, for the
purposes of identifying FCCs, this Article also treats the following as a “type of
financial institution” if it is controlled by one of three e-commerce/internet
conglomerates classified by the PBOC as a “de-facto FHC” (Suning Commerce
Group, Tencent, and Alibaba): 1) a company with a national third-party payments
license that processes over $1 trillion USD in payments volume; and 2) a company
that, through one or more non-bank lending businesses, conducts a high level of
financial intermediation. See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 168-69. Given
this Article’s focus on non-financial and financial businesses existing within one
corporate group, its FCC definition does not include investment institutions that
control several financial firms, which do meet the PBOC’s definition of “de-facto
FHCs.” See id. at 169 (classifying state-owned asset managers that control various
financial institutions as one type of “de-facto FHCs”). When identifying FCCs, this
Article considers arrangements constituting an FCC’s control over a financial
company besides direct ownership of a majority of shares in the company. See infra
notes 217-230 and accompanying text. For a list of conglomerates that meet this
Article’s definition of an FCC, see Appendix A. All FCCs analyzed in this Article
are led by non-financial entities except for two insurance companies—Anbang
Insurance Group Co., Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China,
Ltd.—that by mid-2017 also controlled large non-financial business lines, and are
thus treated as FCCs. See infra notes 157, 169 and accompanying text. Throughout
this Article, the term “FCC” generally refers to entities based in Mainland China.
6 See infra Appendix A.
7 See infra notes 197-215 and accompanying text.
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problematic.8 Yet as the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) warned
in its 2018 Financial Stability Report, the rapid growth of
inadequately regulated FCCs over the last few years may pose a
threat to the Chinese economy. 9 As this Article explains, the
complex structures of Mainland China’s FCCs can impede private
and public sector risk monitoring by obfuscating financial
relationships within FCCs and between these groups and other
entities. This in turn may reduce the likelihood that Mainland
China’s FCCs have sufficient resources to withstand negative
idiosyncratic events or broader economic shocks. Notably, the
prevalence of FCCs in Mainland China distinguishes it from the
world’s three other largest financial markets—the European Union
(“EU”), Japan, and the United States—where similarly structured
groups are rare or non-existent due to different regulatory
frameworks and policy approaches.10
The PBOC is actively pursuing regulatory responses to the
comparatively significant role that FCCs play across the PRC’s
financial system relative to other jurisdictions including the EU,
Japan, and the United States. 11 One particularly important issue
flagged in the PBOC’s Financial Stability Report and explored in this
Article is the prevalence of intra-group transactions between
8
See FIN. STABILITY BD., BIG TECH IN FINANCE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
POTENTIAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 23 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P091219-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H9U-Q7WT] (finding that by
allowing technology companies to offer financial services, Chinese firms were able
to drastically expand financial inclusion); Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of
the Currency, Remarks at the Clearing House Annual Conference 10 (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-134.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UFX5-X5K3] (observing that “mixing banking and commerce
can generate efficiencies that deliver more value to customers and can improve
bank and commercial company performance with little additional risk”).
9
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164 (observing that “[w]ithout
adequate regulation and supervision,” the rapid growth of non-financial corporate
groups that control financial entities and engage in high levels of intra-group
transactions “may pose threats to [the PRC’s] economic and social stability”).
10 See infra notes 288-406 and accompanying text.
11 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164-68 (observing that nonfinancial conglomerates in Mainland China that control financial companies have
grown in recent years, but are mostly not subjected to group-wide supervision, and
contrasting this regulatory approach with financial holding company regulatory
regimes in other jurisdictions, including the United States, EU, and Japan); id. at
169-71 (stating that the “savage growth” of non-financial conglomerates that
control financial companies through risky means “must be treated as an acute
disease”); see also infra notes 249, 266-282 and accompanying text (describing recent
policy actions proposed and taken by the PBOC and other agencies that would
increase regulation over or augment the structure of certain FCCs).
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Mainland China’s FCC-controlled financial firms and their nonfinancial affiliates. In 2018, PRC regulators seized the assets of a
massive, opaquely-structured FCC that controlled numerous
financial companies and reportedly relied upon false financial
transactions between these entities and affiliates to fuel growth. 12
Shortly thereafter, the PBOC and the PRC’s top banking regulator
both warned that other FCCs were using financial firm affiliates to
fund company expansion through inappropriate intra-group
transactions.13
These warnings came to a head in mid-2019 when Baoshang
Bank, controlled by a massive FCC called Tomorrow Group, was
taken over by the PBOC and the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission (“CBIRC”) in response to “severe credit
risks”—Mainland China’s first bank takeover in twenty years—and
shortly thereafter, the deposit insurance fund incorporated by the
PBOC took over 150 interbank negotiable certificates of deposit
issued by Baoshang Bank. 14 Indeed, much of Baoshang Bank’s
lending volume was reportedly to other Tomorrow Group
companies. 15 Over forty percent of its liabilities were interbank
12 See Guo Tingbing, In Depth: A Maze of Capital Leads to Anbang’s Aggressive
Expansion, CAIXIN (Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-04-30/amaze-of-capital-leads-to-anbangs-aggressive-expansion-101084940.html
[https://perma.cc/RT4T-HPXB].
13
See China Official Says Crackdown on Murky Conglomerates Isn’t Over,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0117/china-official-says-crackdown-on-murky-conglomerates-isn-t-over
[https://perma.cc/7C9X-P36R] (reporting that Shuqing Guo, chairman of the
China Banking Regulatory Commission, stated that some conglomerates structured
through complex ownership structures used affiliate banks as “ATM machines”);
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170 (finding that “some non-financial
enterprises obtain credit funds, manipulate profits, and transfer or hide assets
through loans and guarantees from financial institutions they own . . . [which] are
used as cash machines”).
14 See Cheng Leng, China’s State Insurance Fund to Take over Baoshang NCDs from
July 8—Sources, REUTERS (July 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/chinabanks-baoshang/chinas-state-insurance-fund-to-take-over-baoshang-ncds-fromjuly-8-sources-idUSL4N24516F [https://perma.cc/B6JL-U2L5] (citing regulators);
see also IMF, People’s Republic of China: 2019 Article IV Consultation, 8, Country Report
No.
19/266
(Aug.
2019),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/08/08/Peoples-Republi
c-of-China-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-Staff-48576
[https://perma.cc/3PGQ-4ZNY].
15 See Xia Guobei & Leng Cheng, Troubled Tomorrow Group Selling Control of
Baoshang Bank, CAIXIN (June 7, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-0607/troubled-tomorrow-group-selling-control-of-baoshang-bank-101266629.html
[https://perma.cc/6GNF-5T97] (discussing the close relationship between
Baoshang Bank and Tomorrow Group).
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debts 16 —its distress increased funding costs for banks and nonfinancial institutions heavily reliant on interbank markets by
sparking market-wide fears. 17 The PBOC responded by injecting
over 400 billion yuan (over $60 billion U.S. dollars (“USD”)) into
interbank markets.18
Then in early 2020, long-standing financial difficulties at another
FCC—HNA Group, headquartered in Hainan province—triggered
local government involvement. Regulators had already intervened
to support the heavily-indebted conglomerate’s ability to raise funds
in 2018, 19 but after the coronavirus pandemic’s severe impact on
16 See Wu Hongyuran, Timmy Shen & Teng Jing Xuan, Exclusive: Baoshang
Bank’s Creditors Get Added Backstop on Deposits, Debts Worth Over 50 Million Yuan,
CAIXIN (May 27, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-05-27/exclusivebaoshang-banks-creditors-get-added-backstop-on-deposits-debts-worth-over-50million-yuan-101420491.html [https://perma.cc/62LW-HKNL].
17 See Andrew Galbraith & Cheng Leng, China’s Baoshang Bank Takeover Raises
Contagion Fears, REUTERS (May 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-banks-regulator-ncd/chinas-baoshang-bank-takeover-raises-contagionfears-idUSKCN1SX0QT [https://perma.cc/YM5Q-KJ8A] (reporting that “[t]he
seizing of Baoshang fanned concerns about indebted small banks across the
country, pushing up yields on some negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD) issued
by regional banks by more than 10 basis points”); Gabriel Wildau & Yizhen Jia,
Regional Lenders: China’s Most Dangerous Banks, FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/24e2a368-7b4b-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d
[https://perma.cc/8P8A-E6UJ] (reporting that many of Mainland China’s regional
banks rely heavily on interbank markets for funding). Mainland China’s banksponsored wealth management products, which are mostly issued by small and
medium joint-stock banks but operated off-balance sheet by non-bank affiliates,
channel both bank and non-bank funds into a range of assets, including money
market instruments, bonds, and equity assets. Torsten Ehlers, Steven Kong & Feng
Zhu, Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure and Dynamics, 14-15 (Bank for Int’l
Settlements,
Working
Paper
No.
701,
2018),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work701.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93N-23MH].
18 See Anjani Trivedi & Shuli Ren, China’s Lehman Moment Is Drawing Closer,
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201906-19/china-s-lehman-moment-is-drawing-closer
[https://perma.cc/DN625A8B]. Throughout this Article, the 2017 conversion rate of 6.759 yuan to $1 USD
reported by the OECD is used to convert yuan volumes into approximate USD.
Exchange Rates, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/conversion/exchange-rates.htm
[https://perma.cc/EN97-WXXY]. In instances where the yuan and Japanese yen
are converted, a 16.585 yen to 1 yuan conversion rate is used, according to the
OECD report of 112.166 yen to $1 USD conversion rate for 2017. Id. In instances
where the yuan and Euro are converted, a 7.637 yuan to 1 euro conversion rate is
used, as the OECD reports a 0.885 euro to $1 USD conversion rate for 2017. Id.
19 See China Prepares State Support for HNA Fundraising, BLOOMBERG (June 15,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/china-is-said-toFNprepare-state-support-for-hna-fundraising
[https://perma.cc/TF3Z-SVZG]
(reporting that, in June 2018, a “senior official at the People’s Bank of China led a
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HNA Group in 2020, the Hainan provincial government established
a working group made up of local authorities to help the FCC
restructure its sizable debts to a number of large banks. 20 Most
recently, the FCC Alibaba and its affiliate Ant Financial have been
subject to a range of high-profile regulatory actions, discussed in
depth below.
In order to improve understanding of the complex, multi-sector
conglomerates at the center of these recent events, this Article
analyzes the economic, legal, and policy origins of Mainland China’s
FCCs, as well as what differentiates their structure and regulation
from financial groups and mixed conglomerates in the EU, Japan,
and the United States. Unlike older research that contrasts financial
conglomerate regulation in the EU, Mainland China, and the United
States,21 this Article focuses on conglomerates that both control two
or more types of large financial companies and also conduct
substantial non-financial business activities. This Article also fills
research gaps stemming from the fact that most Chinese FCCs
emerged relatively recently and operate across financial sector
verticals (for example, banking and insurance), so their significance

meeting with three regulators, the Hainan provincial government, HNA CoChairman Chen Feng and the group’s biggest creditor, instructing attendees to
support HNA’s future bond issues”).
20 Haihang Jituan (海航集团) [HNA Group], Hainansheng Haihang Jituan Lianhe
Gongzuozu Jiang Quanmian Xiezhu Quanli Tuijin Benji Tuanfeng Xian Huajie Gongzuo
(海南省海航集团联合工作组将全面协助全力推进本集团风险化解工作) [Hainan
Province’s HNA Group Joint Working Group Will Fully Assist the Group’s Risk
Resolution
Work],
XUEQIU
(
雪
球
)
(Feb.
29,
2020),
https://xueqiu.com/2701143866/142553597
[https://perma.cc/N2UB-8KHY]
(reporting that the working group was established in late February 2020). In midMarch 2020, HNA Group announced that the working group was helping HNA
Group address governance and debt problems facing the conglomerate, and that,
with the support of policymakers, it was in the process of restructuring debts with
a number of large banks. Haihang Jituan (海航集团) [HNA Group], Haihang Jituan
Yu Bufen Zhaiquan Yinhang Daibiao Juxing Zuotanhui (海航集团与部分债权银行代表
举行座谈会) [HNA Group Held a Symposium with Representatives of Some Creditor
Banks],
WEIXIN
(
微
信
)
[WECHAT]
(Mar.
13,
2020),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/el8WWmYEViWMnZh3UHMjmQ
[https://perma.cc/DC28-N97R]. According to one report quoting inside sources,
by mid-March 2020, the working group was, “play[ing] a dual role of rescue and
supervision . . . allowing the government to channel necessary funding and asset
merger services to HNA.” Dave Makichuk, ‘No Bailout’ for Troubled HNA Group,
ASIA TIMES (Mar. 3, 2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/03/no-bailout-fortroubled-hna-group/ [https://perma.cc/8R28-G5T2].
21 See Kuan-Chun Chang, From Zero to Something: The Necessity of Establishing
a Regulatory System of Financial Conglomerates in China, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1,
69-93 (2009).
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is accordingly not emphasized in earlier, sectoral-focused studies on
Mainland China’s financial system structure.22
Part II examines the Leninist origins of the PRC’s first SFCCs,
which emerged in the 1980s, and how legal and regulatory changes
of the 1980s and 1990s facilitated FCC growth during the 2000s. Part
III estimates the role FCCs play in Mainland China’s modern
financial system, while also identifying regulatory reasons for and
organizational drivers of complex FCC structures that may pose
potential financial market risks, as well as recent regulatory steps
taken in response by the PBOC. Part IV contrasts structures of
Mainland China’s FCCs with those of state-owned entities and
corporate groups in the EU, Japan, and the United States, examining
how these jurisdictions’ policy frameworks prevent organizations
similar to Mainland China’s large FCCs from emerging. Part V
concludes, summarizing challenges that FCCs will pose to
regulators moving forward.
II. HOW DECADES OF LEGAL AND POLICY CHANGES SPURRED THE
FORMATION OF CHINA’S FIRST FCCS
Mainland China’s first FCCs formed in the late 1980s. Their
origins can be traced to the PRC’s 1950s to 1970s embrace of a Lenininspired, centrally-planned economic system, through which almost
all financial and commercial activities were coordinated by the state,
as well as 1980s policy shifts guided by an embrace of cross-sector
horizontal integration aimed at achieving a “socialist commodity
economy.”23 Against this backdrop, most large FCCs emerged in the
22 See generally DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT & KAI YAN, THE CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (2013) (analyzing the Mainland China financial
system primarily along categories that reflect financial industry sub-sectors);
Franklin Allen & Jun “QJ” Qian, China’s Financial System and the Law, 47 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 499 (2014) (examining the Mainland China financial system across
banking, stock markets, bond markets, investment industry, asset managers, and
the shadow financial sector); Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian & Xian Gu, An Overview
of China’s Financial System, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 191 (2017) (analyzing the PRC
financial system across: the banking and intermediation sector; financial markets;
the shadow financial sector; and foreign sectors).
23
The founding of the PRC’s political and economic system was highly
influenced by the Soviet Union’s. See Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏), Zhongguo Jingji Gaige
Sanshi Nian Licheng de Zhidu Sikao ( 中 国 经 济 改 革 三 十 年 历 程 的 制 度 思 考 )
[Thoughts on the Reform of China’s 30-Year Economic System], Keji yu Jingji
Huaba (科技与经济画报) [ECON. SCI.], no.5, 2008, at 285. Indeed, the PRC’s embrace
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2000s, thanks to 1990s legal and policy shifts formalizing company
structures and securities markets, as well as efforts throughout the
2000s to channel more private capital into the financial sector. This
Part profiles legal reforms, policy actions, and economic events that
enabled PRC corporate groups to gain control of two or more of nine
types of financial companies24 and thus become FCCs. In particular,
this Part focuses on the origins of Mainland China’s ten largest FCCs
as of 2017,25 and on how these major FCCs gained control of banks,
insurers, and “trust and investment companies,” 26 which have
served as financing vehicles for numerous FCCs’ commercial and
industrial business lines.
a. Born from Lenin’s “State Syndicate”: Origins of FCCs
Shortly after the PRC’s founding, its policymakers embraced
Vladimir Lenin’s vision for a “State Syndicate,” 27 through which
“[a]ll citizens become employees and workers of a single
countrywide state ‘syndicate.’” 28 By 1956, the PRC had adopted
Leninist socialism “with drums beating and gongs clanging,” as
economist Wu Jinglian writes, and all urban nonagricultural
of Lenin’s “State Syndicate” resulted in the mid-1950s establishment of a “centrallyplanned economic system.” See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 9, 12 (2015). Later, the PRC’s central government
implemented a series of policies between 1958 and 1978 that decentralized
administrative power from the central government to subcentral authorities,
forming a decentralized planned economic system. These developments, however,
did not change the nature of the PRC’s planned economy. See id. at 43, 54-55.
24
According to this Article’s definition, FCCs control two or more types of the
following financial firms: banks, certain large non-bank lending companies, certain
large non-bank payments companies, fund companies, futures companies, insurers,
internal financial companies, securities companies, and “trust and investment
companies.” See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
25
Based on data used in this Article’s analysis and its definition of an FCC,
Mainland China’s ten largest FCCs as of 2017 were Alibaba, Anbang Group, CITIC
Group, China Huaneng Group, China Resources, China Merchants Group,
Evergrande Real Estate, Ping An Group, Tomorrow Group, and Funde Group. For
information on the sources and methodology used to identify these FCCs, see infra
note 196 and accompanying text.
26
For an overview of the functions of modern-day trust and investment
companies, see MCKINSEY & CO., infra note 215 and accompanying text.
27 See JINGLIAN WU, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY 83-84
(2005).
28
VLADIMIR LENIN, The State and Revolution, in 25 V. I. LENIN COLLECTED WORKS
381, 473 (Stepan Apresyan & Jim Riordan eds., 1964).
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industries were transformed into a single, giant enterprise—the
“state syndicate.”29 Indeed, Wu explains that each of the thousands
of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) that emerged was not
considered a stand-alone entity, but rather, a “grassroots production
unit for cost accounting” within a “highly integrated system of the
party, the state, and the economy” that spanned many sectors. 30
From 1959 to 1978, SOEs accounted for over eighty-six percent of the
PRC’s total industrial output.31 Policymakers encouraged SOEs to
expand operations across various industries,32 resembling the crosssector expansion FCCs would embrace decades later.
The PRC’s 1950s embrace of a Leninist “state syndicate” also
resulted in the establishment of a “mono-bank” system through
which the PBOC was the PRC’s only bank, 33 serving both
commercial bank and central bank functions.34 This aligned with
Lenin’s vision for “a single giant State Bank, with branches in every
rural district, in every factory.” 35 By the 1960s, the PBOC was
essentially the only source of industrial and commercial credit in the
PRC.36 Similar to operational and commercial activities of SOEs, its
29
UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note
23, at 83-84.
30 Id. at 84.
31
See BECKY CHIU & MERVYN K. LEWIS, REFORMING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES AND BANKS 189 (2006).
32
See, e.g., MAO TSE-TUNG, Instructions (June-September 1958), in SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG: VOLUME VIII (1990).
33 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 188-89.
34 See Franklin Allen, Xian Gu & Jun “QJ” Qian, People’s Bank of China: History,
Current
Operations
and
Future
Outlook
5-6
(2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3018506
[https://perma.cc/T2GA-ZK7U] (noting that under this law and regulation, the
PBOC was made responsible for “[i]ssuing currency, managing the treasury,
administering financial activities, maintaining financial stability and restoring the
economy and rebuilding the country” and also for “(1) printing and issuing
banknotes and bonds and adjusting currency circulation; (2) allocating wealth and
providing short-term and long-term loans and investment; (3) analyzing and
monitoring the financial management of government offices, state-owned
enterprises and cooperatives by managing cash and transferring money; (4)
managing foreign currency, noble metals, and the balance of payments and
settlements; (5) taking charge of financial administration and supervising private
institutions, public-private institutions and foreign organizations involving the
financial industry; (6) managing treasury and cash outflow of the fiscal budget; (7)
issuing treasury bonds; (8) leading specialized banks and state-owned insurance
companies; (9) other relevant financial issues”).
35 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 189 (quoting A.W. SAMANSKY, CHINA’S
BANKING SYSTEM: ITS MODERN HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (1981)).
36 See id.
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lending and monetary policy decisions were ultimately decided by
the State Council,37 “the highest organ of state administration” in the
PRC. 38 By the late 1970s, the PRC had transformed into a large,
cross-sector “state syndicate” that inherently mixed commercial and
financial activities.39
b. The 1980s: The First FCC Emerges from Financial System Shifts
and SOE Reforms
Starting in 1978, the PRC began a decade of sweeping economic
policy changes resulting in dramatic transformations to its financial
system and SOEs. The economic model that came about—
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”—aimed to achieve
economic modernization through pragmatic reforms, although it
remained explicitly guided by Leninism.40 This decade would give
rise to SFCCs, whose business activities, like that of the PRC’s “state
syndicate,” spanned multiple sectors and aligned with national
policy objectives.
Between 1979 and 1984, the PRC’s mono-banking system was
split-up, and major pillars of financial intermediation were handed
over to newly-created, state-controlled entities. Four major stateowned banks (“SOBs”) were formed.41 Previously-established rural
credit cooperatives (“RCCs”) morphed into SOB “grassroots”

See Allen, Gu & Qian, supra note 34, at 6-7.
SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43303,
CHINA’S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERS IN CHARTS 2 (Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting
XIANFA art. 57, §1 (1982) (China)), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HK25-BAFX].
39 See Yingyi Qian & Jinglian Wu, China’s Transition to a Market Economy: How
Far across the River? 4-5 (Stan. Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Working Paper No. 69, 2000),
https://kingcenter.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/69wp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JHC-M8AR] (observing that “the essential point of Lenin’s
[State Syndicate] remained valid for both pre-reform and post-reform China”).
40
Marxism-Leninism was a component of one of the “Four Cardinal
Principles,” introduced by Deng Xiaoping in a 1979 speech that guided “socialism
with Chinese characteristics.” See William A. Joseph, Ideology and Chinese Politics,
in POLITICS IN CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION 129, 156 (William A. Joseph ed., 2010).
41
The large SOBs established during this time are the Agricultural Bank of
China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China. See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 191-92.
37
38
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units, 42 state-influenced urban credit cooperatives (“UCCs”) were
launched,43 and the PBOC’s role as a central bank was reaffirmed by
the State Council. 44 The People’s Insurance Company of China
(“PICC”) was founded as the PRC’s only insurance company and
would remain as such until the late 1980s.45
Although securities markets were undeveloped,46 policymakers
increasingly allowed small businesses to form. 47 Private sector
growth accelerated after 1983 under Deng Xiaoping’s policy of
“don’t argue; try bold experiments and blaze new trails” and related
national-level guidelines, which enabled medium- to large-scale
private enterprises to grow,48 even though the private sector would
42
RCCs are another form of loan-making depository institution that date back
to the 1950s, when their ownership structure at that time was unclear; although by
the 1960s and 1970s, RCCs were managed by “people’s communes.” See KUMIKO
OKAZAKI, RAND, NAT’L SEC. RSCH. DIV., BANKING SYSTEM REFORM IN CHINA: THE
CHALLENGES OF MOVING TOWARD A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY 10 (2007),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAN
D_OP194.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5A3-EVCG]. Starting in the late 1970s, RCCs
“were transformed into the ‘grass-roots unit’ of the [Agricultural Bank of China],”
an SOB. Id.
43
UCCs are depositories that emerged to primarily serve privately-owned
enterprises and individuals. The first UCC was established in 1979. See id. at 9-10;
see also Nicholas Loubere & Heather Xiaoquan Zhang, Co-operative Financial
Institutions and Local Development in China, 3 J. COOP. ORG. & MGMT. 32, 34 (2015)
(explaining that UCCs were “set-up and run by local people, institutions and
governments” and “worked closely with local governments” when making loans).
44 See Allen, Gu & Qian, supra note 34, at 7-8.
45 See SWISS RE CORPORATE HISTORY, A HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN CHINA 31-32
(2017),
https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:eb1aba5f-05ca-4bd4-bfe6d42a6ed6b8c5/150Y_Markt_Broschuere_China_Inhalt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HZZ-L97M].
46 See NICOLAAS GROENEWOLD, YANRUI WU, SAM HAK KAN TANG & XIANG MEI
FAN, THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET: EFFICIENCY, PREDICTABILITY AND PROFITABILITY 10
(2004) (explaining that in the early 1980s, joint stock structures were limited to some
instances of “co-operative shareholding” established by township and village
enterprises in southern coastal provinces).
47
In the early 1980s, there were over 178,000 ge-ti (“个体”) shops and locations
in Mainland China that together employed over two million people. Each of these
entities could technically only hire up to seven people, but by 1983, some employed
over 100 people. Xiaohong Chen, Private Enterprises, and the Growth of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises, in THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 276, 283-84 (Wang
Mengkui ed., 2012).
48 See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra
note 23, at 184 (citing Deng Xiaoping, Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang,
Shenzhen, Zhuhan and Shanghai, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 374 (1993)).
In 1983, a nationwide “three-nots” policy was also issued in response to large-scale
business operations emerging across the PRC: “It is not convenient to promote
these, they are not allowed to be publicized openly, and we should not be in a hurry
to shut them down.” See Xiaohong Chen, supra note 47, at 284-85.
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not be legalized until 1988. 49 Yet capital markets remained
immature, 50 and SOB lending volume was capped by the State
Council and largely restricted to SOEs.51
To fuel large-scale investments and equipment imports, stateowned “trust and investment companies” (“TICs”), from which the
first SFCCs would emerge, were established. 52 The first—China
International Trust and Investment Corporation (“CITIC”)—was
founded with state funds in 1979.53 By 1982, hundreds of TICs—all
state-controlled—were operational. 54 TICs raised capital from
institutional sources, such as governments and international
investors, and used those funds to make loans and investments
across sectors.55
The establishment of TICs was a necessary ingredient for the
formation of the first FCCs. Another was the gradual proliferation
of joint-stock ownership structures for private and public sector
enterprises, accelerated by local-level policy actions between 1984
and 1986, 56 which enabled thousands of joint-stock companies to
49
It was not until 1988 that the PRC Constitution was amended to permit the
private sector to exist. See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC
REFORM, supra note 23, at 59-60.
50
See Grace Xing Hu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Chinese Capital Market: An
Empirical Overview 3-4 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24346, 2018),
http://web.mit.edu/people/junpan/CCM.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5VX-NZ8W]
(discussing the initial stage of the PRC’s significant but slow period of transforming
into a more market-oriented economy after 1976, beginning with the emergence of
common stocks in the early 1980s).
51 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 191-92.
52 See Zhaohui Hong & Ying Yan, Trust and Investment Corporations in China 2
(Fed. Rsrv. Bank Cleveland, Working Paper No. 97-06, 1997),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/workin
g-papers/working-papers-archives/1997-working-papers/wp-9706-trust-and-inv
estment-corporations-in-china.aspx [https://perma.cc/A84K-GMZK] (noting that
“[b]efore TICs were formed, most of the firms in China had only one resource for
all their financial needs—the state-owned banks”); GREGORY C. CHOW, THE CHINESE
ECONOMY 297 (2d ed. 1987) (observing that the first TIC was established in part to
“import advanced technology and equipment”).
53 See QIN XIAO, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND CHINESE ENTERPRISE REFORM: THE
CASE OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION 93 (2004).
54
See ANDREW COLLIER, SHADOW BANKING AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM IN
CHINA 77 (2017).
55 See id. at 76-77.
56
In 1984, the Shanghai Municipal Government established securities
regulations, facilitating private company stock ownership, and enabling an
electronics company to issue stock, marking for the first private sector share
issuance in the PRC’s history. See KANG YONG, LU SHI & ELIZABETH D. BROWN,
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emerge.57 Then in 1986, the State Council stimulated the conversion
of SOEs into joint-stock companies,58 and explicitly encouraged the
development of horizontally-integrated, multi-sector conglomerates
through its “Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Further
Promoting Horizontal Economic Integration” (“1986 Provisions”).59
With the goal of achieving a “socialist commodity economy,” the
1986 Provisions supported “horizontal economic union” between
enterprises through a number of approaches, including multi-sector
conglomerates.60
Following the spirit of these provisions, CITIC’s CEO proposed
to the State Council in 1986 that CITIC be permitted to reorganize as
a “socialist group company” with a banking subsidiary.61 In 1987,
the State Council allowed CITIC to transform into a multi-tiered
conglomerate called “CITIC Group,” 62 launch a wholly-owned
national commercial bank,63 and reorganize its many divisions into
CHINESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 6
(2008),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR618.html
[https://perma.cc/2LXU-JSAK]. By 1986, other local governments had also issued
rules to govern the issuance of private company stocks to the public. See Basile
Cuigniez, The Chinese Stock Market: Historical Evolution and Current Trends 19
(2017)
(M.S.
Dissertation,
Universiteit
Gent),
https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/376/724/RUG01002376724_2017_0001_AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8LP-TZZN].
57
By 1986, over 6,000 companies across the PRC had issued stock, and overthe-counter stock markets were operating in several big cities. Cuigniez, supra note
56, at 19.
58
The State Council’s Regulations on Deepening Enterprise Reform and Enhancing
the Vitality of Enterprises allowed many SOEs to be converted into joint-stock
companies. See Hu, Pan & Wang, supra note 50, at 4; FAN ZHANG, THE INSTITUTIONAL
EVOLUTION OF CHINA: GOVERNMENT VS. MARKET 100 (2018) (noting that according to
the regulations, “local governments could pick some large and medium-sized SOEs
to carry out experiments on changing the SOEs to shareholding companies,” and
“[b]y the end of 1986, about 6,000 shareholding companies had been set up
nationwide”).
59
Guanyu Jinyibu Tuidong Hengxiang Jingji Lianhe Ruogan Wenti De
Guiding (关于进一步推动横向经济联合若干问题的规定) [Provisions on Several
Issues Concerning Further Promoting Horizontal Economic Integration]
(promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 23, 1986, effective Mar. 23, 1986) 1987 LAW
Y.B.
CHINA
1,
267
(China),
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&gid=1510038015
[https://perma.cc/5GPA-3WHX].
60 Id.
61 See YONGJIN ZHANG, CHINA’S EMERGING GLOBAL BUSINESSES 139-40 (2003).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 140 (reporting that this bank’s establishment required State Council
approval); Margot Schueller, Financial system reform in China in THE INTERNATIONAL
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subsidiaries.64 This marked the formation of Mainland China’s first
FCC, as CITIC Group controlled multiple types of financial
companies, as well as large subsidiaries operating across a range of
non-financial sectors.65
This structure exemplified the 1986 Provisions, as did the State
Council’s 1987 decision to allow a non-financial conglomerate to
establish a “finance company of an enterprise group.” 66 By yearend, seven of such internal financial companies had been formed,
each of which was funded by deposits from its own affiliates and
conducted intra-group lending. 67 Around this time, several new
joint-stock regional banks were also established, 68 some of which
were controlled by entities conducting substantial levels of nonfinancial activities. 69 For example, China Merchants Bank,
established in 1987, was wholly-owned by China Merchants
Group—an SOE primarily involved in shipping.70

HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL REFORM 73, 76-77 (Maximilian J.B. Hall ed., 2003) (noting
that this bank was established in 1987 and wholly-owned by CITIC).
64 See QIN XIAO, supra note 53, at 104.
65 See id. at 104-05; YOUNGJIN ZHANG, supra note 61, at 140.
66
Guanyu Zujian He Fazhan Qiye Jituan De Jidian Yijian (关于组建和发展企
业 集 团 的 几 点 意 见 ) [Several Opinions on the Formation and Development of
Enterprise Groups] (promulgated by State Econ. & Trade Comm’n & State Econ.
Restructuring Comm’n, Dec. 16, 1987, effective Dec. 16, 1987), art. 16,
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=810e5e624a7f2348bdfb
&keyword= 关 于 组 建 和 发 展 企 业 集 团 的 几 点 意 见
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate&Search_IsTitle=0
[https://perma.cc/KR7P-ETK4].
67 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 74-75
(1998).
68 See id. at 69-70 (listing eight regional banks established during the late 1980s,
including Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank,
Merchants Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank); Chunhang Liu, Reform
and Opening Up of the Banking Industry in THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 254, 255
(Wang Mengkui ed., 2012) (explaining that Shenzhen Development Bank,
Merchants Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and three other banks
“set up with ownership by shareholders” were established in the late 1980s). Some
regional banks were able to establish significant presences outside their home
locality. See LARDY, supra, at 67.
69 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 192 (explaining that many of the regional
banks formed in the late 1980s were owned by “state-affiliated agencies or large
enterprises, local government bodies or private companies”).
70
History,
CHINA
MERCHANTS
GROUP,
http://www.cmhk.com/en/ac/history/history/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/YE94-YB5U].
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In the late 1980s, the State Council allowed new insurance
companies to emerge to compete with PICC.71 One was a Shenzhenbased joint-stock regional insurer called Ping An Insurance
Company, established by a consortium that included China
Merchants Group. 72 Around the same time, China Merchants
Group also gained control of a Hong Kong insurance company. 73
Thus China Merchants Group, having expanded into banking and
insurance, became the PRC’s second SFCC. Later, in the 2000s, Ping
An Insurance Company transformed into a privately-controlled
corporate group called Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of
China, Ltd. (“Ping An Group”) and became one of the PRC’s largest
PFCCs, controlling a range of financial and non-financial
businesses.74
c. The 1990s: Economic Shifts, Legal Changes, and an Embrace of the
“Socialist Market Economy” Set the Stage for Rapid 2000s FCC
Formation
By 1990, about half of the PRC’s industrial output was still
attributable to SOEs. 75 Throughout the subsequent decade, a
number of legal changes, market structure shifts, and SOE reforms
were initiated in response to both the PRC’s early 1990s embrace of
a “socialist market economy” and spats of market turmoil.
71 See Qixiang Sun, Lingyan Suo & Wei Zheng, China’s Insurance Industry:
Developments and Prospects in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE: BETWEEN
LOCAL DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 597, 601-02 (J. David Cummins &
Bertrand Venard eds., 2007) (observing that the State Council’s 1985 Interim
Regulations on the Administration of Insurance Enterprises enabled the establishment
of new insurance companies).
72
Ping An Insurance Becomes Goldman Sachs’ First Principal Investment in China,
GOLDMAN
SACHS,
https://www.goldmansachs.com/ourfirm/history/moments/1994-ping-an.html [https://perma.cc/W9F4-THU6].
73 See Changyuan Lin, Financial Conglomerates in China 16-17 (Ctr. for Int’l L.
Stud.,
Working
Paper
No.
2003020011,
Oct.
14,
2003),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=446840
[https://perma.cc/3ULN-HNH6].
74 See History, PING AN, https://www.pingan.cn/en/about/history.shtml
[https://perma.cc/E8VX-3KZB]; see also infra note 169 and accompanying text
(examining when Ping An Group gained control of substantial non-financial
businesses).
75 See NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS
IN
CHINA
75
(2014),
https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/6932/03iie6932.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQT3-54PA].
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Although only one lasting FCC emerged in the 1990s, the legal and
policy groundwork necessary for FCC growth throughout the 2000s
was set during this time, and many financial companies later
acquired by FCCs were established.
i.

Securities Markets Expand and New Banks Form, while the
“Socialist Market Economy” Spurs the Company Law and
Private Sector Growth

In order to legitimize flourishing informal securities markets,
two national stock markets—the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges—were formed in 1990. 76 By 1992, the number of
participating brokerage firms doubled to over eighty.77 During this
time, the State Council also approved the formation of the PRC’s
first futures exchange, spurring the formation of many futures
companies and numerous regional derivatives exchanges.78 Several
securities and futures companies that emerged during the late 1980s
and early 1990s would later be controlled by FCCs.79
As securities markets grew and joint-stock companies
proliferated, national-level policymakers, including General
Secretary Jiang Zemin and PBOC Governor Zhu Rongji, endorsed
the establishment of a “socialist market economy.”80 This economic
76 See Damian Tobin & Ulrich Volz, The Development and Transformation of the
Financial System in the People’s Republic of China 16 (ADB Institute, Working Paper
No.
825,
Mar.
2018),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/411136/adbi-wp825.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C92M-8LU5].
77 See CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: THE STOCK
MARKETS AND THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE REFORM 155 (2003).
78 See Donald Lien & Bo Yang, Futures Markets in the People’s Republic of China:
Development and Prospective, 11 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 25, 29-30 (2004).
79
For example, China Merchant Securities Co. Ltd., controlled by China
Merchants Group, was established in 1991.
Company Profile, CMS,
http://www.newone.com.cn/ws/html?arg=en/AboutUs&; see also infra notes 8688 and accompanying text.
80
See KJELD ERIK BRØDSGAARD & KOEN RUTTEN, FROM ACCELERATED
ACCUMULATION TO SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY IN CHINA 101-02 (2017) (citing
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan
Wenti De Jueding (中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定 )
[Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Decision on Certain Issues
concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy] (Promulgated by
Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Nov. 14, 1993, effective Nov. 14,
1993)
[hereinafter
1993
Socialist
Market
Economy
Decision],
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model was incorporated into the PRC’s constitution in 1993 by the
National People’s Congress (“NPC”),81 and its key feature was the
“modern enterprise” (essentially, corporations) system, which
enabled the conversion of large SOEs into profit-maximizing jointstock companies with equity ownership rights allotted to both state
and non-state entities. 82 The embrace of a “socialist market
economy” also enabled private firms to play a larger role in the
economy, and opened the door to SOE privatization.83
Against this backdrop, in 1992, the PBOC approved the
establishment of two new national commercial banks wholly owned
by SOEs, and then, in 1995, enabled the conversion of these banks
into joint-stock institutions, bringing the total number of national,
non-SOB commercial banks to four. 84 One of these new banks,
Huaxia Bank, was initially owned by a state-owned steel

http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=4cbd93d7254ee66fbdfb&key
word= 中 共 中 央 关 于 建 立 社 会 主 义 市 场 经 济 体 制 若 干
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate&Search_IsTitle=0
[https://perma.cc/GY6D-5FAV].
81
The NPC is a nearly 3,000-member legislative body that usually meets for
about ten days each year. For more information on the NPC, see SUSAN V.
LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41007, UNDERSTANDING
CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 31 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7BH-QFDE]. As legal scholars note, as was the case with this
PRC Constitution amendment, the NPC translates the policy preferences of senior
officials into “state will” “through legal procedure.” See Jianfu Chen, The
Transformation of Chinese Law—From Formal to Substantial, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 689,
721 n.173 (citing Liu Zheng (刘政), Wei Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi
Tigong Geng Youli de Xianfa Baozhang (为建设有中国特色的社会主义提供更有力的宪
法保障) [Further Constitutional Protection for the Construction of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [LEGAL SCI. IN CHINA] 5, 6 (1993)).
This Constitutional change was adopted during the First Session of the Eighth NPC.
See id.
82 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 102 (citing 1993 Socialist Market
Economy Decision, supra note 80); see also Wu Jinglian, Ma Guochuan, Xiaofeng Hua
& Nancy Hearst, The Failure of State-Owned Enterprise Reforms Under Market
Socialism, in WHITHER CHINA? RESTARTING THE REFORM AGENDA 71 (Wu Jinglian &
Ma Guochuan eds., 2016) (observing that “institutional innovations in the large
SOEs” taken in accordance with the 1993 Socialist Market Economy Decision were
carried out “with a view to establishing a modern enterprise (that is, corporate)
institution”).
83 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 103, 105-06; see also Jianfu Chen,
supra note 81, at 721 (observing that the embrace of the “socialist market economy
must first and foremost be seen as a license to practice capitalism in the economic
sphere”).
84 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 66-69. Besides the large SOBs, CITIC’s bank and
the Bank of Communications were the PRC’s first two national banks, established
in 1986 and 1987, respectively. See id. at 64-66, 250 n.36.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

820

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:3

conglomerate known as Shougang Group. 85 Another one, China
Everbright Bank, was established by China Everbright Group86—an
SOE that began as a TIC and operated technology, infrastructure,
and construction businesses87—which would soon also gain control
of a securities company,88 marking the formation of the PRC’s third
SFCC. Problematic transactions between the two newly-established
national banks and their intra-group affiliates soon led to
government-ordered restructurings and Shougang Group’s loss of a
majority stake in Huaxia Bank, 89 a sign of troubles to come for
FCCs.90
Most notably, the PRC’s embrace of a “socialist market
economy” led to the passage of the Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China at the end of 1993. 91 This law eased and
formalized the process through which joint-stock companies could
form92—a critical precondition to the growth in PFCCs that began
roughly a decade later. The proliferation of joint-stock companies
was further enabled by 1992 and 1993 State Council actions that
established the State Council Securities Commission (“SCSC”) and
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”),93 and also
standardized accounting rules and the process for listing on the
PRC’s growing stock markets under a regulatory framework led by

85 See id. at 67-68. Shougang Group would later become an SFCC. See infra
Appendix A (listing major FCCs as of 2017).
86 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 67.
87 See Changyuan Lin, supra note 73, at 14 (listing various business activities of
China Everbright Group in 1994); WU XIAOQIU, CHINESE SECURITIES COMPANIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE TRANSFORMATION, AND
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 29 (2014) (noting that China Everbright Group first emerged
as a TIC).
88 See id.
89
See LARDY, supra note 67, at 67-68; see also NEIL C. HUGHES, CHINA’S
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE: SMASHING THE IRON RICE BOWL 48 (2015) (observing that
China Everbright Group retained control of its newly-formed bank).
90
By the late 2010s, several large FCCs were engaged in high levels of
problematic intra-group transactions. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
91 See BRØDSGAARD & RUTTEN, supra note 80, at 105-06 (citing Gongsi Fa (公司
法) [Company Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec.
1993; rev’d by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 2004),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-03/21/content_1867695.htm
[https://perma.cc/5ZY9-3DVJ]).
92 See Zhao Youg Qing, The Company Law of China, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
461, 467 (1996) (citing Company Law, supra note 91, art. 8).
93 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 4.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss3/5

2021]

Conglomeration Unbound

821

these newly-formed entities.94 Although the CSRC’s powers were
initially quite limited in scope,95 during the late 1990s, it gained a
range of securities and futures markets regulatory authorities96 and
absorbed the SCSC.97
ii.

Further Banking System, Insurance Industry, and SOE Reforms
Enable FCC Formation

By the mid-1990s, banking assets were flooding into stocks,
which in turn resulted in stock market bubbles, and bank lending
volume was insufficient. 98 In response, the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Commercial Banks (“Commercial Bank Law”)
was passed in 1995, which allowed for non-financial company
control of banks—a critical precondition to future FCC growth—but
required that: (1) loans to a single “borrower” not exceed ten
percent of a bank’s capital; (2) banks not invest in securities firms or
TICs; (3) unsecured loans not be extended to a bank’s “related
persons”; (4) secured loans to “related persons” be extended at or
above prevailing market rates; and (5) regulators first approve of
any transaction that will result in a change of “shareholders”
holding over ten percent (later lowered to five percent or more) of a
bank’s shares or capital. 99 In 1995, the NPC also passed the
94 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 194; Gupiao Faxing Yu Jiaoyi Guanli
Zanxing Tiaoli ( 股 票 发 行 与 交 易 管 理 暂 行 条 例 ) [Interim Provisions on the
Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks] (promulgated by State
Council,
Apr.
22,
1993,
effective
Apr.
22,
1993)
(China),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1334
[https://perma.cc/Q7JR-P8QY].
95 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 18-19.
96
See STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PROGRESS,
PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 157-58 (2003) (explaining that in 1997, due to changes
brought about by the National Financial Work Conference, “[securities market]
regulatory powers were concentrated in the CSRC and local governments were
sidelined,” and that, by this time, “the PBOC . . . was forced to hand over its powers
to the CSRC”); Lien & Bo Yang, supra note 78, at 30 (explaining that the CSRC gained
oversight authority over the futures market in 1994).
97 See Tobin & Volz, supra note 76, at 4.
98
See Liping Xu & Yu Xin, Thorny Roses: The Motivations and Economic
Consequences of Holding Equity Stakes in Financial Institutions for China’s Listed
Nonfinancial Firms, 10 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 105, 109 (2017); HUGHES, supra note 89, at
48-49.
99
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业
银 行 法 ) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks]
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Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Insurance Law”),
which allowed non-financial companies to control insurers, but
included a requirement that regulators approve of any transactions
resulting in changes to owners of ten percent or more (later lowered
to five percent) of the shares of a joint-stock insurer.100 Unlike the
Commercial Bank Law, it did not address related party
transactions.101
This omission, as well as the Commercial Bank Law’s narrow
restrictions on intra-group dealings, meant that the laws did not
significantly curb the ability of a non-financial conglomerate to
engage in intra-group transactions conducted on preferential
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10,
1995, effective July 1, 1995), art. 15, 24, 40, 43, http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260
[https://perma.cc/58HV-F7WN].
In
December 2003, the Commercial Bank Law was amended, and regulatory authority
over banks was transferred to the newly-formed China Banking Regulatory
Commission (“CBRC”). See WEI WANG, CHINA’S BANKING LAW AND THE NATIONAL
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN-FUNDED BANKS 140-41 (2013). As part of the December 2003
amendments, Article 24 was amended to require that transactions resulting in a
change of shareholders holding five percent or more of a bank’s shares or capital
first be approved by regulators—the threshold was originally over ten percent.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法)
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (2003), art. 24,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383716.
htm [https://perma.cc/A2GE-4AM9]. Also, many references to the People’s Bank
of China in the Commercial Bank Law were changed to a “regulatory authority
under the State Council.” For example, contrast Article 15 of the 1995 Commercial
Bank Law with that of the 2003 version. The CBRC, the “regulatory authority under
the State Council” mentioned in the 2003 Commercial Bank Law, was established
pursuant to the Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision, passed in 2003 by the
NPC, which resulted in a 2003 State Council notice that established the CBRC. See
China
Banking
Regulatory
Commission,
CHINA
BANKING
NEWS,
http://www.chinabankingnews.com/china-banking-regulatory-commission/
[https://perma.cc/3HLV-GQPN]; Guowuyuan Guanyu Jigou Shezhi de Tongzhi (国务
院关于机构设置的通知 ) [Notice of the State Council on the Setup of Institutions],
GUOWUYUAN
( 国 务 院 )
STATE
COUNCIL
(Mar.
21,
2003),
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2003/content_62041.htm
[https://perma.cc/9L5F-XTCT].
100
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoxian Fa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 保 险 法 )
[Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art.
91,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4644.htm
[https://perma.cc/86FA-5G9S]. The threshold was lowered to five percent in 2009.
See LOVELLS, AMENDMENTS TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA INSURANCE LAW: TIME
FOR A COMPLETE OVERHAUL OR SIMPLY A CONSOLIDATION? § 7.2 (2009),
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/publication/amen
dmentstotheprcinsurance-law_pdf [https://perma.cc/UV98-WQ8T].
101 See LOVELLS, supra note 100, § 7.1 (explaining that the Insurance Law did
not substantially address related party transactions until 2009).
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terms 102 —in other words, a mixed conglomerate could support
intra-group growth via transactions with a financial firm affiliate
priced below prevailing market-wide risk-based prices. 103 FCCs
would later take advantage of these weak regulatory guardrails to
engage in high levels of these transactions.104 FCCs would also grow
by taking advantage of the absence of a clear definition of
“shareholder,”105 and due to the fact that the Commercial Bank Law
allowed for certain changes of actual control over a bank to take
place without regulatory approval. 106 Moreover, while the
Insurance Law generally prohibited insurance companies from
controlling non-insurance businesses, exceptions to that rule were
soon granted—Ping An Insurance Company established a securities
company in 1995 and acquired a TIC in 1996.107

102 See Kuan-Chun Chang, The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates In China
In The Post WTO Era—The Challenges Of Risk Concentration And Risk Contagion, 11 U.
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 30 (2003) (explaining that the Commercial Bank Law
and other rules “fail[ed] to provide a concrete firewall between banks and their
affiliates” and did not regulate several “types of transactions between affiliates that
can adversely affect the condition of banks”); see also Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of
the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), art. 40,
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HVF7WN] (providing a relatively narrow definition of “related persons”).
103
Financial markets regulators associate high levels of these types of
transactions within a mixed conglomerate with an increased risk that the
conglomerate will lack sufficient financial resources vulnerable to withstand
macroeconomic or idiosyncratic shocks. TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, supra note 3, at 2023 (explaining the risks of high intra-group exposures within a financial
conglomerate); id. at 36-37 (explaining why intra-group exposures are particularly
risky for mixed conglomerates); see also infra note 252 and accompanying text.
104
For example, Tomorrow Group’s Baoshang Bank engaged in high levels of
intra-group transactions. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
105
Haier Group, for example, gained control of a bank through separate
investments made by five of its affiliates. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying
text.
106 See IMF, People’s Republic of China: Detailed Assessment Report: Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Country Report No. 12/78, at 40 (Apr.
2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1278.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9KQ-H2BT].
107 See Sun, Suo & Zheng, supra note 71, at 605 (explaining that China Ping An
Insurance (Group) Company Ltd.’s expansions into non-financial business lines
exemplified one of several exceptions made to the newly-passed Insurance Law);
History, supra note 74.
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Despite regulatory shifts, new bank formation still required
PBOC approval,108 and few new joint-stock banks were established
in the five years after the Commercial Bank Law’s passage. 109
Indeed, the four large SOBs still accounted for roughly eighty-five
percent of banking assets in 1995. 110 Yet by 1996, the PRC had
entered a banking crisis, and twenty-four percent of SOB lending
volume was non-performing (meaning that loans were “overdue,
idle, or simply bad”). 111 The next year, PRC stock markets
crashed, 112 and the non-performing loan rate across its financial
sector rose to over twenty-eight percent.113 During the late 1990s,
many TICs failed, including one of the PRC’s largest,114 prompting
policymakers to suspend the operations of almost all TICs and
require that remaining TICs reapply for licenses. 115 Four stateowned asset management companies that acquired SOB nonperforming loans were also established.116 Although these entities
108
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业
银 行 法 ) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l People’s Congress, May 10,
1995,
effective
July
1,
1995),
art.
11,
http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HV-F7WN].
109 See HUGHES, supra note 89, at 58-59 (reporting that “[a]t the end of 1999,
there were just eleven shareholder banks”).
110 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 224.
111 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 257 (reporting the nonperforming loan
ratio by using “the Chinese standard for classifying bad loans”).
112 See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 77, at xxvi.
113 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 257.
114 See COLLIER, supra note 54, at 77-78.
115 See JIANBO LOU, AN OVERVIEW OF PRC TRUST LAW AND TRUST BUSINESS 2,
http://shintakuhogakkai.jp/activity/pdf/vol40_China2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VG8-AEDC] (observing that TIC operations were suspended
in by 2000); Touzi Guanchazhe (投资观察者) [Investment Observer], Zhongguo
Xintuoshi Shang Liuci Zhengdun Dashiji (中国信托史上六次整顿大事记) [Six Major
Events in the History of China Trust], SOUHU ( 搜 狐 ) [SOHU] (May 16, 2016),
https://m.sohu.com/a/75610386_372392/
[https://perma.cc/NZD3-M5XF]
(reporting that by 2001 only sixty TICs were authorized to operate in the PRC due
to the 1999-2000 restructuring of the industry, which resulted in hundreds of TICs
being closed). The 1999-2001 restructuring of the TIC industry resulted from policy
initiatives decided upon at the 1997 National Financial Work Conference convened
by senior national policymakers. See Dai Xianglong (戴相龙), Daixianglong Huiyi
1993 Nian Dao 2000 Nian Jinrong Zhixu Banian Dazhengdun (戴相龙回忆 1993 年到
2000 年金融秩序八年大整顿) [Dai Xianglong Recalls the Eight-Year Overhaul of the
Financial Order from 1993 to 2000], JINRONGJIE (金融界) [JRJ.COM] (July 17, 2018),
http://bank.jrj.com.cn/2018/07/17112124824468.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7U9W-RF89].
116
See Delin Zhang, Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprises, in
THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S REFORM 217, 225-26 (Wang Mengkui ed., 2012).
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would later transform into FCC-like entities,117 no new major FCCs
besides China Everbright Group formed in the 1990s. Yet two
significant late 1990s crisis responses set the stage for FCC growth
during the 2000s.
First, in the midst of financial markets turmoil, a new type of
joint-stock commercial bank was created through the consolidation
of UCCs. 118 These depository institutions had proliferated
throughout the 1980s, and accounted for five times as much private
lending volume as the SOBs in 1996,119 even though UCCs’ financial
assets equaled just four percent of the SOBs’.120 Yet by 1999, UCCs’
balance sheets were seriously distressed—with a non-performing
loan ratio of thirty-seven percent. 121 In response, 2,300 of these
institutions were soon consolidated into over ninety “city
commercial banks” 122 —joint-stock commercial banks primarily
owned by urban non-financial company, individual, and local
government shareholders. 123 Some of these banks would be
acquired by PFCCs in the 2000s.124
The second, late 1990s policy driver of 2000s FCC growth was
the SOE reform strategy of “grasp the large and let go of the small”
(“ 抓 大 放 小 ,” or zhuadafangxiao in Chinese), first endorsed by
national policymakers in 1995.125 At the time, forty percent of SOEs

117 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 63 (observing that these asset
management vehicles maintain investments in both non-financial and financial
entities).
118 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 72.
119 See id. at 71-72.
120 See id. at 224 (reporting that the 1995 total assets of UCCs totaled 303 billion
yuan, while the total assets of the four major SOBs totaled 8.056 trillion yuan).
121 See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 259.
122 See HUGHES, supra note 89, at 59.
123 See LARDY, supra note 67, at 72.
124 See infra notes 131-137, 154 and accompanying text.
125
ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG (中共中央) [CENT. COMM. OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA], ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUANYU ZHIDING GUOMIN JINGJI HE
SHEHUI FAZHAN “JIUWU” JIHUA HE 2020 NIAN YUANJING MUBIAO DE JIANYI (中共中央
关于制定国民经济和社会发展”九五”计划和 2010 年远景目标的建议) [PROPOSAL OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON FORMULATING THE
NINTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE
VISION
OF
2010]
20
(Sep.
28,
1995),
https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/200709/
P020191029595683696918.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB3M-ZV48]. As Chiu and
Lewis explain, this policy was “officially implemented after its confirmation at the
Fifteenth Party Congress in October 1997 and the Ninth National People’s Party
Congress in March 1998.” CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 66-67.
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were losing money, 126 and many had more debts than assets. 127
Within five years, over 10,000 small and medium SOEs were
converted into privately-controlled joint-stock companies largely
owned by management. 128 Concurrently, about 1,000 large SOEs
were restructured, primarily through the consolidation of SOEs into
bigger, joint-stock SOEs.129 Central state organs encouraged many
of these large SOEs to form expansive, multi-sector corporate
groups, the growth of which was supported by preferential credit
and equity market access policies.130
d. The 2000s: Most FCCs are Born
By 2000, the economic, policy, and legal conditions necessary for
the growth of FCCs had been established:
struggling city
commercial banks sought capital injections, large SOEs were
expanding across sectors in the spirit of zhuadafangxiao and the 1986
Provisions, and legal changes stemming from the “socialist market
economy” were driving the growth of equity markets, joint-stock
companies, and demand for insurance by businesses and
individuals. These and other early 2000s developments—including
policymakers’ commitment to sector-based regulation, the growth
of e-commerce, policy changes that attracted more private capital
into the financial system, and a resurgence of TICs—enabled many
more large FCCs to emerge.

126 See UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, supra
note 23, at 157.
127 See Zhang, supra note 116, at 225
128 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 68-69.
129 See id. at 66-67. In response to high losses at SOEs, in 1998 Premier Zhu
Rongji announced that the government would work to turn large and mediumsized SOEs into profit-making entities within three years. See CHIU & LEWIS, supra
note 31, at 74; Zhang, supra note 116, at 225-26. Yet from 2001 to 2005, the PRC’s
SOEs as a whole experienced losses each year. See Xin Li & Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard,
SOE Reform in China: Past, Present and Future, 31 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 54, 60
(2013).
130 See CHIU & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 67.
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PFCCs Form and SFCCs Grow as Insurance and Securities
Markets Restructure, and TICs are Revived

As the 2000s began, newly-formed city commercial banks
needed capital.131 In the early 2000s, Haier Group, a fast-growing
appliance manufacturing conglomerate, 132 gained control of the
Bank of Qingdao, 133 which had been established through the
consolidation of twenty-one UCCs in 1996.134 It did so through five
subsidiaries, each of which acquired ten percent stakes, 135
illustrating the weakness of Commercial Bank Law restrictions on
ownership concentration and complexity. By 2001, the private
industrial and technology conglomerate Tomorrow Group, which
emerged thanks to securities market and SOE reforms of the 1980s
and early 1990s, 136 gained control of Baoshang Bank and Tai’an
Bank, also taking advantage of a wave of city commercial bank
restructuring.137
To improve regulatory oversight over an increasingly complex
banking system, the China Banking Regulatory Commission

See Chunhang Liu, supra note 68, at 259.
See BILL FISCHER, UMBERTO LAGO & FANG LIU, REINVENTING GIANTS: HOW
CHINESE GLOBAL COMPETITOR HAIER HAS CHANGED THE WAY BIG COMPANIES
TRANSFORM 47 (2013).
133 See JEANNIE JINSHENG YI & SHAWN XIAN YE, THE HAIER WAY: THE MAKING OF
A CHINESE BUSINESS LEADER AND A GLOBAL BRAND 108 (2003). Pursuant to the PRC’s
Commercial Bank Law, the PBOC would have needed to approve this acquisition.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
134
See BANK OF QINGDAO CO., LTD., GLOBAL OFFERING 121 (2015),
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2015/1120/ltn201511200
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HWR-NF8Y].
135 See YI & YE, supra note 133, at 108.
136 See Dan Wei (但伟), Mingtianxi Wanzhuan Shangshi Gongsi (明天系玩转上市
公司) [Tomorrow Group’s Fun with Listed Companies], SOUHU (搜狐) [SOHU.COM] (Feb.
7,
2017),
http://roll.sohu.com/20130408/n371904827.shtml
[https://perma.cc/U7RG-N5ZU].
137 See Su Longfei (苏龙飞), Mingtianxi, Anbangxi, Haihangxi, Fuxingxi . . .
Minying Jinrong 28 Jutou Mingdan Ji Chigu Quan Jiemi (明天系、安邦系、海航系、复
星系 . . . 民营金融 28 巨头名单及持股图全揭秘) [Tomorrow, Anbang, HNA, Fosun . . .
The List of 28 Private Financial Giants and Their Shareholding Charts Will Be All
Revealed], XINCAIFU (新财富) [NEW FORTUNE] (Jul. 9, 2019) [hereinafter New Fortune
FCC
history],
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5MTA5MjE3Nw==&mid=2651726309&i
dx=1&sn=84e93cc7ea2fdeceaa27924c4b5b85a5&chksm=bd405d5b8a37d44d788823
3aeb035e167fd0ecb9b9c719df56307acd656686ba7e72b83e5817
[https://perma.cc/G7V5-ZHUX].
131
132
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(“CBRC”) was established in 2003. 138 It soon implemented new
restrictions on intra-group transactions that expanded the definition
of “related party” relative to the Commercial Bank Law, but capped
these transactions at a high level and still relied upon unclear
terminology, thereby impeding effectiveness and enabling further
FCC growth.139 Also, as a reaction to the growing number of nonfinancial corporate groups that controlled numerous financial
companies, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission
(“CIRC”),140 CBRC, and CSRC issued guidelines in 2004 endorsing
138
The CBRC was established pursuant to NPC-approved State Council
actions in 2003. See China Banking Regulatory Commission, supra note 99. Its
establishment was authorized by Article 9 of the Insurance Law. See Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Baoxian Fa (中华人民共和国保险法) [Insurance Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the 8th Nat’l
People’s Congress, June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 9,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4644.htm
[https://perma.cc/86FA-5G9S].
139
A 2004 CBRC rule required that credit extended by a bank to “related
parties” not exceed fifty percent of net capital. Shangye Yinhang Yu Neiburen He
Gudong Guanlian Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa (商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法)
[The Administrative Measures for the Connected Transactions between the Commercial
Banks and their Insiders or Shareholders] (promulgated by China Banking Regul.
Comm’n,
Apr.
2,
2004,
effective
May
1,
2004)
art.
32,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3500&CGid=
[https://perma.cc/QZQ5-7K7U]. It also expanded the Commercial Bank Law’s
definition of “related party” to include legal persons under direct or indirect
“control” by the same organization controlling a bank. Compare id., art. 6-8 with
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法)
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] (2003), art. 40,
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=260 [https://perma.cc/58HVF7WN]. See also Mary Ip, Chinese Financial Markets: Regulators and Current Laws in
CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES FROM WTO MEMBERSHIP 297, 321 (Kam C.
Chan et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the CBRC’s 2004 regulations “amplified the
description of ‘connected persons’”). Yet what constituted “control” remained
ambiguous, enabling preferential “related party” transactions to continue. See IMF,
People’s Republic of China: Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report No.
11/321,
at
41
(Nov.
2011),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11321.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JJ66-Q2CX] (explaining that “no legal requirement [existed] to
identify ultimately beneficial owners and clients of banks” and suggesting that
“[r]ules for identifying related parties . . . need to be strengthened”). Moreover, a
fifty percent threshold is relatively high, and therefore undermined the rule’s
effectiveness.
See MARK A. DEWEAVER, ANIMAL SPIRITS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: INVESTMENT BOOMS AND BUSTS IN THE WORLD’S EMERGING
ECONOMIC GIANT 112 (2012).
140
The CIRC was established in 1998 by the State Council. Guowuyuan Guanyu
Chengli Zhongguo Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weyuanhui de Tongzhi (国务院关于成立中国
保险监督管理委员会的通知) [Notice of the State Council on the Establishment of China
Insurance Regulatory Commission] (promulgated by State Council, Nov. 11, 2014,
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increased cross-agency regulatory coordination, but reaffirming a
commitment to sector-based regulation. 141 Although the State
Council officially approved CITIC Group and China Everbright
Group to be classified as financial holding companies in 2002,142 no
group-wide regulatory regimes were established, 143 enabling
further FCC growth.
Against this regulatory backdrop and amidst securities market
reforms, beginning in 2001, Tomorrow Group gained control of
several securities companies,144 becoming the PRC’s first PFCC. 145
China Huaneng Group, a state-owned utility company, also
emerged as a SFCC during this time after gaining control of a
securities company and its fund management subsidiary,146 one of
effective
Nov.
11,
1998),
https://law.lawtime.cn/d471199476293.html
[https://perma.cc/839Z-7DDZ].
141
Zhongguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui, Zhongguo Zhengquan
Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui, Zhongguo Baoxian Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui (中国银
行业监督管理委员会 、中国 证券监督管理委员会 、中国 保险监督管理委员会 )
[China Banking Regul. Comm’n, China Sec. Regul. Comm’n & China Ins. Regul.
Comm’n], San Da Jinrong Jianguan Jigou Jinrong Jianguan Fengong Hezuo Beiwanglu (
三 大 金 融 监 管 机 构 金 融 监 管 分 工 合 作 备 忘 录 ) [Memorandum of Cooperation on
Financial Supervision of Three Major Financial Supervisory Agencies] art. 8 (Jun. 2004),
http://business.sohu.com/2004/06/28/21/article220752183.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VG7C-WZ5T].
142 See Jin Sheng, China’s Financial Holding Companies: Mixed Operation and
Separate Supervision 5 (Nat’l Univ. of Sing. Ctr. for Banking & Fin. L. Working Paper,
Feb.
3,
2016),
https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2020/07/CBFL-WPS-1601-SJ02_SHENG-Jin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GGT-TEEH].
143 See Tang Shisheng (汤世生), Taiwan Jinkong Moshi Dui Dalu Jinrong de Jiejian
(台湾金控模式对大陆金融的借鉴) [Learning in Mainland Financial Markets from
Taiwan Financial Holding Company Model], ZHONGGUO FAZHAN GUANCHA (中国发展
观
察
)
CHINA
DEV.
WATCH
43
(2011),
https://doc.mbalib.com/view/9f9156ac61a0dbe2abf87dd94beef4b2.html
[https://perma.cc/SW8Z-P42R] (reporting that the PBOC proposed draft
regulations for holding companies in 2000 and 2005, but ultimately abandoned
those plans).
144 See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137.
145
Ping An Group did not become a PFCC until after it gained control of
numerous non-financial companies. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
146 See Gongsi Jianjie (公司简介) [Company Introduction], CHANGCHENG JIJIN, (长
城
基
金
)
[GREAT
WALL
FUND]
http://www.ccfund.com.cn/main/zjcc/gsjs/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/N89R-M2NR] (noting that Great Wall Securities, controlled by
China Huaneng Group, was founded in 2001); ZHONGGUO CHANGCHENG
ZHENGQUAN GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI, (中国长城证券股份有限公司) [CHINA GREAT
WALL SECURITIES CO. LTD.], CHANGCHENG ZHENGQUAN GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI
SHOUCI GONGKAI FAXING GUPIAO ZHAOGU SHUOMINGSHU (长城证券股份有限公司首
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the first of such firms to emerge in the PRC.147 Overall, the number
of fund management companies grew to over fifty-eight by 2006.148
Also in the early 2000s, PBOC regulatory changes allowed TICs
to reemerge as a powerful force in Chinese financial markets.149 As
a result, by 2004, TIC assets had rebounded to 278.4 billion yuan,
and then reportedly rose to 1 trillion and 14 trillion yuan in 2007 and
2014, respectively. 150 In 2003, a TIC controlled by recentlyrestructured Ping An Group—which by then was the PRC’s secondlargest life insurer—received regulatory approval to acquire a
regional bank.151 China Resources—an SOE with business activities
spanning construction, consumer products, energy, and healthcare
that had grown under zhuadafangxiao152 —also gained control of a
TIC in 2006.153 In 2009, it became one of Mainland China’s largest
SFCCs after regulators allowed it to assume an over seventy-five
percent ownership stake in a struggling city commercial bank.154
次公开发行股票招股说明书) [CHINA GREAT WALL SECURITIES CO. LTD. INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERING
PROSPECTUS]
71-72
(2018),
http://www.cgws.com/cczq/tzzgx/xxpl/201905/P020190508581655383249.pdf
(reporting that by 2003, China Huaneng Group and its affiliates controlled over fifty
percent of Great Wall Securities).
147
The PRC’s first fund management companies were established in 1998. See
Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian, Meijun Qian & Mengxin Zhao, A Review of China’s
Financial System and Initiatives for the Future, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 48 (James R. Barth et al. eds., 2009).
148 Id.
149 See JIANBO LOU, supra note 115, at 13-14.
150 Id. at 14.
151 See History, supra note 74 (noting that in February 2003, Ping An Insurance
Company was restructured into a holding company, Ping An Insurance (Group)
Company of China, Ltd., that went public the following year); Ping An Plans to Buy
Fujian
Bank,
CHINA
DAILY
(Nov.
26,
2003),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/26/content_284939.htm
[https://perma.cc/9NY7-CH86] (reporting that in November 2003, Ping An
Group, through its TIC subsidiary, gained control of Fujian Asian Bank in Fujian
province).
152
See
Company
at
a
Glance,
CHINA
RES.,
http://en.crc.com.cn/whoweare/companyataglance/ [https://perma.cc/5HX5CXLG].
153 See Gongsi Jianjie (公司简介), [Company Introduction], HUARUN XINTUO (华润
信
托
)
[CR
TRUST],
https://www.crctrust.com/gsjj/index.html
[https://perma.cc/A58V-85SA].
154 Zhongguo Yinjianhui Guanyu Huarun Gufen Youxian Gongsi Rugu Zhuhaishi
Shangye Yinhang Gudong Zige de Pifu (中国银监会关于华润股份有限公司入股珠海市
商业银行股东资格的批复) [Reply of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on CR
Trust’s Qualifications to Become a Shareholder of Zhuhai Commercial Bank], ZHONGGUO
YINJIANHUI
( 中 国 银 监 会 )
[CBRC]
(Apr.
23,
2009),
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Another driver of PFCC formation was insurance industry
growth brought about in part by an increase in private risk-taking
stemming from the PRC’s embrace of a “socialist market
economy.” 155 Between 1999 and 2004, total Mainland China
insurance industry assets grew from 260.4 billion to 1.112 trillion
yuan, and by 2003, there were twenty-two domestic insurance
companies, versus thirteen in 2000 and just four in 1991.156 One new
insurer was Anbang Property and Casualty Insurance Co., Ltd.,
which was founded in 2004 and later reorganized into a PFCC called
Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. (“Anbang Group”). 157 Funde
Sino Life Insurance Co., Ltd., also launched in the early 2000s, 158
would later become a subsidiary of the PFCC Funde Holding Group
Co., Ltd. (“Funde Group”),159 established in 2007.160
In 2006, the State Council’s “Several Opinions on the Reform and
Development of the Insurance Industry” accelerated insurance
sector growth by supporting restructuring, acquisitions, and
mergers within the industry. 161 Several insurers controlled by
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/govermentDetail.html?docId=275791
&itemId=867&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/9RNH-BNEU].
155
The embrace of the “socialist market economy” in 1993 by national
policymakers resulted in individuals and businesses increasingly assuming
financial risks, thus fueling insurance demand. See Sun, Suo & Zheng, supra note
71, at 602-03.
156 See id. at 603, 606.
157
See
Anbang
Insurance
Group
(China),
PUB. OPS. INT’L,
https://www.publicopinions.net/index.php/directory/the-200-certified-winners
-of-the-sustainable-development-award-2018-2019/1935-anbang-insurance-groupchina.html [https://perma.cc/WG9Q-8HGG] (noting that the CIRC granted
approval for Anbang Property & Casualty Insurance Co., Ltd. to restructure as a
holding group and that, in 2012, Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. was founded);
New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137 (providing a timeline of Anbang Group’s
financial company acquisitions and its expansion into non-financial business lines,
particularly hotel management).
158
See Company Profile, SINO LIFE INS. CO., https://www.sinolife.com/ensinolife/ [https://perma.cc/8DRC-9VCH ].
159 See infra Appendix A.
160
Jituan Jianjie (集团简介) [Group Introduction], FUDE KONGGU JITUAN (富德控
股
集
团
)
[FUDE
HOLDING
GRP.],
http://www.fundegroup.com/web/introduction.aspx [https://perma.cc/PUW9PYPJ].
161
New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137; Guowuyuan (国务院) [State
Council], Guowuyuan Guanyu Baoxianye Gaige Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian(国务院
关于保险业改革发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions of the State Council on the
Reform and Development of the Insurance Industry] (Jun. 15, 2006),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-06/26/content_320050.htm
[https://perma.cc/D2T5-HZXN].
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Tomorrow Group were established shortly thereafter. 162 HNA
Group—an airline company that had acquired SOE assets 163 —
similarly established an insurance company joint venture, 164
becoming a PFCC.165
Also in 2006, the CIRC formally allowed insurance companies to
invest in up to two banks.166 Shortly thereafter, Ping An Group—
still the PRC’s second-largest life insurer167—gained control of two
Mainland China banks.168 By this time it had morphed into a PFCC
that controlled a range of significant non-financial subsidiaries with
business lines spanning e-commerce, hotel management, electronics
manufacturing, and expressway maintenance.169
See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137.
See David Barboza & Michael Forsythe, Behind the Rise of China’s HNA: The
Chairman’s
Brother,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/business/hna-group-deals-china.html
[https://perma.cc/G4HU-BXXR].
164 See Da Shiji (大事记) [Major Events], DINGCHENG RENSHOU (鼎诚人寿)
[DINGCHENG LIFE], https://www.dingchenglife.com.cn/c/2019-0923/485307.html [https://perma.cc/9L9F-F8W7].
165
HNA Group had already acquired a futures company in 2003. See Haihang
Jituan Caiwu Youxian Gongsi (海航集团财务有限公司) [HNA Group Finance Co., Ltd.],
QINGKE
YANJIU
(
清
科
研
究
)
[PEDATA.COM],
https://m.pedata.cn/ep/detail_254369410.html [https://perma.cc/Y4ER-7H6E].
166
Guanyu Baoxian Jigou Touzi Shangye Yinhang Guquan de Tongzhi (关于保险
机构投资商业银行股权的通知) [Notice on Insurance Institutions Investing in Equity of
Commercial
Banks]
(Oct.
16,
2006),
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200610/16/content_414876.htm [https://perma.cc/625U-SWGT].
167 See PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 3
(2010), https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2010/0427/ltn201
004271085.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP9U-8U6D].
168 See History, supra note 74.
169
Although Ping An Insurance Company of China gained control of financial
companies throughout the 1990s, it did not become an FCC until after it both
reorganized as Ping An Group and gained majority equity interests in several
principal subsidiaries engaged in non-financial businesses across a number of
sectors between 2007 and 2009. Compare PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD.,
supra note 167, at 144-46 (listing various non-financial companies in which Ping An
Group, by 2009, controlled over fifty percent of equity interest, including three
manufacturers, a consulting company, two IT companies, and three hotel
management businesses) with PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., ANNUAL
REPORT
2007,
at
121-23
(2008),
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2008/0326/ltn200803264
57.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W3K-AGM2] (presenting a list of principal subsidiaries
of Ping An Group as of December 2007, which only includes three non-financial
companies—two property managers and one expressway management company—
in which Ping An Group controlled over fifty percent of equity interest). In 2004,
Ping An became a publicly listed company in which U.K. and U.S. banks held major
162
163
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Mainland China’s First Internet PFCC Forms

As Mainland China’s private sector grew, so did a new online
retailer called Alibaba 170 which, in 2004, built out a payments
processing system called Alipay that allowed it to facilitate online
payments as the custodian of buyer and seller funds.171 Alipay soon
morphed into a mobile payments service with tens of millions of
users, prompting the PBOC to create a new regulatory framework
for these activities—Alipay received Mainland China’s first
Payments Business License in May 2011. 172 That same month,
Tenpay Payment Technology Co., Ltd. (“Tenpay”), a company
controlled by Tencent Holdings Ltd. (“Tencent”), an online gaming,
music, and social network company, also received one of these
licenses. 173 In 2013, Alipay and Alibaba’s financial services
stakes, but for which the largest shareholder was a Shenzhen municipal
government investment vehicle. See Christine Chan, HSBC to Strengthen Grip on
Ping
An,
S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Jun.
8,
2004),
https://www.scmp.com/article/458658/hsbc-strengthen-grip-ping
[https://perma.cc/7UEQ-2G4K]; see also History, supra note 74. By 2020, Ping An
Group’s Healthcare and Technology unit operated China’s largest online healthcare
platform, known as Ping An Good Doctor. See Eric Ng, Ping An Good Doctor, China’s
Largest Health Care Platform, Reports Jump in Users Amid Coronavirus, Smaller than
Expected Annual Loss, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3050074/ping-good-doctor-chinas-larg
est-health-care-platform-reports-jump-users [https://perma.cc/8M2X-J26P].
170 See DUNCAN CLARK, ALIBABA: THE HOUSE THAT JACK MA BUILT 131 (2016).
Alibaba was incorporated in 1999, but before then it had already been conducting
business for several years, and at the time of its incorporation had over 28,000
customers. Id. at 102.
171 See Julia Wu, A Brief History of Jack Ma’s Ant Financial - the $150B Unicorn,
HACKERNOON (Aug. 6, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/the-story-of-ant-financial4t2aq3zh8 [https://perma.cc/F3KG-2TJE].
172
Gongsi Licheng (公司历程) [Our History and Timeline], MAYI JITUAN (蚂蚁集
团 ) [ANT GRP.], https://www.antfin.com/history.htm [https://perma.cc/JZS633AG]. Notably, in 2011, Alipay was spun off into a company directly controlled
by Alibaba’s CEO. See Huang Yuntao & Kevin Soh, Alipay Gets License to Set Up Epayment System, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/usalipay/alipay-gets-licence-to-set-up-e-payment-system-idUSTRE74P26120110526
[https://perma.cc/KJV2-KB8L].
173 See Guanyu Caifutong (关于财付通) [About Tenpay], CAIFUTONG (财付通)
TENPAY,
https://www.tenpay.com/v3/helpcenter/about/about.shtml
[https://perma.cc/9MGR-AJAX]. Tenpay Payment Technology Co., Ltd. (财付通
支付科技有限公司) is also known as Tenpay, and it is reportedly over ninety-five
percent owned by Tencent Computer (深圳市腾讯计算机系统有限公司 or 腾讯计
算机 in Chinese). Caifutong Zhifu Keji Youxian Gongsi (财付通支付科技有限公司)
[Tenpay],
TIANYANCHA
(
天
眼
查
)
TIANYANCHA,
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businesses—including a sizable non-bank consumer micro-lending
service—were restructured into a new company soon rebranded as
Ant Financial, which later expanded its non-bank credit product
offerings.174 Ant Financial remained seventy-five percent owned by
Alibaba management and employees, 175 thus this Article treats
Alibaba as effectively maintaining control of Ant Financial as
Alipay’s annual payments processing volume grew to over $1
trillion USD in 2015.176

https://www.tianyancha.com/company/2313221010. Since 2005, Tencent has
controlled Tencent Computer through contractual agreements, even though it lacks
direct equity ownership in the company. See TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD., 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT
80,
83
(2006),
http://cdc-tencent-com1258344706.image.myqcloud.com/storage/uploads/2019/11/09/d530cf0097fd78
8ce2ff5d0583e6dcb4.pdf [https://perma.cc/37ZG-2F46]; TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD.,
infra note 181, at 261, 263.
174
Ant Financial’s formation process began in 2013, and by 2014, in addition
to Alipay and investment platforms, Ant Financial also operated Ant Credit, a nonbank lending service. See Ant Fin. Servs. Grp., Official Launch of Ant Financial
Services Group Brings New Financial Ecosystem to China, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141016005260/en/Official-Laun
ch-of-Ant-Financial-Services-Group-Brings-New-Financial-Ecosystem-to-China
[https://perma.cc/9CLX-7JJS]. By Q1 2014, Ant Credit “had loaned RMB190
billion for more than 700,000 small and micro-businesses.” IFC, Ant Financial
Services Group and Goldman Sachs 10,000 Women Launch First Internet-Based GenderFinance Program in China to Boost Women Entrepreneurship, INT’L FIN. CORP. (Jan. 27,
2015), https://ifcext.ifc.org/IFCExt/pressroom/IFCPressRoom.nsf/0/5DFDA58B
CBFE71B685257DDA00303B14?OpenDocument
[https://perma.cc/G74WQ3HH]. By 2017, Ant Financial operated five non-bank consumer and business
lending services. See CITIGROUP, BANK OF THE FUTURE: THE ABCS OF DIGITAL
DISRUPTION
IN
FINANCE
39
(2018),
https://www.citibank.com/commercialbank/insights/assets/docs/2018/The-Ba
nk-of-the-Future/2/ [https://perma.cc/72EM-ZFG8]. Additionally, by 2017, Ant
Financial also controlled two Chongqing-based non-bank small consumer loan
companies that in 2017 issued over 200 billion yuan in asset-backed securities. See
Yan Qinbo (闫沁波), Mayi Jinfu Jiang Zai Chongqing Sheli Xiaofei Jinrong Gongsi(蚂蚁
金服将在重庆设立消费金融公司) [Ant Financial Sets Up a Consumer Finance Company
in Chongqing], 21 CAIJING (21 财 经 ) [21 FINANCE] (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2018-02/06/content_80272.htm
[https://perma.cc/2SBB-5SGD]. For the purposes of this Article, all of the
consumer and business small loan services provided by Ant Financial are treated
as one financial company, while Ant Financial’s two Chongqing-based small loan
businesses are together treated as one financial company.
175
See ANT FIN., ANT FINANCIAL (2016), https://www.alibabagroup.com
/en/ir/pdf/160614/12.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF4T-QXMH].
176
See ZENNON KAPRON & MICHELLE MEERTENS, SOCIAL NETWORKS, ECOMMERCE PLATFORMS, AND THE GROWTH OF DIGITAL PAYMENT ECOSYSTEMS IN CHINA:
WHAT IT MEANS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 7 (2017), https://btca-prod1.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/284/english_attachments/ChinaReportApril20
17Highlights.pdf?1492606527 [https://perma.cc/H2YH-C3P2].
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This milestone marked the emergence of Mainland China’s first
“internet PFCC” (“IFCC”)—a subcategory of PFCC that
distinctively: (1) operates a large retail payment system ($1 trillion
USD processed annually); and (2) earns much of its revenue from
internet-related activities. 177 In 2015, Ant Financial also gained
control of a fund management company that it had already
partnered with to launch one of the world’s largest money market
mutual funds. 178 Unlike Ant Financial, Tencent operates a fund
management platform but does not control a major retail-oriented
fund management company,179 although throughout the late 2010s
both Tencent and Alibaba conducted very high levels of venture
capital investing. 180 Tencent-controlled non-bank lender Tenpay
Micro Loan launched in 2014, but Tencent did not become an IFCC
until 2016 after it both gained control of a bank and its annual
payments volume grew to over $1 trillion USD.181
177
As mentioned above, this Article treats $1 trillion USD in annual payment
processing volume as a threshold for determining whether the financial activities
of an FCC are “significant.” See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
178 See EO INTELLIGENCE, DECIPHERING THE TRILLION-VALUED UNICORN – ANT
FINANCIAL CASE STUDY 7-8 (2019), https://img2.iyiou.com/ThinkTank/2019-0621/Ant%20Financial%20Case%20Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VJ8-UZYG]
(reporting that in 2015, Ant Financial gained control of fifty-one percent of
Tianhong Asset Management’s total shares). Tianhong Asset Management
launched the Yu’e Bao money market fund in 2013 via a partnership with Ant
Financial. Id. at 6-7. By 2014, Yu’e Bao was the world’s fourteenth largest money
market mutual fund. See Gwynn Guilford, China’s $122 Billion Boom in Shadow
Banking
is
Happening
on
Phones,
QUARTZ
(Feb.
10,
2014),
https://qz.com/175421/chinas-122-billion-boom-in-shadow-banking-is-happenin
g-on-phones/[https://perma.cc/A5AX-24DF].
179
Tencent’s Licaitong is an online marketplace for financial products, through
which Tencent enables customers to invest in funds established by fund
management companies with which it partners, but does not control. See LEON QI,
JOHN CHOI & LIZ ZENG, DAIWA CAP. MKTS., DEMYSTIFYING INTERNET FINANCE 11
(2014),
http://asiaresearch.daiwacm.com/eg/cgibin/files/China_Financials_and_Internet_sectors_140312.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB4R-ES7Q].
180 See Savannah Dowling, Huge Rounds, Heated Competition: How Tencent &
Alibaba Are Defining VC in China, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Jan. 21, 2018),
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/huge-rounds-heated-competition-tencentalibaba-defining-vc-china/ [https://perma.cc/9CQ6-DY8G] (reporting that
Tencent’s and Alibaba’s participation in venture capital funding rounds grew
dramatically from 2013 to 2017, totaling over 200 and 100 investments,
respectively).
181
Tenpay Micro Loan (深圳市财付通网络金融小额贷款公司 or 财付通小贷 in
Chinese), which was founded in 2013 and lends to small and medium enterprises,
is ultimately controlled by Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology Co. Ltd. (深圳市世
纪凯旋科技有限公司), a company that, through contractual agreements rather than
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iii. 2010s Banking System Policy Decisions Enable Further PFCC
Growth
A series of 2010s policy decisions enabled Tencent and other
privately-owned conglomerates to expand into banking. First, in
2010, the State Council issued “Some Opinions on Encouraging and
Guiding the Sound Development of Private Investment,” calling for
more private capital in the financial services industry.182 The PBOC
also once again decided not to implement holding company
regulations for FCCs, although in 2011 it again proposed
introducing such regulations for some conglomerates. 183 Then in
2012, the CBRC issued “Suggestions on the Implementation of
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Invest in the Banking
Sector,” which affirmed that “private enterprises may invest in

equity ownership, is controlled by Tencent. See Shenzhenshi Caifutong Wangluo
Jinrong Xiaoe Daikuan Gongsi (深圳市财付通网络金融小额贷款公司) [Tenpay Micro
Loan],
TIANYANCHA
(
天
眼
查
)
TIANYANCHA,
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/2325765626 (providing information on
the nature of Tenpay Micro Loan’s business and the company’s origins, and
reporting that the firm is over seventy percent owned by Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan
Technology Co. Ltd.); TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 261, 263
(2020),
https://cdc-tencent-com1258344706.image.myqcloud.com/uploads/2020/04/02/ed18b0a8465d8bb733e33
8a1abe76b73.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2BF-U56L] (reporting that while Tencent
“does not have legal ownership in equity” of Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology
Co. Ltd., “under certain contractual agreements . . . [Tencent] and its other legally
owned subsidiaries control [Shenzhen Shiji Kaixuan Technology Co. Ltd.]”).
Tencent gained control of a bank in 2014. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
The volume of Tencent’s WeChat Pay transactions first exceeded $1 trillion USD in
2016. See KAPRON & MEERTENS, supra note 176, at 7. Tencent launched WeChat Pay
in 2013 by integrating Tenpay into its WeChat platform, and WeChat Pay payments
and transfers are routed through Tenpay. See About Tenpay, supra note 173.
182
Guowuyuan (国务院) [State Council], Guli He Yindao Minjian Touzi Jiankang
Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian (鼓励和引导民间投资健康发展的若干意见) [Some Opinions
on Encouraging and Guiding the Sound Development of Private Investment], art. 18
(2010),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-05/13/content_1605218.htm
[https://perma.cc/SX6T-BCU7].
183
See DELOITTE, JINRONG HUNYE JINGYING ZHENGSHI MAIRU XINPIANZHANG (金
融 混 业 经 营 正 式 迈 入 新 篇 章 ) [MIXED FINANCIAL COMPANIES HAVE OFFICIALLY
ENTERED
A
NEW
CHAPTER]
1-2
(2020),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cn/Documents/
financial-services/deloitte-cn-fsi-financial-holding-company-supervision-zh-2001
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC5B-RH3D].
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banking financial institutions through establishment, subscription
for new stock, transfer of equity, and merger and restructuring.”184
Amidst these policy shifts, HNA Group gained a twenty percent
stake in Yingkou Coastal Bank in 2010 with approval from the
CBRC. 185 That year, the CBRC also published a notice allowing
major shareholders to gain ownership interests exceeding twenty
percent of shares in some at-risk rural and urban commercial banks,
although it also generally restricted a single company from investing
in more than two banks. 186 Yet at the same time, the CBRC
accelerated efforts to merge troubled RCCs into joint-stock rural
commercial banks 187 and thus, in the following years, Tomorrow
Group expanded investments in two rural commercial banks, while
Anbang Group acquired a thirty-five percent share of Chengdu
Rural Commercial Bank.188 Overall, between 2002 and 2013, private
ownership of joint-stock banks increased from eleven to forty-five
percent and private ownership of city commercial banks increased
from nineteen to fifty-six percent.189
184
Guanyu Guli He Yindao Minjian Ziben Jinru Yinhangye de Shishi Yijian (关于
鼓励和引导民间资本进入银行业的实施意见) [Suggestions on the Implementation of
Encouraging and Guiding Private Capital to Invest in the Banking Sector], CHINA
BANKING
REGUL.
COMM’N
(May
26,
2012),
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/35AF2AE678A043
9BA5E296C3137A5652.html [https://perma.cc/Q5N4-468W].
185
Zhongguo Yinjianhui ( 中 国 银 监 会 ) [China Banking Regul. Comm’n],
Zhongguo Yinjianhui Guanyu Choujian Yingkou Yanhai Yinhang de Pifu (中国银监会关
于筹建营口沿海银行的批复) [Reply of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on the
Establishment of Yingkou Coastal Bank], ZHONGGUO YINJIANHUI (中国银监会) [CHINA
BANKING
&
INS.
REGUL.
COMM’N]
(Oct.
25,
2010),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=272901&itemI
d=4110&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/YSL8-FHW5].
186
Zhongguo Yinjianhui ( 中 国 银 监 会 ) [China Banking Regul. Comm’n],
Zhongguo Yinjianhui Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Zhongxiao Shangye Yinhang Zhuyao
Gudong Zige Shenhe de Tongzhi (中国银监会办公厅关于加强中小商业银行主要股东
资 格 审 核 的 通 知 ) [Notice of the General Office of the China Banking Regulatory
Commission on Strengthening the Qualification Review of Major Shareholders of Small and
Medium-sized Commercial Banks], ZHONGGUO YINJIANHUI ( 中 国 银 监 会 ) [CHINA
BANKING
&
INS.
REGUL.
COMM’N],
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/govermentDetail.html?docId=278643
&itemId=863&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/327A-UPUS].
187 See MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42380, CHINA’S BANKING
SYSTEM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42380.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TQ29-KMHU].
188 See New Fortune FCC history, supra note 137.
189
See Qingmin Yan (阎庆民), Yinjianhui Zhuxi Yanqingmin Tan Minying
Yinhang Shidian Gongzuo (银监会副主席阎庆民谈民营银行试点工作) [Qingmin
Yan, Vice Chairman of the CBRC, Talks Sbout the Pilot Work of Private Banks],
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Yet until 2014, no Mainland China-based banks had been
established entirely with private capital in the PRC.190 That year, the
CBRC approved the establishment of five pilot privately-owned
banks.191 The first of the pilot banks, WeBank, was established in
2014 and is controlled by Tencent. 192 Two other pilot banks
established in 2015 were also backed by PFCCs: 1) MYbank,
controlled by Ant Financial; and 2) Shanghai Huarui Bank,
controlled by JuneYao Group, an FCC that also controls a range of
non-financial business including a namesake airline and several
consumer goods retailers.193 The CBRC soon formalized the process
by which privately-owned banks are formed by issuing related

ZHONGGUO YINJIANHUI (中国银监会) [CHINA BANKING & INS. REGUL. COMM’N] (Mar.
11,
2014),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=44777&itemId
=915&generaltype=0 [https://perma.cc/845L-4T8T].
190
Before 2014, Mainland China only had one bank founded by private
capital—Minsheng Bank. See Xinhua, China Regulator Approves Operation of Private
Webank,
CHINA
DAILY
(Dec.
13,
2014),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-12/13/content_19080267.htm
[https://perma.cc/9E5F-3ZGC]. However, Minsheng Bank was not entirely
founded by private capital. See About CMBC, CHINA MINSHENG BANK (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://en.cmbc.com.cn/CMBCToday/AboutCMBC/IntroductiontoCMBC/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/62VR-D8MN] (noting that Minsheng Bank was the “first
national joint-stock commercial bank initiated and founded mainly from nonpublic enterprises”).
191 See Jamil Anderlini, China Opens Door to Private Banks, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/7096239e-a8e0-11e3-bf0c-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/WSH2-AT2M].
192 See Yang Ge, Online Banks Tied to Tencent, Alibaba Bulk Up 1 Yuan at a Time
on Microloans, CAIXIN (Jun. 7. 2017), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-0607/online-banks-tied-to-tencent-alibaba-bulk-up-1-yuan-at-a-time-on-microloans101099195.html [https://perma.cc/WSH2-AT2M] (reporting that WeBank is 30
percent owned by Tencent). A mid-2017 New Fortune article reported that Tencent
controlled WeBank; see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
193
See Jiang Xueqing, Micro Firms Handed a Boost, Thanks to New Breed of Private
Banks,
CHINA
DAILY
(Jan.
22,
2019),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/22/WS5c46805aa3106c65c34e5cb6.htm
l [https://perma.cc/4HC9-2T8T] (reporting that MYBank is thirty percent owned
by Ant Financial); Huarui Bank, JUNEYAO, http://www.en.juneyao.com/hrbank
/index.jhtml [https://perma.cc/HXP6-5X66] (reporting that Shanghai Huirui Bank
formally started operation in May 2015). A mid-2017 New Fortune article reported
that Ant Financial controlled MYbank while JuneYao Group controlled Shanghai
Huirui Bank as well as a TIC. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. For
information on JuneYao Group’s non-financial business lines, see Appendix A, and
Group
Introduction,
JUNEYAO,
http://www.en.juneyao.com/
GroupIntroduction.jhtml [https://perma.cc/V58X-E52S].
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licensing procedures and regulatory requirements in 2015. 194 By
2017, the CBRC approved the establishment of seventeen privatelyowned banks including Jiangsu Suning Bank, backed by consumer
goods retailer Suning.com Co., Ltd. (“Suning Commerce Group”),195
marking the formation of another PFCC.196

194
CBRC, Guidance on Promoting the Development of Private-owned Banks,
GOV.CN
(June
22,
2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/201506/22/content_5042920.htm [https://perma.cc/5WU6-PMDR].
195
See Li Dongmei, Chinese Retailer Suning Launches Private Internet Bank,
CHINA
MONEY
NETWORK
(June
19,
2017),
https://www.chinamoneynetwork.com/2017/06/19/chinese-retailer-suninglaunches-private-internet-bank [https://perma.cc/DM9J-WADB]; Suning Tesco,
Suning,
https://www.suningholdings.com/cms/suningdqtxtdata/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/R76A-5RV3]. Given the PBOC’s classification of Suning
Commerce Group as a “de-facto financial holding company,” as well as thresholds
used in foreign regulatory regimes to determine that a non-financial firm controls
a bank, this Article treats Jiangsu Suning Bank as being controlled by Suning
Commerce Group. See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169; infra notes 315320, 345-349 and accompanying text (explaining how twenty-five and twenty
percent ownership stakes held by a non-financial company in a bank are used by
U.S. and EU financial regulators, respectively, to determine whether a heightened
regulatory regime is appropriate). Suning.com Co., Ltd. is also called Suning
Commerce Group (苏宁云商集团股份有限公司). See Suning Tesco, supra.
196
By 2017, Suning Commerce Group also controlled Suning Financial
Services, which offers non-bank consumer and business loans. See MANCY SUN,
PIYUSH MUBAYI, TIAN LU & STANLEY TIAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, THE RISE OF CHINA
FINTECH 66 (2017), https://hybg.cebnet.com.cn/upload/gaoshengfintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JDY-SN4V]. In 2017, Suning Financial Services reportedly
offered $24.3 billion USD loans. See Zhou Pengfeng (周鹏峰), Minying Jinkong
Yangben Zhi Suning Jinrong: Sanzudingli You Youhuo You Tiaozhan (民营金控样本之
苏宁金融：三足鼎立 有诱惑有挑战) [Suning Finance, a Specimen of Private Finance: A
Three-Legged Stand with Temptations and Challenges], 21 JINGJIWANG (21 经 济 网 )
[21JINGJI.COM]
(Sep.
1,
2018),
http://www.21jingji.com/2018/91/wMMDEzODBfMTQ0NzIwMQ.html [https://perma.cc/64GA-3MWP]. For the
purposes of this Article, Suning Financial Services and its various financial
affiliates, including numerous regional non-bank lending subsidiaries, are
collectively treated as one “company that, through one or more non-bank lending
businesses, conducts a high level of financial intermediation,” one of the nine types
of financial companies considered in this Article’s categorization of FCCs. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text (providing the methodology used in this Article to
classify FCCs); Shanghai Suning Jinrong Fuwu Jituan Youxian Gongsi (上海苏宁金融
服务集团有限公司) [Shanghai Suning Financial Services Group Co., Ltd.], TIANYANCHA
( 天 眼 查 ) TIANYANCHA, https://www.tianyancha.com/company/3403000763
(reporting that Shanghai Suning Financial Services Group, also known as Suning
Financial Services, controls numerous provincial non-bank small business lending
subsidiaries, as well as various other financial companies that do not correspond to
the nine types of financial companies considered in this Article’s categorization of
FCCs).
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE, STRUCTURE, AND REGULATION OF FCCS IN
MAINLAND CHINA
FCCs play a critical role in Mainland China’s financial system
across various industry verticals, including banking, payments,
insurance, and fund management. This Part presents estimates of
the extent to which financial companies controlled by FCCs
participate in key segments of Mainland China’s financial markets.
It also examines causes of and policy issues related to FCC
organizational complexity that compound the difficulty of
identifying, assessing, and regulating the financial market risks
posed by Mainland China’s FCCs.
a. Mainland China’s FCCs Are Significant Across Financial Industry
Verticals
Appendix A provides a list of large FCCs used to estimate the
scope of financial services activities conducted by Mainland China’s
FCC-controlled firms. These FCCs were identified using data from
several prominent Chinese financial news and data aggregation
services—including New Fortune, Wind, and TianYanCha—as well
as an analytical framework provided in the PBOC’s 2018 Financial
Stability Report. 197 Importantly, given the prevalence of complex
197
Appendix A is primarily sourced from mid-2017 New Fortune publications
that list financial companies controlled by the PRC’s largest state-owned and
privately-owned conglomerates, ranked by financial assets. Su Longfei (苏龙飞),
Zhongguo Minying Jinrong Quanli Bang TOP100: Mayun Jingran Zhi Pai Diwu, Naxie
Ren Bi Ta Geng (中国民营金融权力榜 TOP100：马云竟然只排第五，哪些人比他更
有权力?) [Top 100 of China’s Private Financial Power List: Jack Ma Is Only Fifth, Who Is
More Powerful than Him?], XIN CAIFU ( 新 财 富 ) [NEW FORTUNE] (July 11, 2017),
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/A_y9igKA7A8Rnt0WQYScag
[https://perma.cc/N3K9-TBFH]; Su Longfei (苏龙飞), Yang Qi Jinrong Quanli Bang:
ZhaoShangju, Huarun, Guojia Dianwang, Yancao Zonggongsi……Jiemi 23 Da Shiye
YnagYnagYnagYnagYangYnag Qi Jinrong Quan Buju (央企金融权力榜：招商局、华
润、国家电网、烟草总公司……揭秘 23 大实业央企金融全布局!) [List of Financial
Powers of Central-Government-Owned Enterprises: China Merchants, China Resources,
State Grid, Tobacco Corporation . . . Unveiled the Full Layout of 23 Major Industrial
Central-Government-Owned Enterprises!], XIN CAIFU (新财富) [NEW FORTUNE] (July
13,
2017)
[collectively
hereinafter
New
Fortune
2017
Reports],
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/4_Ay3Hc2vOhuwk1d06Y7zg
[https://perma.cc/9H2D-GJKS]. Besides Tencent, all conglomerates listed in the
New Fortune 2017 Reports that are also included in Appendix A are those that
conform with this Article’s definition of an FCC because, as of 2016-17: (1) each
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conglomerate controlled two or more of the nine types of financial companies
considered in this Article’s approach to identifying FCCs; (2) financial companies
controlled by each conglomerate collectively accounted for over $10 billion USD
(about 70 billion yuan) in financial assets; and (3) each conglomerate operated large
non-financial business lines. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Capital
leasing companies listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports, however, are excluded
from estimates of FCC-controlled financial companies set forth in Appendix A, as
these are not one of the nine types of financial companies considered in this article’s
approach to identifying FCCs. Also, even though the New Fortune 2017 Reports
indicate that Tencent’s 2017 financial assets were below the $10 billion USD
threshold, this article still considers it an FCC because of the scale of its payment
system. See id. For an overview of the sources used to determine if a conglomerate
listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports operated large non-financial business lines
in 2016-17, see infra note 407. Notably, given the close relationship between Alibaba
and Ant Financial, this Article treats Alibaba as an FCC rather than Ant Financial,
the entity listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports. See supra notes 174-176 and
accompanying text. Appendix A also includes four FCCs not listed in the New
Fortune 2017 Reports: CITIC Group, China Everbright Group, Shougang Group,
and Suning Commerce Group. The PBOC has categorized CITIC Group, China
Everbright Group, and Suning Commerce Group as “de-facto financial holding
companies.” See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 168-69. This Article treats
Suning Commerce Group as controlling two financial companies that are types
considered in this article’s approach to identifying FCCs. See supra notes 195-196
and accompanying text (listing financial companies controlled by Suning
Commerce Group). This article treats CITIC Group as controlling seven of these
financial companies: CITIC Bank (which together with AiBank and CITIC Bank’s
subsidiaries, including China CITIC Bank International, is treated as a single
financial company), CITIC Trust, CITIC Securities (which together with its financial
company subsidiaries, besides CITIC Futures, is treated as one financial company),
CITIC Futures, CITIC-Prudential Fund Management Co., Ltd., CITIC Finance Co.,
Ltd. (an internal financial company), and CITIC-Prudential Life Insurance Co., Ltd.
See CITIC LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 175, 336-39 (2018),
https://www.citic.com/ar2017/download%20center/en/e00267.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BYZ-2UMY] (reporting CITIC Group as the parent company
of CITIC Ltd., which at the time held fifty percent or more shares in each of CITIC
Bank, CITIC-Prudential Life Insurance Co., Ltd., CITIC Trust, and CITIC Finance
Co., Ltd.); Group Structure, CITIC INT’L FIN. HOLDINGS LTD. (Dec. 15, 2017),
http://www.citicifh.com/eng/structure/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/5ED3XPXZ] (reporting that CITIC Bank, through a subsidiary, as of December 2017
controlled seventy-five percent of China CITIC Bank International); Gongsi Jianjie (
公司简介) [Company Profile], ZHONGXIN BAOCHENG (中信保诚) CITIC-PRUDENTIAL
FUND MGT. CO., LTD., https://www.citicprufunds.com.cn/pc/companyInfo
[https://perma.cc/73DA-Y6A7] (explaining that CITIC-Prudential Fund
Management Co., Ltd, founded in 2005, is a joint-venture of CITIC Trust and
Prudential Group Co, Ltd.); CITIC SEC., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 54, 106 (2018),
http://www.citics.com/newsite/en/FinancialInformation/FinancialReport/2018
04/P020180420605294602805.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5NQ-STJH] (reporting that
in 2017 CITIC Securities controlled CITIC Futures as well as other financial
companies, and that 16.5 percent of CITIC Securities shares were ultimately
controlled by CITIC Group, by far the largest shareholder). Given the close
relationship between CITIC Group and CITIC Securities, this article treats CITIC
Securities as being controlled by CITIC Group. See id. (detailing numerous
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significant CITIC Securities related party transactions with CITIC Group); Nisha
Gopalan, How CLSA Had the Life Squeezed out of It, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-09/clsa-losing-identitythreatens-citic-s-global-ambitions [https://perma.cc/X7FH-X4J3] (referring to
CITIC Securities as a unit of CITIC Group); Zhonggong Zhongxin Jituan
Weiyuanhui (中共中信集团委员会) [CCP CITIC Group Committee], Zhonggong
Zhongxin Jituan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xunshi Zhenggai Qingkuang de Tongbao (中共中
信集团委员会关于巡视整改情况的通报) CCP CITIC Group Committee Announcement
on Inspection and Rectification, Zhonggong Zhongyang Jilü Jiancha Weiyuanhui (中
共 中 央 纪 律 检 查 委 员 会 ) [Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the
Communist
Party
of
China]
(Apr.
27,
2016),
www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/zyxszt/2015dsl_zyxs/agls_2015dsl_zyxs/201605/t2016
0501_78340.html [https://perma.cc/2P44-SAXV] (indicating that CITIC Securities
acts as a subsidiary of CITIC Group). This article treats China Everbright Group as
controlling seven financial companies that are types considered in this article’s
approach to identifying FCCs. Zhongguo Guangda Jituan Gufengongsi (中国光大集团
股 份 公 司 ) [China Everbright Group], TIANYANCHA ( 天 眼 查 ),
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/210456243 (reporting that China
Everbright Group owns fifty percent or more shares of each of Everbright Sun Life
Insurance Co., Everbright Xinglong Trust Co., Ltd., China Everbright International
Trust & Investment Corporation, and Everbright Financial Holding Asset
Management Co., Ltd.—which either directly or through subsidiaries controls
several fund companies and is, for purposes of this Article, treated as a single
financial company); CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 65, 67-68 (2018),
http://www.cebbank.com/site/gdywwz/Investor%20Relations/Financial%20Re
ports/H_Share81/66410664/2018042722274447511.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M5YYKJ4] (reporting that in 2017 China Everbright Group and its state owner Central
Huijin Investment Ltd. together controlled over fifty percent of China Everbright
Bank’s shares); EVERBRIGHT SEC. CO., LTD., ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANNUAL RESULTS FOR
THE
YEAR
ENDED
DECEMBER
31,
2017,
at
106
(2018),
http://www.ebscn.com/upload/20180327/20180327083850883.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DL3V-3R8L] (reporting that as of December 2017, China
Everbright Group was the controlling shareholder of Everbright Securities
Company Limited, which is, together with its subsidiaries, treated as a single
financial company in this article, with the exception of Everbright Futures Co., Ltd.,
which this Article treats as a separate financial company). This Article also treats
Shougang Group as a FCC, even though it is not explicitly mentioned by the PBOC.
See Shougang Jituan Youxian Gongsi (首钢集团有限公司) [Shougang Group Limited
Company],
TIANYANCHA
(
天
眼
查
)
[TIANYANCHA],
https://www.tianyancha.com/company/672482 (reporting that Shougang Group
controls one internal financial company and a fund company that controls other
financial companies but for purposes of this article is treated as a single financial
company); infra note 200 (explaining that in mid-2017 Shougang Group controlled
over 20 percent of Huaxia Bank, a large bank). This Article’s counts of financial
companies controlled by Suning Commerce Group and the two large IFCCs include
payments and non-bank lending companies that are not included in tallies
presented in the New Fortune 2017 Reports. See supra notes 5, 174, 181 and
accompanying text (explaining the circumstances under which these types of
financial companies are included in this Article’s counts of financial companies
controlled by an FCC as well as how many of these types of companies are
controlled by the IFCCs).
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FCC organizational structures that rely on cross-shareholding and
ownership pyramids,198 as well as the lack of public information on
ownership relationships between opaquely organized FCCs and
non-listed banks and insurers, it can be difficult to determine
whether a particular financial firm is controlled by an FCC. This
Article largely relies on mid-2017 New Fortune investigative reports
to make these determinations, which were critical to producing
Figure 1 and Table 1 below.199
i.

Banking: FCC-Controlled Banks Account for One-Quarter of
Banking Assets Held Outside the Large SOBs

According to the estimate presented in Figure 1,200 by mid-2017,
FCC-controlled banks accounted for about thirteen percent of
Mainland China’s commercial banking assets, while banks
198
For an explanation of these ownership structures that enable an FCC to
control a financial company even though it does not directly own the majority of
shares, see infra notes 225-228 and accompanying text.
199 See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200
Appendix B lists all banks included in this analysis, and was primarily
developed by cross-referencing Appendix A’s list of FCCs with New Fortune’s lists
of banks controlled by Mainland China’s largest conglomerates in 2016-17, using
each conglomerate’s respective ownership share in the bank(s) it controlled. See
New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197 and accompanying text. For the four
FCCs identified in this Article but not listed in the New Fortune 2017 Reports, the
following sources are used to determine each FCC’s ownership stake in its
respective bank affiliate: CITIC LTD., supra note 197 and accompanying text; HUA
XIA
BANK
CO.,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2017,
at
64
(2018),
http://www.hxb.com.cn/en/images/abouthuaxiabank/investorrelationship/inf
ormationdisclosureannualreport/2018/07/13/81C01D5A8B7C45D21CA6DF1FC
D7B2D6C.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT7J-2F3Q] (reporting that in mid-2017,
Shougang Group controlled 20.28 percent of Huaxia Bank); CHINA EVERBRIGHT
BANK, supra note 197 and accompanying text. Suning Commerce Group is excluded
from Appendix B because it did not establish a bank until mid-2017. For each of
the banks listed in Appendix B, Wind data was used to determine Q2 2017 banking
assets, except in three instances where data limitations necessitated that 2016 Wind
data be used, and one instance where 2015 data, as reported by New Fortune, was
used. See Wind Financial Terminal, WIND, https://www.wind.com.cn/en/wft.html
[https://perma.cc/GA68-RLD5]; infra note 408 and accompanying text. SOB and
total commercial bank assets data used to produce Figure 1 was obtained from the
CBRC website. Yinhangye Jianguan Tongjizhibiao Yuedu Qingkuangbiao (2017 Nian) (
银行业监管统计指标月度情况表 (2017 年)) [Monthly Statistics Fact Sheet], ZHONGGUO
YINHANG BAOXIAN JIANDUGUANLI WEIYUANHUI ( 中 国 银 行保 险 监 督管 理委 员 会 )
[CHINA
BANKING
&
INS.
REGUL.
COMM’N]
(Feb.
1,
2018),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=146945&itemI
d=954&generaltype=0 [https://perma.cc/J53C-YPVH].
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“influenced” by FCCs—meaning that an FCC held twenty percent
or more of shares, but there is no clear indication that as of mid-2017
it controlled the bank—accounted for almost six percent of
commercial banking assets.
Figure 1: FCC-Controlled and FCC-Influenced Banks Account
for Almost 20 Percent of Mainland China Commercial Banking
Assets by 2017

Of the twenty-two banks controlled by FCCs in early 2017, the
largest were China Merchants Bank, CITIC Bank, China Everbright
Bank, and Ping An Bank.201 Overall, in mid-2017, FCC-controlled
banks accounted for at least twenty-four percent of Mainland China
commercial banking assets not controlled by large SOBs,202 totaling
23 trillion yuan (approximately $3.4 trillion USD).203
ii.

Payments: IFCCs Operate Major Retail Payments Systems

According to a J.P. Morgan analysis, fifty-four percent of
Mainland China’s 2018 e-commerce spending by value took place
via digital wallet mobile payments services. 204 Moreover, a 2018
study reported that digital wallet mobile payments services
accounted for forty percent of Mainland China’s retail in-person

201 See infra Appendix B. This table excludes a bank controlled by Suning
Commerce Group.
202 See supra Figure 1 (grouping the Mainland China banking assets by FCCcontrolled banks’, FCC-influenced banks, large state-owned banks and “other
banks”).
203 See infra Appendix B. For conversion rate, see Exchange Rates, supra note
18.
204
E-commerce
Payments
Trends:
China,
J.P.MORGAN
(2019)
https://www.jpmorgan.com/merchant-services/insights/reports/china
[https://perma.cc/JC8S-2XN7].
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spending. 205 Across e-commerce and in-person spending, over
ninety percent of Q4 2018 mobile payments were executed via
services provided by the PRC’s two IFCCs, Tencent and Alibaba.206
Taken together, these findings suggest that payments companies
controlled by the PRC’s two IFCCs accounted for forty to fifty
percent of Mainland China’s retail payments in 2018.207
iii. Insurance, Fund Management, and TICs: FCCs Have Sizable
Market Shares
By 2017, several FCCs played a very large role in the PRC’s
insurance industry. Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, data compiled by
S&P Global Ratings and New Fortune together suggest that in early
2017, FCC-controlled life insurance companies accounted for over
one-third of life insurance policies written in Mainland China.208

205
SUKRITI BANSAL, PHILIP BRUNO, OLIVIER DENECKER, MADHAV GOPARAJU &
MARC NIEDERKORN, GLOBAL PAYMENTS 2018: A DYNAMIC INDUSTRY CONTINUES TO
BREAK
NEW
GROUND
8
(2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial%20Servi
ces/Our%20Insights/Global%20payments%20Expansive%20growth%20targeted
%20opportunities/Global-payments-map-2018.ashx
[https://perma.cc/J33RLUFF].
206
JOSHUA YOUNGER, ALEX YAO, KATHERINE LEI & ARTHUR LUK, J.P. MORGAN, A
CASE STUDY IN ALTERNATIVE PAYMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE 7
(2019).
207
This figure is estimated using data reported by other sources. See supra
notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
208
To produce Table 1, each of the PRC’s twenty-five largest life insurance
companies and their respective market share, as reported by S&P Global Ratings,
was cross-referenced against insurers that, according to the New Fortune 2017
Reports, were controlled by FCCs listed in Appendix A. See infra Appendix A; New
Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197; S&P GLOBAL, CHINA’S TOP 25 INSURERS 39
(2017),
https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/0/China%27s+Top+25+Insurers
/5f4d65c5-130c-4027-83dd-dd3eec5b8796 [https://perma.cc/DVJ6-K6N3].
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TABLE 1: 2017 ESTIMATED MARKET SHARE OF FCC-CONTROLLED
LIFE INSURERS
FCC that Controls the
Insurers (est. mid-2017
ownership stake)
Ping An Life Insurance
Ping An Group (99.5%)
平安人寿
Anbang Life Insurance
Anbang Group (100%)
安邦人寿
Huaxia Life Insurance
Tomorrow Group (93%)
华夏人寿
Funde Sino Life Co. Ltd.
Funde Group (81%)
富德生命
Tianan Life Insurance
Tomorrow Group (40%)
天安人寿
Evergrande Life Insurance
Evergrande Group (50%)
恒大人寿
Qianhai Life Insurance
Baoneng Group (100%)
前海人寿
Estimated total market share of FCC-controlled life insurers
Insurance Company

Chinese
Name

Market Share of Q1
2017 Life Insurance
Policies Written
13.2%
9.0%
5.3%
3.9%
2.6%
1.0%
1.0%
36.0%

The PRC’s large FCCs also play a major role in fund
management. Most significantly, Ant Financial’s money market
fund is one of the largest in the world, with over one trillion yuan in
assets under management in 2018.209 The fund assets of other FCCs
listed in Appendix A are also substantial, and totaled over one
trillion yuan at year-end 2016.210 Moreover, both IFCCs also serve
as important channels through which retail investors invest in bankadministered wealth management products 211 that are similar to
MMFs. Serving as funding vehicles to various financial institutions,
these wealth management products collectively accounted for 22.2
trillion yuan in assets under management by 2019.212
By year-end 2016, the total assets of TICs controlled by FCCs
listed in Appendix A likely equaled about seven trillion yuan,213 and
Mainland China’s TIC assets reportedly totaled 23 trillion yuan in

See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 9.
The total asset value of FCC-controlled funds was calculated by summing
the 2016 fund assets reported by New Fortune for funds it reported as controlled
by FCCs listed in Appendix A. See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197; see
infra Appendix A.
211 See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 11-12.
212 See id.; Ehlers, Kong & Zhu, supra note 17.
213
The total asset value of FCC-controlled TICs was calculated by summing
the 2016 TIC assets reported by New Fortune for TICs it reported as controlled by
FCCs listed in Appendix A. See New Fortune 2017 Reports, supra note 197; see infra
Appendix A.
209
210
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mid-2017. 214 Thus, overall, TICs controlled by Mainland China’s
FCCs likely accounted for about 30 percent of total TIC assets in
early 2017. These TICs largely serve either as funding vehicles
through which assets of wealthy individuals or businesses are used
to finance high-risk projects, or as a conduit through which banks
and other financial firms can invest in asset classes that they would
otherwise not be able to purchase due to regulatory reasons.215
b. Understanding FCC Organizational Complexity and Related
Regulatory Challenges
The PBOC’s 2018 Financial Stability Report flagged the rapid
growth of non-financial conglomerates controlling two or more
types of financial firms as a potential risk to the Chinese economy,
warning that these groups’ complex structures can enable excessive
financial leverage, impede supervision, and enable corporate
groups to circumvent regulations on improper intra-group
transactions.216 This Section identifies drivers and characteristics of
FCC organizational complexity, explores how the PBOC and market
observers believe FCC structures contribute to regulatory
challenges, and examines the potential impact of recent regulatory
shifts aimed at addressing some of these issues.
i.

Cross-Shareholding & Pyramids: Characteristics of Many FCC
Structures

During the early 2000s, as sweeping legal and policy changes
and economic turmoil helped drive many FCCs to form, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) found that PRC regulators were understaffed and ill-

214
BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., CHINA TRUST INDUSTRY REPORT 2 (2018),
http://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-China-Trust-Report-Feb-2018_ENG_tcm
52-188092.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XS5-SZGQ].
215
PING AN TRUST CO. & MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE COMING
TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA’S TRUST INDUSTRY—CHINA TRUST INDUSTRY REPORT 2013,
at
4
(2013),
http://www.mckinseychina.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/mckinsey-china-the-coming-transformation-of-chinastrust-industry.pdf?5c8e08 [https://perma.cc/FGV3-ASZJ].
216
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-70.
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equipped to conduct proper industry oversight. 217 Accordingly,
some of the large FCCs that emerged in the 2000s were established
through opaque webs of shell companies and non-publicly-listed
financial institutions.218 Indeed, up until regulations were tightened
in 2018,219 rules aimed at restricting a single entity from controlling
more than one bank and one insurer were systematically
circumvented through regulatory arbitrage whereby complex FCC
structures were used to exert control over numerous financial
institutions.220 This problem was exacerbated by unclear definitions

217
See OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC POLICY
CHALLENGES 50 (2002).
218 See Michael Forsythe, Behind China’s Anbang: Empty Offices and Obscure
Names,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sep.
1,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/asia/china-anbang-insurance.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/Y2BP-7SL5] (reporting on Anbang Group’s complex web of
business units); David Barboza, Behind a Chinese Powerhouse, a Web of Family
Financial
Ties,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
18,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/business/dealbook/hna-debt-deal-hain
an-airlines.html [https://perma.cc/UW3Q-7F4N] (reporting on the conglomerate
structure of HNA Group).
219
In 2018 and 2019, the CBRC, CIRC, and CSRC tightened supervisory
loopholes that enabled corporate groups to control numerous financial companies.
Shangyeyinhang Guquan Guanli Zanxing Banfa (商业银行股权管理暂行 办法 )
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Equities of Commercial Banks]
(promulgated by China Banking Regul. Comm’n, Jan. 5, 2018, effective Jan. 5, 2018),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/govermentDetail.html?docId=265032
&itemId=861&generaltype=1 [https://perma.cc/UE7B-MXWS]; Baoxiangongsi
Guquan Guanlibanfa (保险公司股权管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of
Equities of Insurance Companies] (promulgated by China Insurance Regulatory
Commission,
Apr.
10,
2018,
effective
Apr.
10,
2018),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=372940&itemI
d=928&generaltype=0
[https://perma.cc/R74E-TKWH];
Zhengquangongsi
Guquan Guanliguiding (证券公司股权管理规定) [Provisions on the Administration
of Equities of Securities Companies] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory
Commission,
July
5,
2019,
effective
July
5,
2019),
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201907/P020190705633045079946.p
df [https://perma.cc/6K9K-LLPA].
220 See Tian Jing (田静), Jituan Nei Jinrongjigou Jianguan Mianlin de Tiaozhan Yu
Duice (集团内金融机构监管面临的挑战与对策) [Challenges and Countermeasures
Faced by Group Financial Institutions], 98 BIJIAO (比较) [COMP. STUD.] 228, 228 (2018),
http://bijiao.caixin.com/2019-01-16/101370632.html [https://perma.cc/6DUP3GP7]; PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170; see also Peng Qinqin & Liu Xiao,
Party’s Over for China’s Financial Holding Companies, CAIXIN (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-11-20/partys-over-for-chinas-financialholding-companies-101173771.html [https://perma.cc/TX7B-5DTT] (observing
that rules restricting a single company and its affiliates from collectively controlling
more than one bank were “widely circumvented” throughout the 2010s).
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of critical legal terms such as “shareholder,” enabling FCCs to
circumvent regulatory barriers to bank and insurer acquisitions.221
By December 2017, the PRC was “materially non-compliant”
with international regulatory best practices related to monitoring
the transfer of significant bank ownership stakes, as Mainland China
regulators had, according to the IMF, “no systematic process for
regularly receiving/collecting information on names and holdings
of all significant shareholders or those that exert controlling
influence [over banks].” 222 Indeed, during this time, the ultimate
controlling shareholders of some large FCCs were unknown
entities.223 This outcome was enabled by highly-complex webs of
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings 224 —organizational
approaches through which an FCC’s ultimate controlling
shareholder is able to control a financial firm despite only directly
owning a minority of its voting rights.
Through pyramid structures, a controlling minority shareholder
of a holding company can exert control over a financial firm in
which that holding company maintains a controlling stake. 225
Complex FCCs generally utilize multi-tiered pyramid structures,226
thereby compounding the gap between an FCC parent company’s
share of cash flow rights and the extent of its control over a financial
firm.
Cross-shareholding, on the other hand, occurs when
companies own stakes in each other, which in other words means
221
See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. For example, Haier
established five different companies to gain control over a bank. See supra note 135
and accompanying text.
222
IMF, People’s Republic of China: Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed
Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
Country
Report
No.
17/403,
at
256
(Dec.
2017),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/12/26/Peoples-Republi
c-of-China-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Detailed-Assessment-of-45516
[https://perma.cc/UY7Q-FULY].
223
For example, in 2017, HNA Group’s largest shareholder was essentially an
unknown person. See Who Owns HNA, China’s Most Aggressive Dealmaker?, FIN.
TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8acfe40e-410b-11e7-9d5625f963e998b2 [https://perma.cc/JSC8-WLYA].
224 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-70; Tian Jing, supra note
220, at 228.
225 See Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids,
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating
Control from Cash Flow Rights 1, 5-7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
6591, 1999), https://www.nber.org/papers/w6951 [https://perma.cc/WCY9VVXF].
226 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169-170; Tian Jing, supra note
220, at 228.
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that each company indirectly owns some of its own shares.227 An
FCC can use cross-shareholding to allocate voting shares in such a
way that greatly reduces the number of shares it must own to control
an affiliated financial firm.228
According to the PBOC, Mainland China’s FCCs have exerted
control over financial companies by using a mix of crossshareholding and pyramid structures. 229 Indeed, by 2018, the
ownership structures of some FCCs were highly complex and
involved dozens of corporate levels. 230 Opaque and complex
structures of FCCs have exacerbated financial risks and impeded
effective supervision, for reasons explained below.
ii.

FCC Complexity Impedes Effective Capital Regulation

Capital acts as the “first line of defense against losses” for
financial institutions, 231 and regulatory requirements related to
capital levels aim to ensure that an institution’s capital is high
enough to absorb significant losses. 232 Higher capital levels also
reduce the likelihood that linkages between multiple financial firms
will result in one entity’s failure triggering failures of others.233 In
late 2018, the PBOC warned that complex ownership structures
within Mainland China’s FCCs create the risk that banks and
See Bebchuck, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 225, at 7-8.
See GUIDO FERRARINI, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL LAW REFORM
AND
THE
CONTESTABILITY
OF
CORPORATE
CONTROL
11
(2000),
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1931676.p
df [https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM] (explaining that “cross-[share]holdings allow
[a] company involved to place into friendly hands a number of its own shares,
thereby reducing the investment required to the controllers to keep control of the
relevant company”).
229
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169 (observing that some “de-facto
financial holding companies . . . invest in financial institutions through
multilayered shareholding and cross-holdings”).
230 Id.
231
Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation,
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 763, 764 (2010).
232 See Why Do Banks Need to Hold Capital?, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (May 3,
2019), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/ssmexplained/html/
hold_capital.en.html [https://perma.cc/28HT-LEDU].
233 See Testimony Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs U.S.
Senate, 114th Cong. (Jun. 7, 2016) (written statement of Hal S. Scott, Director, Comm.
on
Cap.
Mkts.
Regul.),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060716_Scott%20Testimony.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R4MC-676L].
227
228
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insurance companies will be undercapitalized. 234 Similarly, 2019
research by economists at Chongqing University of Technology
determined that effective capital regulation for PRC mixed
conglomerates is impeded by “the prominent phenomenon of multilevel shareholding and cross-shareholding.”235
Consistent with these observations, international banking
regulators and central banks agree that complex ownership
structures can enable financial groups to obfuscate their capital
adequacy. 236 Indeed, complex cross-shareholding webs between
Anbang Group affiliates enabled the FCC to misrepresent to
regulators that it quintupled its capital within just a few months as
it dramatically expanded its ownership of banks and launched an
investment fund. 237 A related problem is that the complex
ownership structures of Mainland China’s FCCs can enable
widespread multiple leveraging, 238 meaning that funds raised by
one entity within a corporate group are used as capital to support
risk-taking in separate but affiliated business units.239
These issues are compounded by a lack of adequate regulatory
coordination. As FCCs formed in the 2000s, contact between
relevant regulators was limited to periodic meetings conducted
pursuant to guidance that did not address multiple leveraging. 240
234
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169 (observing that “layered
shareholding and cross-holdings” are “driv[ing] up the overall leverage ratio” at
some financial institutions).
235
Chenyuan Zhao & Qiumin Yu, A Summary of Risks in China’s Financial
Holding
Companies,
10
MOD.
ECON.
1385,
1390
(2019),
https://www.scirp.org/pdf/ME_2019051515361999.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5U6N-5FDR].
236 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION
OF
FINANCIAL
CONGLOMERATES
28-29
(2012),
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint29.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5AP-F2UM].
237 See Ding Feng & Jia Huajie, In Depth: What’s Driving Insurer Anbang’s Big
Bang?, CAIXIN (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2015-02-04/whatsdriving-insurer-anbangs-big-bang-101012703.html
[https://perma.cc/7MHP7BAD].
238
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 162 (observing that “increased
leverage” has emerged within holding companies that own financial institutions
“due to investment with non-proprietary funds”); Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at
1389-90.
239
See HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 213-14 (2010).
240 See Deng Zhongfeng & Cing Yangbin, Analysis on Double Leverage Risk of
Financial Holding Conglomerates, 257 N. ECON. & TRADE 80, 82 (2006) (observing that,
during this time, the only agreement between the CBRC, CIRC, and CSRC to
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The PBOC found that “regulatory gaps” brought about by “sectoral
regulation” enabled FCCs to “make repeated capital injection[s] in
the disguise of a shell company.”241
Also, as the financial activities of almost all FCCs were not
subject to consolidated supervision at a holding company level,
there was no group-wide or mid-tier holding company constraints
on leverage.242 In late 2018 the PBOC also observed that some FCCs
had invested in financial institutions with borrowed funds, thereby
increasing leverage.243 Multiple leveraging was exacerbated during
the 2010s by the wide-spread practice of FCCs conducting offshore
debt issuances backed by a domestic affiliate’s cash flow,244 and until
2018 CIRC regulatory action, this debt could be omitted from
leverage calculations.245
Additionally, non-bank micro-lending companies controlled by
IFCCs could make loans with funds raised through the recycling of
asset-backed security cash flows and the issuance of other forms of
debt instruments, leading to high leverage, and these entities have
also collaborated with banks to make jointly-issued loans, causing
concerns from regulators and market observers over capital
adequacy and risk contagion.246 For example, Alibaba affiliate Ant
facilitate coordinated supervision of financial conglomerates limited coordination
to periodic joint meetings, and that no formal regulations existed to facilitate such
coordination); Zhang Yuzhe, Wu Hongyuran & Teng Jing Xuan, China to Roll Out
Financial Holding Company Regulations Later This Year, CAIXIN (Jun. 3, 2018),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-06-03/china-to-roll-out-financial-holding-co
mpany-regulations-later-this-year-101261859.html
[https://perma.cc/T58LZ4HP] (reporting that between 1999 and 2018, there was a “lack of consensus
between government agencies on who should regulate financial holding companies
and how they should do so”).
241
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169.
242 See Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1389-90.
243
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 169.
244 See Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1390; see also Julie Zhu, Buying Overseas,
Chinese Conglomerates Leverage Offshore Assets for Financing, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-capitaloutflows-financing/buying-ov
erseas-chinese-conglomerates-leverage-offshore-assets-for-financing-idUSKBN17T
3EG [https://perma.cc/XA3R-HN2E].
245 See Yang Qiaoling & Han Wei, China Clamps Down on Insurers’ Overseas
Financing, CAIXIN (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-0213/china-clamps-down-on-insurers-overseas-financing-101211049.html
[https://perma.cc/V9SK-JEAX].
246 See HUANG QIFAN (黄奇帆), JIEGOUXING GAIGE: ZHONGGUO JINGJI DE WENTI
YU DUICE (结构性改革：中国经济的问题与对策) [STRUCTURAL REFORM: PROBLEMS
AND SOLUTIONS OF CHINESE ECONOMY] 91 (2020); Zhou Jueshuo (周矍铄), Daxing
Hulianwang Qiye Jinru Jinrong Lingyu de Qianzai Fengxian Yu Jianguan (大型互联网企
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Financial’s leverage ratio is reportedly well over sixty times assets
as a result of the lending activity of Chongqing-based non-bank
online consumer lending affiliates,247 which were lightly-regulated
at the provincial level but made loans worth over 300 billion yuan
with just 3 billion yuan in capital. 248 Notably, the PBOC in 2017
constrained ABS issuance by these entities, and in November 2020,
along with other agencies, issued draft “Interim Measures for the
Administration of Online Petty Loan Business (Draft for Soliciting
Opinions),” which, among other things, would require that: (i) the
balance of proceeds raised by a non-bank micro-loan company
operating an online non-bank micro-loan business through issuing
bonds, ABS products, or other forms of standardized debt assets not
exceed four times its net assets; and (ii) for a single jointly-issued
loan, the capital contribution made by a non-bank micro-loan
company operating an online non-bank micro-loan business not fall
below thirty percent.249
业进入金融领域的潜在风险与监管) [The Potential Risk and Regulation of Large Internet
Enterprises Entering the Financial Sector], CAIXIN (Nov. 1, 2020),
http://opinion.caixin.com/2020-11-01/101621303.html [https://perma.cc/HY26N7TC]; Wu Hongyuran, Hu Yue & Han Wei, In Depth: Cheers and Fears in $283
Billion
Bank-Tech
Lending
Tie-Up,
CAIXIN
(Oct.
27,
2019),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-10-27/in-depth-cheers-and-fears-in-283-billi
on-bank-tech-lending-tie-up-101475874.html [https://perma.cc/C5BM-ZA8D].
247 See Liu Caiping, Zhang Yuzhe, Yue Yue, Wei Yiyang & Han Wei, Why Ant
Group’s IPO May Stay on Ice for a While, NIKKEI ASIA (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/Why-Ant-Group-s-IPO-may-stay-on-ic
e-for-a-while [https://perma.cc/68KB-4SK7].
248 See id.; HUANG QIFAN, supra note 246, at 91.
249
See China Cracks Down on Online Micro-Lending Firms with New Rules,
REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-regulationsloans/china-cracks-down-on-online-micro-lending-firms-with-new-rules-idUSKB
N1DV4OU [https://perma.cc/9GEJ-7RXE]; Wangluo Xiaoe Daikuan Yewu Guanli
Zanxing Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (网络小额贷款业务管理暂行办法(征求意见稿))
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Petty Loan Business (Draft for
Soliciting Opinions], ZHONGGUO YINBAOJIANHUI (中国银保监会) [CHINA BANKING &
INS.
REGUL.
COMM’N]
(Nov.
2,
2020),
http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=938821&itemI
d=951 [https://perma.cc/ZS5E-HUC5]; see also Aries Poon & Rebecca Isjwara,
China’s Leverage Caps on Microlenders Bring Ant’s Regulatory Risk to Forefront, S&P
GLOB.
MKT.
INTEL.
(Sep.
16,
2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-h
eadlines/china-s-leverage-caps-on-microlenders-bring-ant-s-regulatory-risk-to-for
efront-60376685 [https://perma.cc/7QEJ-532H]. The November 2020 measures,
once finalized, may only have a limited impact on the leverage of Ant Financial’s
non-bank online consumer lending affiliates, which have largely already shifted to
a partnership model whereby most lending is underwritten by partner financial
institutions. Id.
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iii. Potentially Problematic Intra-Group Transactions and FCC
Interconnectivity
According to the PBOC, by 2018, certain banks and insurers
controlled by FCCs had morphed into “cash machines” for the defacto controlling persons, the ultimate beneficiaries, or affiliated
non-financial enterprises, yet through complex structures that took
advantage of a sector-based regulatory approach, these activities
were hidden from regulators. 250 For example, according to one
account, Tomorrow Group appropriated about 150 billion yuan
from Baoshang Bank between 2005 and 2017.251
Generally, banking regulators across the world prohibit intragroup transactions not conducted at prevailing market rates and
limit various forms of intra-group transactions, which can reflect
insufficiently diverse exposures, and may stem from pressure by
management to support intra-firm growth, a potential source of
inadequate risk management.252 Furthermore, although intra-group
transactions are not inherently problematic,253 high levels of intragroup funding may reduce reliance on external financing, which can
serve as a source of private risk-monitoring.254 Notably, throughout
the 2005 to 2015 boom period for FCCs, PRC regulators had in place
regulations aimed at ensuring that intra-group transactions between
insurers, banks, and securities firms would be conducted at market

See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170.
See Zhou Xuedong (周学东), Zhongxiao Yinhang Jinrong Fengxian Zhuyao
Yuanyu Gongsi Zhili Shiling—Cong Jieguan Baoshang Yinhang Kan Zhongxiao Yinhang
Gongsi Zhili de Guanjian (中小银行金融风险主要源于公司治理失灵——从接管包商
银行看中小银行公司治理的关键) [Financial Risk of Small and Medium-sized Banks
Stems from the Failure of Corporate Governance – An Analysis of the Crucial Determinants
of Corporate Governance of Small and Medium-sized Banks based on the Case of Baoshang
Bank] 15 ZHONGGUO JINRONG (中国金融) [CHI. FIN.] 19 (2020).
252 See SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 121; see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
253 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTRA-GROUP TRANSACTIONS
AND EXPOSURES PRINCIPLES ¶ 2 (1999), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs62.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9JU-JXX6] (observing that some intra-group transactions “can
facilitate . . . synergies”); see also id. ¶ 7 (reporting that most regulatory regimes
require that intra-group transactions take place at “arm’s length,” meaning at
prevailing market rates).
254
See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in an International
Perspective: a Survey of Corporate Control Mechanisms among Large Firms in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany (1994),
https://www.bis.org/publ/econ41.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6B-M8HV].
250
251
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rates and reported to regulators.255 Yet these rules were regularly
circumvented by certain FCCs during the 2010s through regulatory
arbitrage, as FCCs’ complex structures impeded regulators’ ability
to categorize affiliated transactions.256 Moreover, there were legal
loopholes that enabled intra-group transactions between insurers
and intra-group affiliates until 2019.257
Opaque and complex FCC structures can not only mask
interconnectivity within corporate groups, but also impede
understanding of connectivity between FCCs and other financial
institutions. Indeed, information necessary to understand financial
relations between various FCC affiliates and external firms may not
only be poorly understood by regulators, but also by personnel
working within the FCC. 258
Moreover, some FCCs are
internationally active—through leveraged transactions conducted
via a fund and several other affiliated business entities, HNA Group
was able to acquire a ten percent stake in the global financial group
255
Zhongguo Baojianhui (中国保监会) [China Ins. Regul. Comm’n], Baoxian
Gongsi Guanlian Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Banfa (保险公司关联交易管理暂行办法)
[Interim Measures for the Administration of Affiliated Transactions of Insurance
Companies]
(Apr.
4,
2007),
http://bxjg.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab5225/info52464.htm
[https://perma.cc/XBL4-ERXY]; Shangye Yinhang Yu Neiburen He Gudong Guanlian
Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa (商业银行与内部人和股东关联交易管理办法) [The Administrative
Measures for the Connected Transactions between the Commercial Banks and their Insiders
or Shareholders] (promulgated by China Banking Regul. Comm’n, Apr. 2, 2004,
effective
May
1,
2004)
art.
32,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3500&CGid=
[https://perma.cc/QZQ5-7K7U]; ASIA-PACIFIC OFF. OF THE CFA INST. CENTRE FOR
FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS: CAUTIONARY TALES FOR
INVESTORS
IN
ASIA
(2009)
14,
https://www.cfainstitute.org//media/documents/article/position-paper/related-party-transactions-cautionary
-tales-for-investors-in-asia.ashx [https://perma.cc/PRS2-X7GA] (the CSRC
“banned listed companies from providing loan guarantees to their parents and
required the latter to settle their loans to subsidiaries starting in 2006”).
256 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170-71; see also Xuan Lei, China
Regulator Bars 5 Insurers from Transactions with Shareholders, Affiliates, S&P GLOB.
MKT.
INTEL.
(Oct.
11,
2017)
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/ol4
dj_ilwt9q8ahtm3naqa2 [https://perma.cc/D3NB-W3Y5].
257 See Wu Yujian & Denise Jia, China Revises Rules on Insurers’ Related-Party
Transactions, CAIXIN (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-0910/china-revises-rules-on-insurers-related-party-transactions-101460546.html
[https://perma.cc/RNZ7-TLXB] (explaining that, through 2019, “rules did not
clarify [an] insurance company’s management responsibilities on related
transactions by subsidiaries, making those in control of the insurer able to use the
subsidiaries to bypass regulations to get access to the insurer’s premium income”).
258 See Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 232; Zhao & Yu, supra note 235, at 1390.
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Deutsche Bank in 2017.259 Moreover, HNA Group’s structure at the
time was so complex that its largest shareholder remained a
mystery,260 causing analysts to fear that the unclear magnitude of
HNA Group’s size and operations created the risk that any material
financial distress at the conglomerate could be transmitted across
borders.261 One prominent scholar has also raised concerns that the
interconnectivity between and within IFCCs may drive risk
contagion and systemic risk.262
iv. Cross-Subsidization and Unfair Competitions Concerns
The PBOC has also raised concerns that certain intra-group
transactions enable cross-subsidization that both contributes to
market risk and could bring about “unfair competition”—a nonfinancial institution may transfer assets through loans and
guarantees made by its financial affiliates within the same FCC,
constituting cross-subsidization (meaning that profits from one type
of business activity are used to support other business activities).263
PRC officials fear such intra-group cross-subsidization can enhance
the competitive advantages of FCCs and affiliates, which has caused
them and other observers to raise market fairness concerns.264 Other
commentators note that certain SFCCs enjoy unfair advantages in
259
See Olaf Storbeck., Deutsche Bank’s Biggest Shareholder Pulls Back from
German Lender, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/52f159ea4cb8-11e9-bbc9-6917dce3dc62. By March 2019, HNA Group, through its affiliates,
only controlled five percent of Deutsche Bank’s voting rights, yet had nearly zero
economic interest in Deutsche Bank’s stock. Id.
260 See Who Owns HNA, China’s Most Aggressive Dealmaker?, supra note 223.
261 See, e.g., Anjani Trivedi & Julie Steinberg, How China’s Acquisitive HNA
Group
Fell
From
Favor,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
19,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-chinas-acquisitive-hna-group-fell-fromfavor-1511118961 [https://perma.cc/MNU9-CZV4].
262 See Zhou Jueshuo, supra note 246. Zhou Jueshuo is rumored to be a former
PBOC governor. See Eliza Gkritsi, The Unsigned Op-Eds that Foreshadowed Ant Group
IPO
Suspension,
TECHNODE
(Nov.
9,
2020),
https://technode.com/2020/11/09/china-voices-the-unsigned-op-eds-that-foresh
adowed-ant-group-ipo-suspension/[https://perma.cc/CNE6-N92W].
263 See Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 233-35; see also PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA,
supra note 5, at 103, 170; Cross-Subsidization, OECD (Aug. 13, 2013),
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4968
[https://perma.cc/Z5GQZUDR].
264 See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 103; infra notes 266-268 and
accompanying text; Tian Jing, supra note 220, at 233-35.
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the form of state support inconsistent with the principle of
competitive neutrality.265
The PBOC currently appears most concerned that the interaction
between financial and non-financial activities within IFCCs will
hinder risk monitoring and what it sees as fair competition. 266
Indeed, in December 2020, PBOC Deputy Governor Pan Gongsheng
stated that a major focus of the PBOC’s late 2020 supervisory
interviews of Alibaba affiliate Ant Group (previously named Ant
Financial) was eliminating “unfair competition.” 267 Relatedly, the
PRC’s antitrust regulator (the State Administration for Market
Regulation) has expressed concern about “unfair competition” by
so-called “platform economy” conglomerates—in November 2020,
it proposed “Guidelines on Antitrust in the Field of Platform
Economy (Draft for Soliciting Opinions),” which, if implemented,
would limit horizontal integration and intra-group transactions at
multi-sector conglomerates controlling both financial companies
and sizable consumer-oriented business lines (such as the IFCCs and
Suning Commerce Group).268
265 See Zhang Chunlin, ‘Competitive Neutrality’ for SOEs Can Help China At
Home and Abroad, CAIXIN (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-1016/competitive-neutrality-for-state-firms-can-help-china-at-home-and-abroad-101
335637.html [https://perma.cc/3E8D-WXZP]; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. &
DEV., COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY: MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESS 9 (2012), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/industryand-services/competitive-neutrality_9789264178953-en#page1
[https://perma.cc/86VS-CKEX] (explaining that “competitive neutrality occurs
where no entity operating in an economic market is subject to undue competitive
advantages or disadvantages”).
266 See Guo Shuqing, Party Sec’y & Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of
China & CBIRC Chairman, Speech at the Singapore FinTech Festival (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.bis.org/review/r201222f.pdf [https://perma.cc/E45J-CLZW].
267
Xinhua (新华), Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Fuhangzhang Pan Gongsheng
jiu Jinrong Guanli Bumen Yuetan Mayi Jituan youguan Qingkuang da Jizhe Wen
( 中国人民银行副行长潘功胜就金融管理部门约谈蚂蚁集团有关情况答记者问) [Pan
Gongsheng, Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Answered Reporters’
Questions about the Interview with the Financial Management Department about Ant
Group], XINHUA [新华] XINHUA (Dec. 27, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/202012/27/c_1126912928.htm [https://perma.cc/2XTJ-G4JM].
268
See Guanyu Pingtai Jingji Lingyu de Fanlongduan Zhinan (Zhengqiu
Yijian Gao) (关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南(征求意见稿)) [Guidelines on Antitrust
in the Field of Platform Economy (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)] (promulgated by
St.
Admin.
for
Mkt.
Regul.,
Nov.
10,
2020),
http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202011/t20201109_323234.html
[https://perma.cc/3NE8-F9VA]; see also Soon Chen Kang & Xiuxi Zhu, Alibaba in
Crosshairs of Growing Antitrust Scrutiny in China, S&P MKT. INTEL. (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-h
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Recent Regulatory Responses to FCCs

These developments along with the PBOC’s proposed non-bank
lending rules discussed above are components of accelerating efforts
since 2018 by PRC regulators to constrain the operations of and
increase supervision over certain FCCs—particularly the IFCCs.
That year, a modest pilot regulatory program for FCCs was
introduced, which brought about heightened group-wide risk
management standards for the financial operations of three FCCs (as
well as two other holding groups). 269 Yet shortly thereafter, the
PBOC reported it continued facing the challenge of “regulatory
blind spots,” seeking regulatory authority to engage in “holistic, ongoing and look-through supervision” of certain mixed
conglomerates.270 On September 11, 2020, its request culminated in
the State Council’s issuance of the “Decision of the State Council on
Implementing Access Administration of Financial Holding
Companies” (“Access Administration Decision”),271 authorizing the
eadlines/alibaba-in-crosshairs-of-growing-antitrust-scrutiny-in-china-61345140
[https://perma.cc/JQ9J-DEJB]
269
In 2018, five corporate groups—China Merchants Group, Shanghai
International Group, Beijing Financial Holdings Group, Ant Financial, and Suning
Commerce Group—were placed in a pilot regulatory program that entailed more
stringent capital requirements and heightened risk management standards for the
financial operations of each of these five corporate groups. See Stella Yifan Xie &
Chao Deng, China to Tighten Rules on Five Financial Giants, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-tighten-rules-on-five-financial-giants-15
41246489 [https://perma.cc/9FUK-WVYM] (citing state-run media outlet Xinhua
News Agency). Two of these are large FCCs identified in this Article’s analysis,
while one—Ant Financial—is controlled by Alibaba, another FCC. See infra
Appendix A. PRC regulators are able to apply group-level supervision principles
to the FCC Ping An Group because it is headed by a regulated financial services
business, an insurer. See IMF, People’s Republic of China: Financial Sector Assessment
Program: Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Insurance Core Principles, Country
Report
No.
17/402,
at
92-94
(Dec.
2017),
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17402.ashx
[https://perma.cc/RMH3-G62P]. All other FCCs identified in this Article, besides
Anbang Group, are headed by a non-financial entity. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text; see infra Appendix A. As the IMF observed in 2017, “[w]here
there is a non-financial parent entity [controlling a bank or banking sub-group], the
CBRC . . . supervises banks or banking sub-groups within the wider group,” but
“[a]t present there is no holding company regime in law or regulation” that enables
group-wide supervision. IMF, supra note 222, at 114.
270
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 170-72.
271 See Guowuyuan Guanyu Shishi Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Zhunru Guanli de
Jueding (国务院关于实施金融控股公司准入管理的决定 ) [Decision of the State
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PBOC to promulgate rules requiring non-financial enterprises and
persons controlling two or more types of certain financial
institutions to apply to establish a separately capitalized financial
holding company subject to PBOC supervision and regulation. 272
The PBOC’s regulations, “Interim Measures for the Supervision and
Administration of Financial Holding Companies” (“FHC
Measures”), mirrored a July 2019 PBOC proposed rule and were
implemented in November 2020, requiring “de-facto financial
holding companies”—entities that meet criteria set forth in the
rules—to apply to the PBOC for approval for formal formation and
formal licensing as a PBOC-regulated financial holding company
within twelve months.273
Under the FHC Measures, however, only a conglomerate with a
high proportion of financial assets (eighty-five percent or more of
the group’s total assets) could be reorganized from the top-down as
a “financial holding group” subject to group-wide regulation and
Council on Implementing Access Administration of Financial Holding Companies]
(promulgated by St. Council, Sep. 13, 2020, effective Nov. 1, 2020),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-09/13/content_5543127.htm
[https://perma.cc/U5SR-N46R].
272
Id. The types of financial institutions for which a financial holding
company would have to be formed include: commercial banks (excluding rural
banks), financial leasing companies, TICs, asset managers, securities companies,
public funds, futures companies, and insurers. Id. A financial holding company
will need to be established if a domestic non-financial enterprise, a natural person,
or an authorized legal person de-facto controls at least two types of these financial
institutions and: (1) if it de-facto controls at least one commercial bank, either total
assets of all financial institutions exceed or equal 500 billion yuan, total assets of all
financial institutions other than commercial banks exceed or equal 100 billion yuan,
or assets under management exceed or equal 500 billion yuan; (2) if it does not
control any commercial banks, either total assets of all financial institutions exceed
or equal 100 billion yuan or assets under management exceed or equal 500 billion
yuan; or (3) if total financial assets do not meet the standards stated in either (1) and
(2), but the PBOC deems that a financial holding company should be established.
Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Shixing Banfa (金融控股公司监督管理试行
办 法 ) [Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Financial
Holding Companies] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, Sep. 13, 2020,
effective Nov. 1, 2020), art. 6 [hereinafter PBOC FHC Measures],
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/tiaofasi/144941/144957/4093006/index.html
[https://perma.cc/379P-BBNA].
273
Jinrong Konggu Gongsi Jiandu Guanli Shixing Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian
Gao) (金融控股公司监督管理试行办法 (征求意见稿)) [Interim Measures for the
Supervision and Administration of Financial Holding Companies (Draft for
Soliciting Opinions)] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, Jul. 26, 2019),
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-07/26/content_5415624.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q6BZ-42UH] (China); PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art.
13.
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supervision.274 This threshold is hardly met by most Chinese FCCs.
For FCCs that do not meet the threshold, financial affiliates
controlled by the FCC will likely reorganize into a separately
capitalized, PBOC-regulated financial holding company controlled
by a domestic non-financial entity.275 However, it remains to be seen
if certain FCC structures could preclude the need for such
reorganization.276 Regardless, most FCCs will likely not be subject
to robust group-wide regulation under the new rules,277 although
those that ultimately create PBOC-regulated financial holding
companies pursuant to the regulations will be subject to new
holding company-level capital regulations, 278 qualitative and
quantitative risk management standards, 279 cross-shareholdings
restrictions, 280 “penetration supervision” of controlling
shareholders and the actual controller, 281 and anti-monopoly
regulations.282
It remains unclear whether an FCC controlling a “de-facto
financial holding company” that requires PBOC licensing under the
new rules would, as a whole, be protected by the PRC’s national
financial safety net. Were that to be the case, it could weaken market
discipline, resulting in moral hazard and excessive risk-taking by
affiliated financial institutions.283 Moreover, the 2019 extension of
PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 6.
See China’s New Rules on Financial Holding Firms to Curb Systemic Risks, FITCH
RATINGS
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/non-bank-financial-institutions/china-n
ew-rules-on-financial-holding-firms-to-curb-systemic-risks-14-10-2020
[https://perma.cc/5YUG-GL9D].
276 See id. (noting that “[i]mplementation will be key to the effectiveness of
these new regulations”). Indeed, it seems possible that certain ownership
structures could enable FCCs to control two or more financial companies but not
reorganize those entities within a financial holding company pursuant to the new
rule.
277
However, although it appears that financial holding companies organized
pursuant to the rule will not be subject to any clear supervisory benchmarks, the
establishment of these entities would likely enable regulators to more closely
scrutinize intra-group transactions. See id.
278
PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 7.
279 Id. art. 24-35.
280 Id. art. 18.
281 Id. art. 40, 41.
282 Id. art. 11, 35, 47.
283 See TRIPARTITE GRP. BANK, supra note 3, at 17 n.9 (suggesting that the real or
apparent extension of a safety net over non-financial affiliates of a mixed
conglomerate is an undesirable policy outcome); see also GARY H. STERN & RON J.
274
275
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the national financial safety net to protect 99.98 percent of the
corporate creditors of Tomorrow Group’s Baoshang Bank as well as
likely on average over ninety percent of its other creditors’ claims—
including large inter-bank creditors—illustrates that the financial
operations of certain FCCs may already be viewed by PRC
regulators as too-big-to-fail.284
In short, the Access Administration Decision and FHC Measures
are likely to enhance PBOC oversight authority over the financial
operations of most FCCs and modestly limit intra-group transaction
volume, but will not directly restrict the ability of FCCs to form
through non-financial entities gaining control of multiple large
financial companies.285 Indeed, the new rules arguably legitimize
the structure of certain FCCs, 286 even though the two IFCCs—
particularly Alibaba—continue to be subject to fierce regulatory
scrutiny.287 In fact, as recent events suggest, FCCs may ultimately
enjoy a generous extension of the PRC’s national financial safety net.
FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 2 (2004) (explaining that
the expansion of the expectation of government protection over creditors results in
excessive risk taking and moral hazard).
284 See Liu Jiefei, Regulators Move to Restructure Troubled Baoshang Bank, CAIXIN
(Jun. 17, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-06-17/regulators-move-torestructure-troubled-baoshang-bank-101427929.html
[https://perma.cc/7KPC6FD2].
285
PBOC FHC Measures, supra note 272, art. 36 (setting forth restrictions on
related party transactions for financial holding companies and their holding
institutions); supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
286
In September 2020, the PBOC noted the economic benefits of certain FCCs
to the Chinese economy, observing that some
non-financial enterprises [that] have held several different types of
financial institutions through investment . . . have improved resource
allocation, reduced cost as well as enriched and improved their financial
services through this business model, which was conducive to meeting the
demands of various enterprises and consumers and to boosting the
capacity of the financial sector for serving the real economy.
See PBC Officials Answer Press Questions on Trial Measures on Regulation of Financial
Holding
Companies,
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA
(Sep.
18,
2020),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4048269/4098744/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2J8-4VF4].
287
In addition to the restrictions on horizontal integration that the November
2020 SAMR regulations would bring about, a mid-January 2021 draft PBOC rule
would effectively mandate anti-trust investigations into and forced divestures by
the two IFCCs because of the market concentration enjoyed by their financial
affiliates. See Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Guanyu 《Feiyinhang Zhifu Jigou Tiaoli
(Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) 》Gongkai Zhengqiu Yijian de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于
《非银行支付机构条例（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知 ) [Notice of the
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IV. HOW FCCS DISTINGUISH MAINLAND CHINA FROM OTHER
MAJOR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
This Part explores how the structure and regulation of Mainland
China’s FCCs distinguishes its financial markets from those of the
EU, Japan, and the United States. First, Chinese SFCCs conduct a
much broader range of significant financial and non-financial
business activities relative to European, Japanese, or U.S.
government-owned entities that offer financial services. Second,
EU, Japanese, and U.S. regulatory frameworks either prohibit the
structures of most of the PRC’s largest FCCs or subject non-financial
parent companies and affiliates within somewhat similarly
structured entities to higher levels of regulation, while few
comparable groups exist in these jurisdictions. Third, although
cross-shareholdings and pyramid structures do exist within Japan’s
and the EU’s financial sectors, only in Mainland China are some
large mixed conglomerates characterized by both structural
features, as well as high levels of intra-group transactions.
a. Mainland China’s SFCCs, Unlike State-Owned Groups in Other
Major Markets, Engage in a Wide Range of Financial and NonFinancial Activities
Mainland China’s largest SFCCs conduct a wide range of sizable
financial activities but, generally, most of their revenue comes from
non-financial business lines. 288 This model does not exist in the
United States, where few government-owned companies directly
People’s Bank of China on Public Consultation on the “Regulations on Non-bank
Payment Institutions (Draft for Soliciting Opinions)”] (promulgated by People’s
Bank
of
China,
Jan.
20,
2021),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/rmyh/105208/4166553/index.html
[https://perma.cc/M63G-UL4D]; see also Timmy Shen, China’s New Monopoly Rules
Put
Fintech
Giants
in
the
Crosshairs,
CAIXIN
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-01-22/chinas-new-monopoly-rules-put-fint
ech-giants-in-the-crosshairs-101653928.html [https://perma.cc/2CH4-ANKM].
288
For example, financial services revenue at CITIC Ltd., the major corporate
unit of CITIC Group, made up less than forty percent of 2018 revenue. See CITIC
LTD., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 9 (2019) [hereinafter CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT],
https://www.citic.com/uploadfile/2019/0418/20190418044301701.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5XJ-FAVB]. Many SFCCs listed in Appendix A—such as
China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinochem Group—are likewise not
primarily focused on financial activities.
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provide business- or consumer-facing financial services and those
that do are often guided by precise financial markets policy
objectives and do not operate substantive non-financial business
lines. It is also a stark contrast from the Eurozone and Japan, where
besides two post office groups that control relatively large financial
companies, state-owned institutions that provide a sizable amount
of business- or consumer-facing financial services either directly or
through affiliates are largely not active in non-financial sectors and
predominantly focus on a limited number of financial sector
business lines.
One of the few large U.S. federal government-owned financial
companies is the Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”), 289 which guarantees principal and interest
payments for securities comprised of U.S. government-guaranteed
mortgages.290 In addition to narrowly-focused, federal governmentowned financial services entities, the U.S. is also home to some small
government-owned entities that directly provide retail financial
services, including a North Dakota state government-owned
bank, 291 as well as some U.S. state government-owned non-profit
289
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government sponsored enterprises that
securitize mortgages, are not considered to be “government-owned,” as both firms
are under federal government conservatorship, meaning that the powers of
common stockholders have been transferred to a U.S. government agency, but the
majority of equity rights have not. See N. ERIC WEISS & DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44525, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP:
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS
7-8
(May.
31,
2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44525.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZG-3Z25]. For a
list of other U.S. federal government corporations, see KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL30365, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW (2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30365.pdf [https://perma.cc/X66F-BHGG].
290
Ginnie Mae is a wholly owned U.S. Government corporation. It securitizes
mortgages insured or guaranteed by the U.S. Federal Housing Administration
(which guarantees mortgages to first-time and low-income homebuyers), as well as
several other U.S. government programs. See Our Model & Platform, GINNIE MAE,
https://www.ginniemae.gov/about_us/who_we_are/Pages/our_business_mod
el.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6MN-FBBA].
291
BANK
OF
N.
DAKOTA,
ANNUAL
REPORT
4
(2018),
https://bnd.nd.gov/annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/7DE7-C3NY] (explaining
that the Bank of North Dakota is “the only state-owned bank in the country”). The
bank’s “primary service is to North Dakota’s financial institutions and state
agencies” and it only “deal[s] directly with North Dakota residents . . . to fill a need
that is underserved and for which the private sector has requested [their]
involvement.” See Eric Hardmeyer, Why Public Banking Works in North Dakota, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/01/should-states-operate-p
ublic-banks/why-public-banking-works-in-north-dakota
[https://perma.cc/T7ZE-W2PF].
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insurance corporations. 292 Yet, unlike Mainland China’s SFCCs,
these state-owned institutions all almost exclusively conduct
financial activities, and are not structured as large multi-layer
corporate groups.
In Japan, there are several directly government-owned banks,293
which unlike Mainland China’s SFCCs, are designed to focus on
lending to economic sectors deemed by the government to be
underserved.294 Only one of these entities—Shoko Chukin Bank—
provides a range of retail-facing financial services and conducts
some non-financial business activities.295 Yet the scope of its nonfinancial activities is quite small and its lending activities equaled
less than two percent of Japan’s outstanding commercial bank loans
in 2017.296 Conversely, Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance
maintain sizable retail financial services market shares in Japan and
are majority-owned by government-controlled Japan Post
Holdings—which also controls non-financial businesses such as a
postal service—but the government’s ownership stake in Japan Post
Holdings must fall to around one-third in the coming years under a
privatization plan, and the stakes of Japan Post Holdings in Japan
Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance are likewise each set to fall to
fifty percent or lower.297
292
See,
e.g.,
Who
We
Are,
CITIZENS
PROP.
INS.
CORP.,
https://www.citizensfla.com/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/NC9J-445H].
293
IMF, Japan Financial System Stability Assessment, Country Report No.
17/244,
at
51
(Jul.
12,
2017),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/31/Japan-FinancialSystem-Stability-Assessment-45151 [https://perma.cc/VX7F-VPAL].
294 See Lev Ratnovski & Aditya Narain, Public Financial Institutions in Developed
Countries—Organization and Oversight 7-8 (IMF, Working Paper No. 07/227, 2007),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07227.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB93-K6QC].
295
See New Appearance of Shoko Chukin Bank, SHOKO CHUKIN BANK,
https://www.shokochukin.co.jp/english/about/company/reborn/;
SHOKO
CHUKIN
BANK,
ANNUAL
REPORT
60
(2018),
https://www.shokochukin.co.jp/english/about/company/report/2018/pdf/ar1
8_all.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMQ5-YR6Q].
296 See id.; Shoko Chukin Bank’s Q1 2017 loan balance (9.357 trillion yen)
equaled just 1.7 percent of Japan’s 2017 outstanding commercial bank loan balance,
which the Federal Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis reports was about 539 trillion yen. See id.;
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, ECONOMIC DATA, USE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,
ASSETS: OUTSTANDING LOANS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS FOR JAPAN (June 26, 2018),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JPNFCSODCXDC [https://perma.cc/WQ7USSV7].
297
See IMF, supra note 293, at 9 n.5, 50-1; Hisao Kodachi, Insurance scandal
delays Japan Post privatization by 5 years, NIKKEI ASIA (Feb. 13, 2020),
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In the Eurozone, roughly eight percent of banking assets were
held by large public sector institutions in 2015.298 Approximately
sixty percent of these assets belonged to Germany’s regional
government-owned banks (generally known as Landesbanken), such
as LBBW, the Eurozone’s largest government-owned financial
firm. 299 Like Mainland China’s SFCCs, Landesbanken can be
structured as holding companies300 and may control non-financial
firms.301 Yet as opposed to FCCs, for which non-financial business
lines are significant, Landesbanken earn over ninety-eight percent of
their operating income from financial activities. 302 On the other
hand, unlike the Landesbanken and the Eurozone’s other sizable
state-owned financial firms, France’s La Banque Postale—the
Eurozone’s second largest state-owned financial firm, accounting
for ten percent of Eurozone 2015 public sector banking assets303—is
controlled by a state-owned group that earns the majority of its
revenue from non-financial business activities. 304 Yet as Table 2
illustrates, that parent group, La Poste, controls a narrower range of
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Insurance-scandal-delays-Japan-Post-privatizati
on-by-5-years [https://perma.cc/K7RR-PXBZ]; Taro Fuse & Taiga Uranaka, Japan
Post Insurer Plans $2.9 Billion Buyback From Parent, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2020)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-16/japan-post-insurerplans-2-9-billion-buyback-to-cut-owner-stake [https://perma.cc/3HPV-8X2E].
298 See Nicolas Véron, The Governance and Ownership of Significant Euro-area
Banks, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUTION, May 2017, at 1, 5, https://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/PC-15-2017-290517.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WZ7EHJTE].
299 See id. at 13-15 (reporting data used to calculate German public sector
regional and local government-owned banks’ share of EU banking assets).
300 See IMF, Germany: Financial Sector Assessment Program, Country Report No.
16/189,
at
56
(June
2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16189.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WM5B-UQJG].
301
For example, BayernLB controls “one of the largest catering firms in
Munich.”
Group
Subsidiaries,
BAYERNLB
(JAN.
1,
2021),
https://www.bayernlb.com/internet/en/blb/resp/about_us/konzern_4/toechte
r_3/toechter_2.jsp [https://perma.cc/SR5E-YQNQ].
302
Data from 2017 shows that Germany’s largest Landesbanken generated over
73 percent of operating income from interest, and about 25 percent from
commissions and financial transactions. DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, MONTHLY REPORT
29,
36
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/760004/6d8b3367ff98c77e715eac6c
7c12bfc7/mL/2018-09-ertragslage-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5EV-BPXY].
303 See Véron, supra note 298, at 13-15.
304
LE GROUPE LA POSTE, 2020 UNIVERSAL REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 8, 12 (2021),
https://le-groupe-laposte.cdn.prismic.io/le-groupe-laposte/8438b095-1a9a-477a8a25-9699ee41876a_GLP2020_UDR_EN_mars_2021.pdf.
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non-financial affiliates than large Chinese SFCCs. Table 2 contrasts
business lines of the Eurozone’s two largest state-owned financial
groups with those of large Chinese SFCCs, as well as large stateowned entities in the United States and Japan that provide financial
services.
TABLE 2: FINANCIAL & NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESS LINES OF
LARGE GOVERNMENT-OWNED GROUPS ENGAGED IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES IN THE EU, JAPAN, THE PRC, AND THE UNITED STATES
(FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES IN GREY)

LBBW
(Germany)306

Shoko
Ginnie Mae
Chukin Bank
(U.S.)308
307
(Japan)

Commercial
banking

Commercial
banking

Commercial
banking

Insurance

Insurance

Leasing

Securities
brokerage
Asset
management
Payment
solutions
Traditional mail

Securities
brokerage
Asset
management

Credit card
services
Property
management

La Poste
(France)305

China
Merchants
Group309

China
National
Petroleum
Corporation

CITIC
Group311

310

MortgageCommercial
backed security banking
guarantees
Securities
brokerage
Insurance

Commercial
banking

Commercial
banking

TIC business

TIC business

Insurance

Insurance

Asset
Securities
management
brokerage
Venture capital Financial
leasing
Private equity Asset
management

Private equity
Asset
management
Securities
brokerage

305
Id.; La Banque Postale and its Subsidiaries, LA BANQUE POSTALE,
https://www.labanquepostale.com/en/about-us/presentation.subsidiaries.html
[https://perma.cc/WH8E-86FH].
306
The
Subsidiaries
of
LBBW,
LBBW,
https://www.lbbw.de/group/landesbank-baden-wuerttemberg/subsidiaries/
subsidiaries_7wong3s3u_e.html [https://perma.cc/YU2S-9E99] (last visited Mar.
13, 2021).
307
New Appearance of Shoko Chukin Bank, supra note 295, at 60.
308
Our Model & Platform, supra note 290.
309
Structure,
CHINA
MERCHANTS
GRP.,
http://
www.cmhk.com/en/ac/orst/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/XWJ6-SULB].
310
About
CNPC,
CPNC,
http://www.cnpc.com.cn
/en/aboutcnpc/aboutcnpc_index.shtml [https://perma.cc/DR3D-674B].
311
See CITIC LTD., supra note 197, at 11, 23, 29, 37, 48-52, 336-38; CHINA CITIC
BANK,
2017
ANNUAL
REPORT
57-59
(2018),
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2018/0427/ltn201804272
486.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ4A-P693].
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Parcels
shipping &
logistics
Property
management
Digital services

Futures
company

Telecom service

Mineral/metal
exploration &
extraction
Engineering &
construction
Power plant
management
Steel
manufacturing
Machinery &
truck parts
manufacturing
Toll road
Oil/gas sales & Ports operation
management
trading
& maintenance
Food trading
Oil/gas service Environment
and shipping
stations
services
Tobacco trading
Real estate
and shipping
development &
management
Bulk cargo
Helicopter fleet
transportation
operation
Publishing
IT services
Agriculture
Food
distribution and
sales
Telecom service

Financial
leasing
Real estate
development &
management
Ports operation
& maintenance

Oilfield services Futures
company

Equipment
manufacturing
Chemical
product
manufacturing
Oil /gas
exploration &
production
Oil/gas
Chemicals sales
distribution
& trading
Ship repairing New energy
& maintenance development
Infrastructure Gas pipeline
management
operator
Ship
Engineering &
construction
construction

Financial
leasing
Venture capital

b. Could Mainland China’s FCCs Exist Under the EU’s, Japan’s, or the
United States’ Regulatory Frameworks?
Another distinctive characteristic of Mainland China’s financial
system relative to the world’s three other largest is that its FCCs can
control relatively large banks and insurers, and can do so without
being subject to significant group-wide supervision or regulation.312
As mentioned above, even an FCC regulated under the FHC
312

See PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, supra note 5, at 164-70.
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Measures, as a whole, largely will not be subject to group-wide
regulation and supervision. The analysis below examines why
organizations structured similarly to Mainland China’s largest
FCCs—many of which by 2017 controlled both a bank and an
insurer,313 and could exhibit high levels of intra-group transactions,
as explained above—largely do not exist in the EU, Japan, or the
United States.
i.

Most FCC Structures Could Not Exist Under the United States’
Regulatory Model

The United States is one of a small number of countries in the
world where commercial firm ownership of banks is generally
prohibited, albeit with notable exceptions.314 According to the U.S.
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), ownership of twenty-five
percent or more of a bank’s voting securities constitutes control of a
bank,315 and regulators can also utilize subjective tests to determine
that owning as little as five percent of voting shares constitutes
“control.” 316 Once federal regulators determine that an entity
“controls” a bank, that entity is considered a “bank holding
company” (“BHC”) 317 and is subject to a number of holding
company-level regulations, including that the BHC serve as a source
of strength to its subsidiary bank,318 adherence to strict caps on intra-

313
For a list of the ten largest FCCs as of 2017, see supra note 25 and
accompanying text. By early 2017, each of these FCCs controlled either: (i) a bank;
(ii) one or more insurers; or (iii) a bank and one or more insurers. Seven of the ten
largest FCCs controlled a bank and one or more insurers, and only seven FCCs
listed in Appendix A do not control either a bank or insurer. See supra note 197 and
accompanying text.
314 See JAMES R. BARTH, TONG LI, APANARD ANGKINAND, YUAN-HSIN CHIANG &
LI LI, INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES: SUPPORTING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 35
(2011),
https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/ResearchReport/PDF/I
LC.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELG7-KZW2].
315
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (2019).
316
12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (2019).
317
12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2019).
318
12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2019).
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group transactions involving the bank, 319 and compliance with
group-wide capital requirements.320
By 2016-17, fifteen of the PRC’s largest FCCs maintained an
ownership stake in a bank greater than twenty-five percent.321 Thus,
these FCCs would be regulated as BHCs at the holding company
level under a U.S.-style regulatory model.322 Yet importantly, the
BHC Act also generally restricts BHCs from controlling nonfinancial companies.323 Were a regulatory environment similar to
that of the U.S.’s enacted across Mainland China, the structures of
these fifteen FCCs would be effectively prohibited.
Surely, some U.S. states have permitted the chartering of nonfinancial company-owned banks, known as “industrial loan
companies” (“ILCs”). 324 Yet state laws still require that these
institutions obtain federal deposit insurance, 325 a process that
necessitates an application to and approval by the U.S. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),326 which has approved no
such applications for non-financial company-owned ILCs since
2004, around the time that Wal-Mart’s efforts to establish an ILC
were fiercely resisted.327 By 2017, only six non-financial company319
12 U.S.C. § 371c (2019) (the aggregate value of intra-group transactions of
the bank and its subsidiaries to one affiliate generally may not exceed ten percent,
and to all affiliates, generally may not exceed twenty percent).
320
12 CFR § 225, app. A.
321 See infra Appendix B.
322
12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2019) (defining bank holding company).
323
12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2019). Some relatively minor exemptions do exist for
foreign banks, merchant banking investments, and investments in companies that
conduct activities closely related to the business of banking. See DIV. OF SUPERVISION
AND REGUL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., BANK HOLDING COMPANY
SUPERVISION MANUAL §§ 3040, 3907, 3020 (2020).
324
All six non-financial company-owned ILCs are headquartered either in
Utah or Nevada. See JAMES R. BARTH & YANFEI SUN, A NEW LOOK AT THE
PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE US
BANKING
SYSTEM
51
(2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197316
[https://perma.cc/H88X-NT7Z].
325
See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1544-45 (citing, as an example, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 7-8-3(4)(b) (2006)).
326
In 2006, the FDIC implemented a moratorium on approving commercially
owned ILC applications. See id. at 1549-50 (citing FDIC, Moratorium on Certain
Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71 FED. REG. 43,482, 43,483
(Aug. 1, 2006)).
327
Numerous U.S. government officials opposed Wal-Mart’s early 2000s
effort to establish an ILC. See Wilmarth, supra note 325, at 1542. The last non-
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owned ILCs remained in the U.S., 328 five of which each had total
assets between $20 million and $1.4 billion USD, while one had
approximately $9 billion USD in assets.329 Some of these ILCs are
controlled by primarily non-financial U.S. corporate groups that also
control other types of financial firms, 330 but overall, these groups
each conduct a level of financial intermediation below the
thresholds used in this article’s FCC definition.331
U.S. companies may concurrently control sizable non-financial
businesses and large non-bank financial firms, such as insurers.332
For example, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. controls freight rail
transportation and energy businesses as well as large insurance
companies, and some companies it controls are active in derivatives
markets.333 Yet Berkshire Hathaway operates as a holding company
financial company-owned ILC approved for federal deposit insurance by the FDIC
was Target Bank, which subsequently closed. See BARTH, LI, ANGKINAND, CHIANG
& LI, supra note 314, at 24; DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46489, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN COMPANIES (ILCS): BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46489.pdf. In December 2020, the FDIC eased
regulations regarding ILC applications for deposit insurance, and in May 2020, it
granted conditional approval of applications for two ILCs each controlled by a
financial business, rather than a commercial business. See id. at 11-12 (reporting
that Nelnet and Square, for which the FDIC approved ILC applications in March
2020, are primarily financial companies).
328 See BARTH & SUN, supra note 324, at 51.
329 See id. BMW Bank of North America, ultimately controlled by Germany’s
BMW AG, had over $9 billion USD in total assets. See id.
330
For example, Harley-Davidson Inc. is the ultimate parent company of the
ILC Eaglemark Savings Bank, as well as a Nevada-based insurance company,
Harley-Davidson Insurance Services, Inc. See id.; About Us, HARLEY-DAVIDSON
(2020),
https://www.insurance.harley-davidson.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/F5YY-PLDG].
331 See supra notes 5, 329 and accompanying text.
332
Broadly, this business structure is not prohibited by federal or state laws.
See generally Lanny A. Schwartz, Hilary S. Seo, Nancy Lee, Allen Mayer & Elena
Belov, So, Now You Own a Broker-Dealer!: Regulatory Considerations for
Integrating a Brokerage Firm into a Corporate Group (DavisPolk & Oliver Wyman,
2017),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2017-09-20_so_now_you_own_broker_dealer.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CAK2-QC7Z]; BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44046,
INSURANCE REGULATION: BACKGROUND, OVERVIEW, AND LEGISLATION IN THE 114TH
CONGRESS
(2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44046.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UHE9-HR77].
333 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2018, at K-1, K-85 (2019),
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2018ar/2018ar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RA3B-L6RQ]; see also Ryan Tracy, Regulators Weigh Whether
Berkshire
Poses
Systemic
Risk,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
23,
2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-considering-whether-berkshire-hatha
way-poses-systemic-risk-1390491379 [https://perma.cc/TD7X-65XB].
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with “essentially no centralized or integrated business functions,”
and is largely not involved in the day-to-day operations of firms it
controls 334 —it does not meet this Article’s definition of an FCC.
Most other large U.S. insurers exist within corporate groups that
primarily operate within the financial sector335 and, accordingly, are
not structured like an FCC.
This is perhaps in part because, unlike many of the PRC’s FCCs,
which integrate the activities of financial and non-financial
businesses, 336 U.S. corporate groups that control insurers face
stringent regulation of group-wide activities. Material intra-group
transactions by an insurer are subject to regulatory review, and such
transactions must be conducted at “fair and reasonable” terms. 337
The U.S. state insurance regulators also have the power to examine
risks posed to an insurer by its “ultimate controlling party,” and can
examine the books and records of that entity and other intra-group
affiliates.338 State regulators must be notified of changes in major
insurer shareholders and can actively scrutinize intra-group activity
to ensure that it does not threaten insurer-level capital adequacy.339
Notably, applying a U.S.-style regulatory regime to Mainland
China’s FCCs would result in the two IFCCs being subject to BHC
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., supra note 333, at K-1.
For a list of the largest insurers in the United States by market share, see
Facts + Statistics: Insurance Company Rankings, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-insurance-company-rankings
[https://perma.cc/XM5K-GA4F].
336
Mainland China’s conglomerate structures often foster internal capital
markets. See KON SIK KIM, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN EAST ASIA 18-19
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 391/2018, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141179
[https://perma.cc/R24E-LM4T]. Some large FCCs use funds raised from
consumers for insurance products to fuel international expansion into non-financial
sectors. James T. Addy, In China, Insurers Sell Risky Products to Fund Risky
Investments, Freaking Out Regulators, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-china-insurers-sell-risky-products-to-fundrisky-investments-freaking-out-regulators-1484130601 [https://perma.cc/7E9DJFZL].
337
NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM
REGULATORY ACT (MODEL #440-4) §5 (2015) [hereinafter Model U.S. State Insurance
Holding
Company
Act],
https://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-440.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HME-QCBZ].
338 Id. §6. All fifty U.S. states have passed this model legislation. See WEBEL,
supra note 332, at 19-20.
339 Id. §5; see also Ctr. for Ins. Pol’y & Research, Group Supervision, NAT’L ASS’N
INS.
COMM’RS
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_group_supervision.htm
[https://perma.cc/3Q9P-RR6C].
334
335
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Act group-wide regulation,340 as Tencent and Alibaba (through Ant
Group) each control over twenty-five percent of a commercial
bank’s shares.341 Although WeChat Pay and Alipay are enormous
PBOC-regulated services, and the PBOC serves as custodian for user
funds for these payment systems, 342 neither of the ultimate
controlling groups were subject to group-wide supervision through
much of the 2010s.343 Conversely, in the United States, debit and
credit card networks—the dominant channel for non-cash retail
payments—are controlled by BHCs.344
ii.

Applying EU Rules Would Subject Some Large FCCs to Strict
Group-wide Regulation, and Similarly Structured EU Groups
are Rare

Unlike the United States, the EU generally permits corporate
groups to concurrently control banks and sizable non-financial
companies. However, an EU-based corporate group that conducts
substantial non-financial activities while also controlling two or
more types of financial firms can be subject to enhanced group-wide
regulatory requirements through “supplementary supervision” as a
“mixed financial holding company” if the following conditions set
forth in EU Directive 2002/87/EC (as amended) are met345:
See infra Appendix B and accompanying text; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841.
See infra Appendix B; supra notes 175, 193 and accompanying text.
342 See Chen Jia & He Wei, PBOC Reins in Funds of Payment Platforms, CHINA
DAILY
(Jan.
15,
2019),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/15/WS5c3d169fa3106c65c34e4671.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/NTQ9-C9WN].
343 See supra notes 269-287 and accompanying text.
344 See STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT
CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND
INNOVATION 215-17 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/201808/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities--Nonbank-Financial
s-Fintech-and-Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKR3-C5NQ].
Seventy-four
percent of non-cash 2017 U.S. consumer transactions were reportedly conducted by
credit and debit cards. Id. at 221.
345
A corporate group that meets the EU definition of “mixed financial holding
company” is “subject to supplementary supervision at the level of the . . .
conglomerate.” See Council Directive 2002/87, art. 5(2), 2003 O.J. (L 35) [hereinafter
Supplementary
Supervision
Directive],
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02002L0087
-20140101&qid=1578025064160&from=EN [https://perma.cc/8H27-GXBR]; see
also Michael Gruson, Consolidated and Supplementary Supervision of Financial Groups
340
341
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(1) An otherwise non-regulated EU entity (“Group X”) either
exercises a “dominant influence” over, or directly or indirectly owns
twenty percent or more of the voting rights or capital of, at least one
banking or investment services firm, and at least one insurance
sector company;346
(2) The balance sheet total of financial sector entities
substantially invested in or controlled by Group X [the “Financial
Balance Sheet”] equals over forty percent of Group X’s group-wide
balance sheet;347 and
(3) Either: A) Group X’s insurance company assets and its
combined banking and investment services firm assets each, as a
share of the Financial Balance Sheet, exceed ten percent, while both
Group X’s insurance sector solvency requirements and Group X’s
combined banking and investment services sector solvency
requirements each equal over ten percent of Group X’s total
financial sector solvency requirements,348 or B) the smaller of Group

in the European Union 42-43 (Inst. for L. & Fin., Working Paper Series No. 19),
https://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/ILF_WP_0
19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CJ8-TJ7P] (explaining that “the term mixed financial
holding company [covers] . . . conglomerates headed by a non-regulated entity
holding company”).
346
A “mixed financial holding company” is a “group”—defined to include
“undertakings which consist[] of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries and the
entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation”—
that is not headed by a “regulated entity” (including banks, insurers, and funds),
but which meets the Supplementary Supervision Directive’s definition of a
“financial conglomerate,” one criteria of which is that at least one entity within the
group “is within the insurance sector and at least one is within the banking or
investment services sector.” Supplementary Supervision Directive, supra note 345,
arts. 2(12), (14)-(15). “Subsidiaries” are defined as either: (i) “any undertaking over
which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, a parent undertaking effectively
exercises a dominant influence”; (ii) “all subsidiaries of such subsidiary
undertakings”; or (iii) an entity that is a “subsidiary undertaking,” as defined in
Article 1 of Council Directive 83/349/EEC—including a company for which
another entity “has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights.” Id.
art. 2(10) (citing Council Directive 83/349 of the Council of the European
Communities, Seventh Council, Jun. 13, 1983 (as amended, Jan. 7, 2013), art. 1, 2003
O.J.
(L
193),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:01983L0349
-20130701&from=EN [https://perma.cc/WWV6-DFXJ]).
“Participation” is
defined to include “direct or indirect ownership of 20% or more of the voting rights
or capital of an undertaking.” Supplementary Supervision Directive, supra note
345, art. 2(11).
347 Id. art. 2(14)(b)(i) (citing art. 3(1)).
348 Id. art. 2(14)(b)(iii) (citing art. 3(2)).
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X’s combined banking and investment services company assets or
its insurance sector assets exceeds six billion euros.349
“Supplementary supervision” brings about a range of reporting
obligations and expanded supervisory authorities over a
conglomerate, including group-wide capital requirements, 350 risk
concentration
reporting, 351 restrictions
on
intra-group
352
353
transactions, and risk management standards.
Entities that do
not meet criteria set forth above but earn a large amount of income
from financial activities can still be designated as “mixed financial
holding companies” by national regulators, subject to the same
“supplementary supervision” regime. 354 Additionally, in the EU,
“financial holding companies”—defined to mean a corporate group,
the subsidiaries of which are “exclusively or mainly” financial
companies, at least one of which is a credit institution or investment
firm, “and which is not a mixed financial holding company”355—are
subject to consolidated group-wide regulation, and notably, the
term “mainly” can be understood to mean that over 50 percent of a
group’s revenues are associated with financial firm subsidiaries.356
Notably, in 2016, less than one percent of Eurozone banking
assets were held by financial holding companies or mixed financial
holding companies that were both: (i) ultimately controlled by a
non-financial entity or particular family; and (ii) deemed by
Id. art. 2(14)(b)(iii) (citing art. 3(3)).
Id. art. 6
351 Id. art. 7.
352 Id. art. 8.
353 Id. art. 9.
354
Id. art. 3(5) (noting that regulators may “in exceptional cases and by
common agreement” use income structure, off-balance sheet activities, or total
assets under management thresholds to replace the art. 3(2) balance sheet threshold
used to determine if an organization’s financial activities are significant under art.
2(14)(b)(iii) and therefore whether it meets the definition of “financial
conglomerate,” a term that, under art. 2(15), includes “mixed financial holding
companies”).
355
Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council
of the EU of 26 June 2013, art. 4(1)-(3), 4(20), 2003 O.J. (L 176),
https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/501983
/3b700c1c-f136-405d-a4b3-b22ea0a062af/CELEX_32013R0575R(02)_EN_TXT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RVW6-N4B2]. The term “mainly” can refer to when “50% of
the equity, consolidated assets, revenues, personnel or another indicator deemed
relevant by [a regulator] are associated with subsidiaries that are institutions or
financial institutions.” What is Meant with ‘Mainly’ in the Definition of ‘Financial
Holding Company’?, EBA (Nov. 21, 2014), https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-bookqa/-/qna/view/publicId/2014_796 [https://perma.cc/JS9R-9YTX].
356 See Gruson, supra note 345, at 2-5.
349
350
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regulators to be “significant”—generally defined as groups or
institutions with over thirty billion euros in assets.357 By late 2019,
just five mixed financial holding companies, as defined above, were
directly or indirectly supervised by the European Central Bank.358
Additionally, several non-financial companies controlled one or
more “less significant” financial institutions.359
Considering the above-mentioned criteria, were an EU
regulatory regime implemented in Mainland China, larger FCCs for
which financial sector assets make up a sizable share of the groupwide balance sheet, such as CITIC Group360 and Tomorrow Group
(as it existed in 2017361), would likely be subject to “supplementary
supervision.” Other large FCCs, as structured in 2017, could also
357
By 2016, approximately eighty percent (22,118 billion euros) of Eurozone
banking assets (27,699 billion euros) were held by “significant institutions” (“SIs”),
of which only four—VW Financial Services, Investar/Argenta Bank, RCI Banque,
and Precision Capital/BIL—were over fifty percent owned by a non-financial
business or a particular family, accounting for 121 billion, 39 billion, 37 billion, and
33 billion euros in total assets, respectively. Véron, supra note 298, at 2, 13-15 (listing
total Eurozone banking assets and listing assets of and major shareholders in the
Eurozone’s largest SIs). SIs generally include all Eurozone financial groups or
institutions with total financial assets exceeding thirty billion euros, although some
smaller institutions can also be classified as SIs. Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of
the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 (SSM Framework Regulation), art. 5052,
2014
O.J.
(L
141),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0468&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/7BN4-TJ8N].
358
See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, LIST OF SUPERVISED ENTITIES (Sep. 2019),
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.listofsupervised
entities201910.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4W5-FFRW].
359
Examples of banks controlled by manufacturing or telecommunications
groups include Airbus Bank GmbH; Mercedes-Benz Bank AG; Mercedes-Benz
Bank GmbH; Siemens Bank GmbH; and MOBILIS banque. See id. at 27, 34, 43, 69,
79.
360
In 2018, CITIC Ltd.’s total financial services company assets (7.1 trillion
Hong Kong Dollars) equaled well over forty percent of its total, group-wide assets
(7.7 trillion Hong Kong Dollars). CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 288, at 2.
Additionally, the total assets of both an insurer fifty percent controlled by CITIC
Ltd. and CITIC Bank each exceeded over six billion euros. Id. at 10, 18. For 2017
currency conversion rates, see Exchange Rates, supra note 18, and accompanying
text.
361
At year-end 2016, the assets of banks and insurance companies controlled
by Tomorrow Group totaled 1.3 trillion and 796 billion yuan (approximately 104
billion euros), respectively, while Tomorrow Group’s total financial sector
company assets equaled over three trillion yuan. See New Fortune 2017 Reports,
supra note 197. For 2017 currency conversion rates, see Exchange Rates, supra note
18 and accompanying text. A 2017 report describing the conglomerate’s businesses
suggests that well over forty percent of Tomorrow Group’s assets were likely
financial sector companies at the time. See New Fortune FCC history, supra note
137.
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seemingly be classified as a “financial holding company” under the
EU’s regulatory approach, and would thus be subject to group-wide
supervision.
It is doubtful that the business mix and structure of the PRC’s
two IFCCs would be permitted in the EU. As of 2019, only nine
internet companies had been granted financial licenses by national
regulators in the Eurozone, and each of these licenses was quite
limited in scope. 362 Moreover, the European Central Bank is
reportedly considering an even stricter regulatory regime for
internet companies that offer financial services.363
iii. Under the Japanese Model, Some FCCs Could Operate, but the
Largest Would Likely be Prohibited
Japan’s approach towards the regulation of companies
structured similarly to Mainland China’s FCCs is also more
accommodating relative to the U.S.’s. Corporate groups that control
various sizable financial and non-financial companies are subject to
differing degrees of regulation by the Financial Supervision
Authority (“FSA”)—Japan’s banking, insurance, and securities
market regulator—depending on the facts and circumstances
surrounding the relationship between a corporate group and the
financial companies it controls.
In Japan, if one company owns over fifty percent of shareholder
voting rights of another company, then the latter company is
considered a subsidiary of the former. 364 A holding company is
defined as “a company for which the ratio of the total acquisition
value (or other value if it is so listed in the latest balance sheet) of
the shares of subsidiary companies to the total assets of said
company exceeds fifty percent.” 365 Companies that meet this
See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 8, at 7.
See Martin Arnold, EU Regulators Monitor Big Tech’s Financial Services Foray,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/27f965da-e5bf-11e8-8a8504b8afea6ea3 [https://perma.cc/4HWH-6YJB].
364
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 2(8),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (unofficial English translation).
365 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
Trade
(Act
No.
54
of
April
14,
1947),
art.
9(4)(i),
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/policy_enforcement/cartels_bidriggings/anti_cartel_f
iles/The_Antimonopoly_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DKM-M7XD] (unofficial
English translation).
362
363
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definition of a holding company and have at least one bank or
insurance company subsidiary are defined as “bank holding
companies” (“Japanese BHCs”) and “insurance holding companies”
(“Japanese IHCs”), respectively,366 and their business is restricted to
managing subsidiaries under their control.367
Certain FCCs—as defined in this Article—can exist under
Japan’s regulatory model. An example of such a company is
Rakuten, Inc., which engages in a variety of e-commerce and
internet services businesses, and also controls large financial
companies.368 Yet although one of its subsidiaries controls a bank
and insurance companies, 369 Rakuten, Inc. is not regulated as a
Japanese BHC or IHC because it does not meet the Japanese legal
definition of a holding company.370 Nevertheless, in 2017, almost
forty percent of Rakuten, Inc.’s total sales reportedly came from
financial sector activities.371 Large non-financial conglomerates can
also directly control a Japanese BHC or IHC—for example, Sony
Corporation owns over sixty-five percent of Sony Financial
Holdings, which controls a bank and insurance companies.372
366
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 2(13),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
art.
2(16),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
367
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-21,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
art.
271-21,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
368
See RAKUTEN, ANNUAL SECURITIES REPORT (“YUKASHOKEN-HOKOKUSHO”):
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017 AND 2018, at 6-7 (2019).
369
Announcement of Agreement Regarding Group Reorganization, RAKUTEN (Feb.
12, 2019), https://global.rakuten.com/corp/news/press/2019/0212_01.html
[https://perma.cc/DHB8-5KFS].
370
For Japan’s legal definition of a holding company, see supra notes 364-365,
and accompanying text. The total acquisition value of the shares of Rakuten’s
subsidiaries is worth less than half of its total company assets. See RAKUTEN, supra
note 368, at 104, 255 (reporting Rakuten, Inc.’s total assets and its capital
investments into its subsidiaries).
371
See Minami Funakoshi & Sam Nussey, Rakuten Seeks to Boost Financial
Services with $415 Million Asahi Fire & Marine Deal, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-rakuten/rakuten-seeks-to-boost-fina
ncial-services-with-415-million-asahi-fire-marine-deal-idUSKBN1FH0ZX
[https://perma.cc/4DNH-349H].
372
Sony Financial Group Structure, SONY FIN. HOLDINGS (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.sonyfh.co.jp/en/company/structure.html
[https://perma.cc/9R3Q-XMNE].
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Japanese non-financial business entities that control financial
companies are nevertheless subject to FSA regulations. In Japan, a
“major shareholder” of a bank or insurer is generally defined to
include a legal person who controls twenty percent or more of
voting shares of a bank, insurer, BHC, or IHC.373 Becoming a “major
shareholder” with the intent to remain one for over a year requires
regulatory approval, 374 and relative to Mainland China, in recent
years, Japan more strictly monitored transfers of bank shares. 375
Additionally, a “major shareholder” can be required to provide
regulators with: (i) access to materials that can be used to evaluate
the state of a bank’s or insurer’s business;376 and (ii) the ability to
perform on-site inspections of the “major shareholder.”377 The FSA
can also order the “major shareholder” to take measures to ensure
the “sound and appropriate management of the business of” a bank

373
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), arts. 2(9)-(10),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
2(13)-(14),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
374
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-9(1)-(2),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
271-10(1)-(2),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
375 Compare IMF, Japan: Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed Assessment
of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Country Report
No. 17/282, at 56-58 (2017) (observing that Japan is “less than compliant” but not
“materially non-compliant” with international standards agreed upon by central
banks related to monitoring the transfer of ownership of shares in banks) with IMF,
supra note 222 and accompanying text (explaining that in 2017, the PRC was
“materially non-compliant” with these standards).
376
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-11,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
271-12,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
377
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-12,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
271-13,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
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or insurer,378 or require the “major shareholder” to divest.379 Most
of Mainland China’s FCCs would be subject to these rules under a
Japanese-style regulatory regime.380
Moreover, Japan’s Antimonopoly Act prohibits the
establishment of a “company which constitutes an excessive
concentration of economic power,” thus limiting the scope of any
conglomerate’s business activities. 381
Japan’s Fair Trade
Commission (“JFTC”) sets definitions for such companies, one of
which is a company that controls directly, or through a subsidiary
or a “virtual subsidiary,”382 both: i) a financial company with over
fifteen trillion yen in total assets; and ii) a non-financial business
with total assets exceeding over 300 billion yen.383 It seems that by
2017-18 CITIC Group met this definition,384 and several other large

378
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-14,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
271-15,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
379
Banking Act (Act No. 59 of June 1, 1981), art. 52-15,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/bank01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4MNXQNWG] (English translation); Insurance Business Act (Act No. 105 of June 7, 1995),
arts.
271-16,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/ins01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5Y-5E64] (unofficial English translation).
380
At least twenty-one FCCs own over twenty percent of a bank while at least
seventeen FCCs own over twenty percent of an insurer. See New Fortune 2017
Reports, supra note 197; see infra Appendix B.
381
FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES CONCERNING COMPANIES WHICH
CONSTITUTE AN EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, Preface (Nov. 12,
2002),
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines_files/Compan
y_Concentration.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RJD-EYR7].
382
The guidelines generally define a subsidiary as a “company in Japan in
which greater than [fifty] percent of its total voting right . . . given to all the stock
holders (or all the individual members) is owned by another company.” Id. §
1(1)(b). A “virtual subsidiary” is defined as a “company in Japan in which greater
than twenty-five percent and fifty percent or less of its total voting right is owned
by the company (including those owned by its subsidiaries . . .) and in which its
voting rights are the largest among all the holders.” Id. § 1(1)(c).
383 Id. § 2(3) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 2 definition of a group that constitutes
an “excessive concentration of economic power”).
384
In 2018, total assets of CITIC Ltd.’s financial services, resources and energy,
manufacturing, engineering contracting, and real estate businesses were 7.1 trillion,
132 billion, 135 billion, 55 billion, and 155 billion Hong Kong Dollars, respectively.
CITIC 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 288, at 2. In 2018, 1 Hong Kong dollar
equaled about 14.1 yen. See Exchange Rates, supra note 18.
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FCCs did as well. 385 Accordingly, these FCCs would likely be
subject to regulatory scrutiny and could have been prohibited from
forming under a Japan-style regulatory regime.
Another definition used by JFTC is a company group with total
assets exceeding 15 trillion yen that controls five or more companies,
each of which has revenue exceeding 600 billion yen and operates in
a different business area.386 Business areas are narrowly determined
using the Japan Standard Industrial Classification system 387 —
examples include “building materials,” “iron and steel products,”
and “banks.”388 Under a third definition, the 15 trillion yen total
assets threshold is removed and replaced with conditions that: (i)
each of five companies controlled by a conglomerate maintains a 10
percent or higher “sales share” in its respective field of business, or
just three, depending on if one company “possesses a substantial
position over a principal field of business with extremely vast scale”;
and (ii) fields of business in which the company engages are
“interrelated.”389 Financial services such as banking, credit cards,
insurance, and securities business are considered interrelated. 390
Thus, if Japan’s regulatory model were applied in Mainland China,
Alibaba could potentially be considered a company with “excessive
385
In 2017, three other primarily non-financial FCCs (China Everbright
Group, China Merchants Group, and Evergrande Group) controlled a bank with
over 900 million yuan in assets via an over twenty-five percent ownership stake,
and thus likely met this definition. See supra note 382 and accompanying text
(explaining the JFTC’s “virtual subsidiary” threshold); see infra Appendix B;
Exchange Rates, supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing a 16.595 yen to
yuan 2017 conversion rate).
386
FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(2) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 1
definition of a group that constitutes an “excessive concentration of economic
power”).
387 Id., § 2(2)(d) (explaining that, with regards to the JFTC’s Type 1 definition,
“‘[p]rinciple fields of business’ shall be types of industries which are included in
the 3-digit classifications of the Japan Standard Industrial Classification and in
which shipment volume exceeds 600 billion”).
388 See Industrial Classification used in the 2016 Economic Census for Business
Activity, STAT. BUREAU OF JAPAN, https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/ecensus/2016/industry.html [https://perma.cc/DD48-NM63].
389
FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(4) (detailing the JFTC’s Type 3
definition of a “company that causes an excessive concentration of economic
power”). See also Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A of Financial Institutions
in Japan: Big Bang Financial Deregulation and the New Environment for Corporate
Combinations of Financial Institutions, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 965, 1003-1006 (1998)
(explaining that “interrelatedness refers to a situation in which there are trade
relations among different fields of business, and goods or services from different
fields of business are complementary to or substitutes for one another”).
390
FAIR TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(3), list 2.
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concentration of economic power” according to this third
definition.391
c. Some Large FCCs are Uniquely Characterized by Complex CrossShareholding and Pyramid Structures in Which Intra-Group
Transactions are Prevalent
As Part III explained, some of Mainland China’s FCCs grew to
be characterized by the widespread, combined usage of pyramid
structures and cross-shareholdings within mixed conglomerates
that engage in high levels of intra-group transactions. Historically,
pyramid structures were prevalent in South and East Asia—
particularly Mainland China—as well as some European countries,
but are now quite rare in much of the EU, Japan, and the United
States.392 In the United States and Europe, instances of intra-group
cross-shareholdings are not common, and cross-shareholdings are
on the decline in Japan as well, despite being prevalent in the past.393

391
In 2018, Alipay accounted for twenty-four percent of third-party internet
payments and Ant Financial accounted for over twenty-five percent of MMF assets.
See YOUNGER, YAO, LEI & LUK, supra note 206, at 7, 9. Data shows that Alibaba also
accounts for over half of internet retail sales. See Alibaba, JD.com Lead in China, but a
Few Others Are Making Dents, Too, EMARKETER (Jun. 2, 2019),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/alibaba-jd-com-lead-in-china-but-a-few-ot
hers-are-making-dents-too [https://perma.cc/2K8U-6VE9].
A close “trade
relationship” between these financial businesses and Alibaba’s e-commerce
business may, under the Japanese regulatory approach, arguably exist. See FAIR
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 381, § 2(4)(d)(i) (categorizing “trade relationships” as a
way in which fields of business can be “interrelated”).
392 See Bubchuck, Kraakman & Triantis, supra note 225, at 7; INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 27 (2007), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/final_report_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FE3T-7JEW] (finding that some European companies use
pyramid structures); Jason W. Howell, The Dual Class Stock Structure in the United
States: A New Dataset and an Examination of Firms Who Leave the Structure 29
(May,
2010)
(Ph.D.
Dissertation,
University
of
Georgia),
https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/howell_jason_w_201005_phd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJN4-32BH] (observing that pyramid structures are rare in the
U.S. but common in other countries); Kim, supra note 336, at 13 (finding that the
“pyramidal ownership structure . . . is relatively rare in the Japanese economy”).
393 See Howell, supra note 392, at 29; INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note
392, at 48; Tatsuhisa Shirakabe, Corporate Japan Sheds More Cross-Shareholdings,
NIKKEI ASIA (Sep. 5, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Businesstrends/Corporate-Japan-sheds-more-cross-shareholdings
[https://perma.cc/HWW8-KYGJ].
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Indeed, between 1996 and 2011, in response to a range of policy
reforms that facilitated more diversified ownership structures,
overall shareholdings by Japanese banks and insurers in other
companies dropped precipitously from over thirty-five percent to
about seven percent of publicly-traded equity shares. 394 Overall,
cross-shareholdings equaled just ten percent of Japan’s 2018 stock
market capitalization, versus thirty-four percent in 1990. 395
Certainly, some regional banks in Japan still maintain significant
cross-shareholding levels. 396 Yet overall, cross-shareholdings are
continuing to decline in Japan, reportedly due to recently
implemented revisions to its corporate governance code, as well as
enhancements to securities regulations, which require that each
publicly-listed company disclose its sixty largest investments in
other companies and state whether any are cross-shareholdings.397
These rules aim to help ensure that ownership relationships are
better understood not only for publicly-traded large banks, but also
at most of Japan’s regional banks, of which approximately threequarters are publicly-listed.398
Thus, despite the modest persistence of cross-shareholdings in
Japan, Japanese mixed conglomerates are not structured in a way
that resembles those of Mainland China’s more complex FCCs,
which exhibit both cross-shareholding and pyramid structures, as
well as relatively high levels of preferential transactions between
financial and non-financial affiliates. Indeed, by 2008, survey data
showed that significant transactions between related parties—
394 See Hideaki Miyajima & Takaaki Hoda, Ownership Structure and Corporate
Governance: Has an Increase in Institutional Investors’ Ownership Improved Business
Performance? 11 POL’Y RES. INST., MIN. OF FIN., JAPAN, PUB. POL’Y REV. 361, 367 (2015),
https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr029/ppr029a.p
df [https://perma.cc/8RTJ-ZJ3T].
395 See Shirakabe, supra note 393.
396 See Leo Lewis, Japan’s Cross-Shareholding Still a Tough Habit to Break, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4a89c3a0-cadc-11e7-aa33c63fdc9b8c6c [https://perma.cc./5MNE-YUJQ].
397
See Satoshi Uchida, Governance Demands Chip Away at Japanese CrossShareholdings,
NIKKEI
ASIA
(Jul.
8,
2019),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Governance-demands-chipaway-at-Japanese-cross-shareholdings [https://perma.cc/AW56-K379].
398
Seventy-nine regional banks are publicly listed in Japan. See Regional Banks
in
Trouble,
JAPAN
TIMES
(May
11,
2019),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/05/11/editorials/regional-bankstrouble/ [https://perma.cc/7GFQ-5WMQ]. In total, Japan has 102 regional banks.
List
of
Licensed
(registered)
Financial
Institutions,
FSA,
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/regulated/licensed/index.html
[https://perma.cc/67HX-X3EE] (reporting data from April 2019 and January 2020).
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including intra-group transactions, a source of risk for crossshareholding structures 399 —occurred at less than four percent of
Japan’s listed companies.400 Moreover, transactions between banks
and a “related person” not conducted according to prevailing
market terms are generally prohibited in Japan, and the term
“related person” is defined to include: (i) a bank’s subsidiary or
affiliate; (ii) a bank’s major shareholder(s) as well as subsidiaries or
affiliates of the major shareholder(s); and (iii) any entity holding
over fifty percent of voting rights in the bank and its subsidiaries or
affiliates. 401 Conversely, some research finds that by 2015, over
ninety percent of listed firms in Mainland China engaged in related
party transactions.402
EU mixed conglomerates also are not characterized by both
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings, as well as high levels
of affiliated transactions. Certainly, in some EU countries such as
Spain, pyramid structures are not rare,403 and can be used to control
financial companies. 404 Yet the low, twenty percent investment
threshold set by the EU’s Directive 2002/87/EC for determining
whether or not a non-financial conglomerate controls a financial
institution takes into account whether “dominant influence” exists
and both indirect and direct ownership. 405 Thus, from the
perspective of whether supplemental supervision is applicable, it
appears that there is little difference between using pyramid
structures to acquire a bank, insurer, or investment company in the
EU versus more direct approaches. Moreover, although EU
See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
See OECD, RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS 31 (2012).
401 See TATSUO TEZUKA, TAKU ISHIZU, MASAO MORISHITA, SUSUMU TANIZAWA,
JAPAN in BANKING REGULATION IN 27 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 77 (Craig Wasserman
ed.,
2009),
https://www.jurists.co.jp/sites/default/files/tractate_pdf/en/200905_tezuka_is
hizu_morishita_tanizawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CK-YSXP]. For definitions of
the terms “subsidiary” and “major shareholder,” see supra notes 364, 373 and
accompanying text.
402 See Kim, supra note 336, at 19 n.62.
403
See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 392, at 27 (finding
meaningful prevalence of pyramid ownership structures in Belgium, France, Spain,
Luxembourg, and Italy).
404 See Valentín Azofra & Marcos Santamaría, Ownership, Control, and Pyramids
in Spanish Commercial Banks, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 1464 (2011),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426610004218
[https://perma.cc/J6CK-YSXP].
405 See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
399
400
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financial conglomerates can be quite complex (with hundreds of
business units), once a corporate group is subject to supplemental
supervision pursuant to Directive 2002/87/EC, regulators pay
particularly close attention to risks such as multiple leveraging and
intra-group conflicts-of-interest.406
V. CONCLUSION
The large role that FCCs play across Mainland China’s financial
system is globally unparalleled, and presents its regulators with a
multifaceted challenge. The complex ownership structures that
have emerged within FCCs are difficult to understand, and can
create opaque interconnectivity not only within corporate groups
but between them. As a result, it may be very difficult to know
whether a particular FCC in Mainland China is adequately
capitalized, and what impacts its failure would have on the
economy.
FCCs emerged in Mainland China not only due to Leninist
influences and the embrace of cross-sector integration that gave rise
to the first SFCCs, but also thanks to unclear definitions in
regulations and laws, insufficiently rigorous supervision, regulatory
arbitrage precipitated by gaping legal loopholes, and frequent caseby-case exceptions throughout the 2000s that enabled FCCs to grow
through investments in banks and insurers. Simple, time-tested
approaches to financial markets regulation, such as ensuring the
regular and accurate disclosure of meaningful intra-group
transactions and bank and insurer shareholders, as well as
implementing sound supervisory frameworks to prevent multiple
leveraging, would go quite far in mitigating potential economic risks
posed by Mainland China’s FCCs. While some recent efforts by
regulators may align with these objectives, it seems that late 2020
PBOC regulations have legitimized certain FCC structures,
suggesting that FCCs may remain a unique phenomenon of the
Chinese financial system for years to come.
Indeed, as this Article’s application of the EU’s, Japan’s, and the
United States’ respective regulatory frameworks to Mainland
406 See Valentina Peleckiene, Kęstutis Peleckis & Gitana Dudzevičiūtė, New
Challenges of Supervising Financial Conglomerates, 5 INTELL. ECON. 298, 305 (2011),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c23f/90b99f9730f857d6b9b07440139abcd1c8ca.
pdf.
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China’s FCCs makes clear, the complexity, size, and cross-sector
structures of some of these groups remain far outside the bounds of
international norms, and even simple approaches to adequately
supervising FCCs may not be easy to implement. This analysis also
illustrates important trade-offs as new regulatory approaches for
FCCs are considered. More broadly, this Article should serve as a
wake-up call to regulators and market participants to be concerned
about risks caused by Mainland China’s FCCs, and will help those
seeking to better understand how the structures and activities of
these entities could change as new regulations are promulgated.
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VI. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: THIRTY-FOUR FCCS (2017)407
FCC name

Selected major non-financial business line(s)

Tomorrow Group

energy; media; technology; tourism; real estate
e-commerce; healthcare; infrastructure; real estate;
technology
aviation; tourism; real estate
aviation; construction; communications; energy;
infrastructure; manufacturing; power generation; metals
and minerals production; real estate; transportation
energy; healthcare; pharmaceuticals; property
management; real estate; tourism
communications; e-commerce; logistics; information
technology
construction; consumer products; energy; healthcare;
logistics; infrastructure; manufacturing; real estate
power transmission
real estate; tourism

Ping An Group
HNA Group
CITIC Group
China Everbright Group
Alibaba
China Merchants Group
State Grid Corp. of China
Anbang Group
Aviation Industry Corp.
of China
China Huaneng Group
China Minmetals
China Oceanwide
Holdings Group
Funde Group
China National
Petroleum Corporation
Wanxiang Group
Baoneng Group
China Baowu Steel
Group
China Oil & Foodstuffs
Corp.
China Resources
Huaxin Huitong Group
Tencent

Est. number of financial
companies controlled
22
9
8
7
7
6
6
6
5

aviation; manufacturing; military

5

power generation; technology; transportation
metals and minerals production; real estate;
transportation

5

energy; information technology; real estate; tourism

4

energy; entertainment; logistics; real estate

4

energy; oil/gas production

4

energy; manufacturing
logistics; manufacturing; real estate; tourism

4
3

energy; steel production

3

agricultural products; foodstuffs production; real estate

3

construction; consumer products; oil/gas production;
power generation; real estate; pharmaceuticals
logistics; information technology; real estate; tourism
communications; e-commerce; entertainment; logistics;
information technology

5

3
3
3

407
For the methodology used to develop this list of FCCs and determine the
number of financial companies controlled by each FCC, see supra notes 5, 197 and
accompanying text. This article only considers nine types of financial companies.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Information on non-financial business
lines was compiled using company websites and the following financial data and
information sources: Bloomberg; Reuters; TianYanCha; Wind.
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China National Offshore
Oil Corp.
China Railway Group
China Zhongwang
Group
Evergrande Group
Haier Group
Hongda Group
JuneYao Group
Nanshan Group
Shougang Group
Sinochem Group
State Power Investment
Corp.
Suning Commerce
Group
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energy; power generation; oil/gas production

2

infrastructure; real estate; manufacturing; transportation

2

manufacturing; metals and minerals production

2

construction; consumer products; foodstuffs production;
healthcare; manufacturing; real estate; tourism
consumer products; manufacturing
chemicals and metals production; logistics; real estate;
transportation
aviation; consumer products; foodstuffs production;
tourism; transportation
aviation; construction; consumer products;
manufacturing; metals and minerals production; real
estate; tourism
construction; logistics; metals and minerals production;
real estate; steel production
agricultural products; chemicals and metals production;
energy
energy; metals and minerals production; power
generation
consumer products; e-commerce; logistics

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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APPENDIX B: TWENTY-ONE FCCS WITH A SIGNIFICANT
MAINLAND CHINA BANK INVESTMENT (2016-17)408
FCC name
China Merchants
Group
CITIC Group
Funde Holding
Group
China Everbright
Group
Ping An Group
Shougang Group
State Grid Corp. of
China

Tomorrow Group

Evergrande Group
Anbang Group
China National
Petroleum Corp.
Haier Group
China Oil &
Foodstuffs Corp.
China Resources
China Zhongwang
Group
Nanshan Group
China Minmetals
Alibaba
Tencent
HNA Group
JuneYao Group

Name of bank controlled (“C”) or
influenced (“I”) by FCC as of 2016

Q2 2017 Banking
Assets (yuan)

FCC's estimated %
of bank shares

China Merchants Bank (C)

6,199,690,000,000

29.97%

CITIC Bank (C)

5,651,216,000,000

65.97%

Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (I)

5,915,395,000,000

20.68%

China Everbright Bank (C)

4,033,546,000,000

29.00%

Ping An Bank (C)
Huaxia Bank (I)

3,092,142,000,000
2,423,098,000,000

57.94%
20.28%

China Guangfa Bank (I)

1,992,227,000,000

20.00%

Baoshang Bank (C)
Harbin Bank (C)
Guangdong Huaxing Bank (C)
Bank of Weifang (C)
Tai'an Bank (C)
Shenyang Rural Commercial Bank (C)
Shengjing Bank (C)
Chengdu Rural Commerical Bank (C)

546,615,738,304
546,927,086,000
122,867,736,462
103,627,719,616*
60,421,695,162
39,814,000,000**
938,711,110,000
671,305,946,542

37.56%
25.93%
27.02%
38.86%
45.91%
30.00%
27.24%
35.00%

Bank of Kunlun (C)

301,192,438,996

77.10%

Bank of Qingdao (C)

281,976,231,000

19.06%

Longjiang Bank (I)

245,573,282,900

20.00%

China Resources Bank (C)

142,236,495,724

75.33%

Bank of Liaoyang (C)

126,343,524,103

31.46%

Yantai Bank (C)
Mianyang City Commercial Bank (C)
MYbank (C)
WeBank (C)
Yingkou Coastal Bank (C)
Shanghai Huarui Bank (C)

74,305,251,158
71,126,740,368
61,522,357,612*
51,995,491,724*
50,744,737,928
30,983,499,686

34.86%
20.00%
30.00%
30.00%
24.80%
30.00%

408
For more information on how this Appendix was developed, see supra
notes 197, 200 and accompanying text. A “*” designates that due to mid-year data
availability issues, year-end 2016 data, as reported by Wind, was used rather than
Q2 2017 banking asset data. A “**” designates that due to data availability issues,
2015 data on banking assets, as reported by New Fortune, was used.
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